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This thesis develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of spectator-participation 
in live art by examining the performance practices of Guillermo Gómez-Peña’s La 
Pocha Nostra, Marina Abramović, and Gob Squad. It explores the potentialities and 
limitations of participation from all sides of the performance border, drawing on my 
experiences as a performing-spectator, watching-spectator, and as an artist-collaborator 
with La Pocha Nostra. Unravelling the relationship between these roles, it reveals how 
participation can create a new hierarchy amongst spectators. The thesis offers a new 
way of looking at the phenomenology of participatory live art by determining these 
encounters as a complex network of contradictory and interdependent relations, 
underlined by the “paradox of participation”: the duality of holding the position of both 
performer and spectator at the same time. Accordingly, it argues that these 
performances constitute a “symmathesy” of participation, to use Nora Bateson’s term, 
which should be viewed as a whole experience rather than as a series of parts. 
Advancing on from “the emancipated spectator”, as outlined by Jacques Rancière, the 
study reconsiders its meaning within live art. In doing so, it demonstrates how ritual, 
presence and ethics converge to underpin the transformative and emergent processes 
that foster and manage participation, while acknowledging the way that imposed 
sanctions serve to uphold the performance. Moreover, it maintains that spectator-
participation has developed into a practice in its own right, and charts the birth of a new 
breed of spectator who anticipates the possibility of co-creation. It recognises several 
emerging types of participant, namely the “expert participant-spectator” and the more 
transgressive “dis-spectator”. The thesis establishes that participation can offer 
spectators a licence to act in ways outside of their everyday political and social reality, 
at the same time; it calls attention to the lack of consideration and after-care given to 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 The First Encounter: La Pocha Nostra’s Ex Centris (2003)  
It is March 2003. I am attending an exhibition entitled Live Culture at the Tate Modern, 
in partnership with the Live Art Development Agency. It is here that I have my first 
encounter with spectator-participation in the work of Guillermo Gómez-Peña1 and his 
performance group, La Pocha Nostra. As I step into the “total” environment2 of Ex-
Centris (A Living Diorama of Fetish-ized Others), I witness a series of intercultural 
specimens displayed on raised platforms of varying heights. The exhibits parody and 
subvert colonial modes of representation, enhanced by a heady mix of live and recorded 
music, multiple video projections, lighting effects, embalmed animals, and old-
fashioned and popular culture artefacts. In this heightened state I notice Gómez-Peña 
attracting a small crowd of spectators around an emerging diorama, as he attempts to 
construct a “human mural”3 with the more adventurous audience members (See Gómez-
Peña 2005: 83-84, and 119-120). He beseeches onlookers: “Is there anyone who is 
willing to co-create with me?” and I find myself drawn into his commanding presence. 
In an uncharacteristic moment of spontaneity, I volunteer to participate. 
 
It was with some trepidation that I left my fellow spectators and made my way to the 
raised platform. I knew that in crossing the border4 I had entered into an invisible 
contract and I was wary of them taking more than I was willing to give. I was thereupon 
                                                          
1 Chicano performance artist, writer, activist, and teacher, Guillermo Gómez-Peña has produced many 
seminal performance art pieces. The most infamous is The Couple in the Cage with Coco Fusco (1992-
1993). He is the director of the performance group La Pocha Nostra. 
2 See Guillermo Gómez-Peña (2005: 81) for an explanation of how they create a “total” environment.  
3 A “human mural” involves staging a series of shifting “tableaux vivants” or “living pictures”. See 
Guillermo Gómez-Peña (2005: 83-84, and 119-120) for further details on the “human mural” exercise. 




greeted by a female La Pocha Nostra member, who quietly asked me if I would mind 
“losing” some of my clothes. In the hours that preceded my crossing I had witnessed La 
Pocha Nostra’s aesthetic, and it could be said that I felt a “special complicity”5 with 
their work. Nonetheless, the idea of stripping off in public was both exhilarating and 
unnerving, and I felt compelled to retain some control over the situation. It was agreed 
that I would lose my top, but with the condition that I could put it back on whenever I 
wished. Beyond the border, I was beginning to draw up my own boundaries. 
 
Over the duration of my encounter, an ever-evolving group of participants lost their 
clothes and to a greater extent their everyday identities as we improvised a series of 
shifting tableaux vivants in response to suggestions given by Gómez-Peña and the 
watching-spectators, which included “a Postcard to President Bush” and “The End of 
the World”. There was a strong feeling of togetherness amongst my community of co-
participants, and a kind of telepathy developed between our bodies as we created in the 
moment. At last, Gómez-Peña declared that we had found the “final image”, and the 
diorama revealed my half-naked body, complete with Native American headdress, in a 
co-dependant pose with a naked female, who was wearing a Mexican hat and armed 





                                                          
5 See Adam Alston (2013: 129) for an insightful account of Michael Fried’s expression “special 





Figure 1: The “final image” of Ex Centris. Photo: Hugo Glendinning.6 
 
I recall the sensation and colour of her skin against mine, our difference all the more 
visible through our co-presence. In crossing the border I had been transformed into an 
Other;7 I had “lost” my clothes, my identity, and I was on the other side of the 
performance. By now a number of journalists and photographers had joined the large 
crowd of spectators. As my muscles strained to maintain the image, and with my gaze 
transfixed in the distance, a sea of cameras flashed and snapped: this was my “fifteen 
minutes”.8 And then the performance was over, and as I struggled to gather up both my 
thoughts and clothes, my fellow participants had dispersed into the crowd, beyond my 
recognition. 
 
                                                          
6 The source for the image is (Gómez-Peña 2005: 121). 
7 The term “Other” is used here as constructed in Colonial discourse, as ‘crucial to the binding of a range 
of differences and discriminations that informs the discursive and political practices of racial and cultural 
hierarchization’ (Bhabha, 1994: 67). 
8 This expression is taken from Andy Warhol, who notoriously said that “everyone will be world-famous 




In the ‘aftermath’9 of the performance, I felt euphoric and transformed by my 
embodied knowledge.  However, this was shortly followed by a sense of loss and 
displacement, as on returning to the audience it quickly became apparent that my newly 
acquired celebrity was short-lived. Gómez-Peña states: 
Once the performance is over and people walk away, my hope is that a process 
of reflection gets triggered in their perplexed psyches. If the performance is 
effective (I didn’t say good, but effective), this process can last for several 
weeks, even months. The questions and dilemmas embodied in the images and 
rituals I present can continue to haunt the spectator’s dreams, memories, and 
conversations. (2005: 25) 
 
It is this ‘haunting’ that Gómez-Peña refers to, which underpins my analysis as I 
continue to wrestle with the complexities of my experience. 
   
1.2 General Introduction and Aims 
This thesis is offered as a timely and open-eyed examination of the emancipation of 
spectators within participatory live art. The title refers to ‘the morning after (the night 
before)’ in recognition of the mixed emotions10 which can arise as a result of one’s 
encounter with participation. But, more generally, the title adopts this well-known 
phrase to suggest that after an abundance of participatory works, we are entering a 
period of awakening whereupon we can reflect on the implications and possibilities of 
this practice.  
 
Since the turn of the Millennium there has been a sea change in the production of 
contemporary performance and the visual arts towards more participatory, interactive 
and immersive forms of spectatorship. The increasing number of invitations for 
                                                          
9 The term ‘aftermath’ ‘is the long term consequences or follow-through of a performance’, as defined by 
Richard Schechner (1985: 19).   
10 These mixed emotions are detailed in section 3.12: ‘Consequences and Potentialities of “Playing”’, and 
include euphoria, embarrassment and regret. 
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audiences to participate or collaborate in performance has led to Time Out offering a 
dedicated ‘Immersive theatre in London’ listing. I suggest that we are now at a juncture 
where the proliferation of participatory practice and the upsurge in critical dialogue 
surrounding participatory aesthetics (evident in the writings of Jacques Rancière, 
Nicholas Bourriaud, Claire Bishop, Jen Harvie, Josephine Machon, Adam Alston, and 
Gareth White, amongst others) enable us to take stock of what is given and what is 
taken when the audience is invited to participate in the art.  
 
This thesis aims to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the function 
and effects of participatory practice in live art. It will examine the processes, pleasures 
and potential pitfalls of inviting the audience to co-create the art. The investigation 
works to elucidate new insights on established discussions surrounding participation, 
and to draw attention to several important areas of analysis which currently lack 
research. As such, it will acknowledge the significance of concepts such as ritual, 
presence and ethics on participation, and afford them the consideration that they 
deserve. The thesis offers a new way of looking at the phenomenology of participatory 
live art by determining these encounters as a complex network of contradictory and 
interdependent relations, underlined by the “paradox of participation”: the duality of 
holding the position of both performer and spectator at the same time. Accordingly, it 
argues that these performances constitute a “symmathesy” of participation, to use Nora 
Bateson’s term, which should be viewed as a whole experience rather than as a series of 
parts. This thesis also proposes an emerging field of spectator-participation as a practice 
in its own right. Accordingly, it charts the birth of a new breed of spectator, whose 
needs, sensitivities, boundaries, and perceptions have evolved along with the escalating 
ambitions and innovations of practitioners working with the audience. It follows a 
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growing expectation amongst spectators of live art to co-create with the artist, to ‘do 
something’, and a tendency to see themselves not just as audience members, but as 
‘insiders’ and ‘part-time’ artists (Gómez-Peña 2005: 54). My analysis considers the 
specialist skills, attributes, and ethical code that underscore what it means to ‘give good 
audience’ as a participant-spectator (Heddon, Iball, Zerihan 2012: 124). It also 
determines how participation can create a hierarchy amongst spectators, as well as 
giving rise to “expert participant-spectators” and the more transgressive “dis-spectator”. 
 
The notion of “the emancipated spectator” as outlined by Jacques Rancière (2007, 
2009) informs many of the arguments that concern audience participation, and my study 
is no exception. However, this thesis goes beyond Rancière’s theory situated in the 
context of the theatre, to reconsider its meaning from the perspective of live art. As a 
live art audience is frequently freed from a seated position in a darkened auditorium, my 
consideration of emancipation is largely directed at the binary of activity and passivity 
in relation to the spectator’s role. It works to offer another insight on “the emancipated 
spectator” in the guise of the participant who is released from their everyday social and 
political reality, even if only until the performance ends.  
 
There are varying forms of participatory practice belonging to live art, including one-
to-one performance, relational art, social works, and immersive theatre. My analysis 
focuses on some of the most extreme models of audience participation employed in the 
work of three leading live artists and companies: Guillermo Gómez-Peña’s performance 
group La Pocha Nostra, Marina Abramović, and Gob Squad. These practitioners have 
been at the forefront of experiments with the audience and they continue to pioneer new 
strategies to foster participation. The performance works selected for discussion can all 
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be described as what Claire Bishop calls “delegated performance” (2008: 111), in the 
way that they invite spectators to complete the work. The case study performances that I 
will examine do not neatly fit into any singular definition of participatory practice; 
however, they all share a desire to engage the audience socially and through an 
embodied experience. They also acknowledge the presence of a watching-spectator, 
which I suggest both complicates and adds a further dimension to the notion of the 
emancipated spectator.  
 
Alongside my critical analysis as a scholar, this study will draw on the embodied 
knowledge that I have gained from three perspectives: as a performing-spectator, a 
watching-spectator, and as an artist collaborator. The discussion explores these varying 
roles in what follows; drawing on the anecdotal evidence of my own encounters 
alongside the analysis of critical theories emerging from live art, performance studies, 
philosophy and the visual arts. Together these perspectives will interpret an aesthetic of 
participation within a contemporary social and cultural context, to reveal the ways in 
which participation can be socially and politically enabling, but also limiting and 
divisive. 
 
In this introductory chapter I will outline my research methodology, as well as 
identify trends and developments in the field of immersive and participatory practice. 
This is followed by a tracing of the origins of spectator-participation within live art and 
related forms. I suggest that there are important lessons to be learnt from the past, which 
have impacted on more recent artistic models. This leads me to introduce the case study 
artists at the centre of this investigation and how their work connects with earlier and 
current practices in participation. In the penultimate section I offer a survey of 
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noteworthy books, journal editions, and other study resources which are indicative of 
the ways in which the field has developed. Lastly, I offer a map of the thesis and an 
overview of the chapters that structure my investigation.  
 
1.3 Methodology  
From the early 2000s onwards there has been a burgeoning interest in audience 
participation from artists, curators, critics and commentators working inside and outside 
of live art, at a time when there has been a prevalence of interactive forms in popular 
culture more widely. Consequently, there has been a range of discourses deployed 
within and about participation from scholars working within the fields of performance 
studies, live art, contemporary visual art, and philosophy. Although the case studies 
under discussion are firmly situated within live art, they are also placed in dialogue with 
theoretical frameworks and scholarly discourses that mediate between art forms. While 
conducting a survey of literature on participation I have noted a frequent separation 
between theoretical writing around the work and the work itself. Even though I 
recognise that it can be helpful to distinguish between the perceptions of those that 
make the work and those that critique it; it is my intention to bring these perceptions 
together in the writing of this thesis. Therefore, I will be adopting the triple perspective 
of the spectator that experiences the work, the artist who makes the work, and the 
scholar who analyses it within the wider context of contemporary critical theory. I 
suggest that there are complex interactions to be found between these viewpoints, which 
extend understandings of participatory practice and its affective capacity. Together 




It is significant that each chapter begins with an anecdote of a participatory encounter 
that I have experienced because it places the work itself as the catalyst for that section 
of the study. Indeed, I discovered over the course of my investigation that rather than 
acting as a prelude to the “real” scholarly research being presented, these accounts were 
actually key to unlocking the pertinent themes and critical concepts to be pursued in 
relation to participation. Bridging the gap between the practice and the theory, this 
thesis locates my embodied knowledge as a spectator, in dialogue with the theoretical 
frameworks that surround participation.  
 
Since beginning this doctoral study, I have noted an increasing trend amongst 
academics in the field to use a combination of first-person accounts alongside scholarly 
writing (Jordan 2016: 116).11 This two-pronged analysis of participation can be seen to 
replicate the duality of the participant-spectator’s role both inside and outside of the 
performance.12 The use of first person accounts to underscore discussions on 
participatory and immersive work was particularly striking at the 24th Annual 
Conference of the German Society for Contemporary Drama in English (CDE) on 
“Theatre and Spectatorship”, hosted in Barcelona, June 2015.13 These researchers 
demonstrate the way that participatory performance transforms the spectator into a 
narrator of their own experience. Furthermore, they may be seen to represent an 
example of Rancière’s notion that: ‘[a]n emancipated community is in fact a community 
of storytellers’ (2007: 280). However, as Mireia Aragay and Enric Monforte note, the 
                                                          
11 There are some arguments within the thesis which first appeared in my Journal article for the Journal of 
Contemporary Drama in English (JCDE) 4(1), May, 2016, entitled: ‘On the Border of Participation: 
Spectatorship and the Interactive Rituals of Guillermo Gómez-Peña and La Pocha Nostra’. 
12 This condition of duality is discussed in section 3.3 and referred to as “the paradox of participation”. 
13 A notable amount of scholars including myself, Josephine Machon, Gareth White, Adam Alston, and 
Holly Maples incorporated anecdotal evidence into their conference papers. 
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stress on community ‘might be perceived to stand in tension with a recurrent emphasis 
in scholarly reflections on immersive, participatory work on the individual journey 
undertaken by each spectator-participant’ (2016: 8 emphasis original). Indeed, the 
significance of participation as a personal experience is indicative of the way in which 
these performances ultimately bring forth an encounter with the self.14   
 
An embodied approach to the study of participatory performance echoes Diana 
Taylor’s methodology, as outlined in her 2003 book The Archive and the Repertoire. 
Here Taylor states: ‘Performance, for me, functions as an episteme, a way of knowing, 
not simply an object of analysis (2003: xvi)’. It is also situated within the expanding 
field of Spectator-Participation-as-Research (SPaR), a term coined by Deidre Heddon, 
Helen Iball and Rachel Zerihan (2012: 122). In this thesis, SPaR is applied to all three 
case studies from the perspectives of a participant-spectator (to varying degrees), 
watching-spectator, and as a collaborative artist with La Pocha Nostra during a ten-day 
residency programme in Tucson, Arizona (2007).15   
 
Building on from the idea that the study of participation requires a personal 
approach, there are also a number of researchers who are making a timely contribution 
to empirical audience research on participation.16 As Helen Freshwater notes in Theatre 
& Audience (2009), this research methodology has been conspicuously ‘absent from 
theatre studies’ (2009: 29). Astrid Breel’s investigation into ‘Audience agency in 
                                                          
14 Participation as self-encounter is a reoccurring theme throughout the thesis, but particularly in sections 
3.12, and 4.6-4.9. 
15 La Pocha Nostra invited twenty-six international artists/academics to join them for an intensive 
residency programme in Tucson, Arizona, supported by the Museum of Contemporary Art (MOCA). The 
participants were introduced to the company’s radical performance pedagogy, working towards the 
realisation of a three-hour durational performance.  
16 The themed section on ‘Theatre Audiences’ for Participations: Journal of Audience & Reception 
Studies, May 2015, features several projects that draw on empirical research methods, including by Kirsty 
Sedgman, Astrid Breel and Julie Wilkinson.  
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participatory performance: A methodology for examining aesthetic experience’ (2015) 
takes a ‘mixed-method approach’ influenced by Participatory Action Research (PAR), 
which stresses ‘a socially constructed reality within which multiple interpretations of a 
single phenomenon are possible by both researchers and participants’ (Kind, Pain and 
Kesby, 2007: 13 in Breel 2015: 371). This emphasis on ‘collaborative knowledge 
production’ corresponds with the multiplicity of interpretation that participatory 
practices are known to produce, and resists a single analytical perspective (Ibid). This 
new direction by scholars has introduced some valuable processes in collecting data on 
participants’ experiences, as well as revealing some interesting responses. However, my 
methodology aims to unravel new understandings of participatory practice beginning 
first and foremost with my own experience of the case study performances. This 
strategy also supports my view that in all of the debates and critiques that surround 
participation, we shouldn’t lose sight of the experience itself.  
 
Nevertheless, I do not claim to speak for all spectators when I evaluate the 
performances under discussion, as each spectator will have their own unique perspective 
on their encounter. Shannon Jackson observes in her book Social Works: Performing 
art, supporting publics (2011):  
 Our evaluations of work depend not only upon critical histories but also upon 
 disciplinary perceptual habits that can make for drastically different 
 understandings of what we are in fact encountering.  Perceptions of stasis, 
 durationality, passivity and activity, stillness and action, might well be in the 
 eye (and body) of the beholder.  (2011: 4)   
 
Reflecting on my position as a researcher, I acknowledge that my background in 
contemporary theatre, performance studies, and live art gives the research a particular 
methodological slant. Therefore, in my reading of the case studies I am inclined to draw 
on critical concepts that emerge from and are regularly applied to these fields. This also 
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explains why some established critiques regarding participation are not attended to in 
great detail in this study, notably discourse around interactivity and digital performance. 
My interest lies with participatory encounters that are founded primarily as a “live”, 
face-to-face exchange between bodies, rather than as a purely technology-based 
experience; notwithstanding the fact that all of the case studies to some extent 
incorporate technology into the fabric of the work.  
 
The emphasis on a live encounter between bodies converges with processes 
associated with phenomenology and interpretation. Therefore, connections can be made 
with aspects of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) in my approach to 
research. IPA is a recent and rapidly developing qualitative study method that examines 
‘experience in its own terms’, particularly, important encounters that interrupt the flow 
of everyday life (J. A Smith, Flowers and Larking 2009: 1). While one could argue that 
all performance takes place in a liminal space outside of daily life, the experiences made 
available through the works in this study constitute a much more affective interruption 
from our everyday existence. In the crossing of the border between the performance 
space and the audience space we are given access to other roles and personas that go 
beyond our normal sense of self.  
 
IPA is founded on a hierarchy of experience; at the lowest level it suggests that we 
continuously and unselfconsciously engage in the everyday course of experience, 
whereas as soon as we become self-conscious of what is happening we ascend to what 
might be defined as “an experience” rather than just experience (J. A. Smith, Flowers 
and Larking, 2009, 2). In this way, all of the self-reflexive anecdotes that permeate this 
study are a testament to these encounters as an experience. Typically in IPA, when an 
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individual is engaged with an experience they reflect on what is happening to them and 
the researcher aims to interpret these reflections (Ibid., 3). As Jonathan A Smith and his 
co-authors note:  
 IPA shares the view that human beings are sense-making creatures, and 
 therefore the accounts which participants provide will reflect their attempts to 
 make sense of their experience. IPA also recognizes that access to experience 
 is always dependant on what participants tell us about that experience, and that 
 the researcher then needs to interpret that account from the participant in order 
 to understand their experience. (Ibid)     
   
This process of interpretation also becomes a phenomenological act in itself, as the 
participant is imprinted on the researcher, who attempts to make sense of the participant 
trying to make sense of what is happening to them. On the one hand, the researcher 
finds themselves employing the same conceptual skills as the participant, but on the 
other hand, they use these skills ‘more self-consciously and systematically’ (Ibid). 
However, as Breel points out, IPA is limited by the fact that while the participant’s 
‘reflection and articulation develops the “original” experience’ in order to make sense of 
it, it is inevitable that some of the complexity and affective nature of that experience 
will be lost in translation (2015: 372). Nonetheless, although first-person accounts of 
participation cannot fully impart the “original” experience, they do enable us to further 
understand the ways in which the participant makes sense of their exchange.  
 
My application of IPA differs from its usual usage in the respect that I am both the 
participant and the researcher simultaneously, which in a sense reflects the doubling of 
the performer/spectator role that comes into being during participatory performance. 
This duality within the research methodology lacks the objectivity that one would 
expect to find in IPA, although I have gained a new perspective on my written accounts 
as time has passed. Yet, it should be acknowledged that the anecdotal evidence that I 
22 
 
offer throughout the thesis is embodied with theoretical knowledge, which alters my 
perception of the experience itself. As Rachel Gomme concedes when discussing her 
subjective analysis of one-to-one performance: ‘My encounter is already being shaped 
by external structure and my own preconceptions, including, for myself as seasoned 
spectator, a degree of critical detachment that perhaps closes down the potential for 
intimate sharing’ (2015: 289). Likewise, it is evident that the more ‘seasoned’ in 
participation I have become, the less I have been inclined to physically interact in the 
work. However, in contrast, there are spectators who foster a greater attachment to 
participation because of their accumulated experience, as discussed in chapter three. 
Reflection and articulation concerning my first encounter with La Pocha Nostra is 
further complicated by “the document performance”,17 to use Rebecca Schneider’s term 
(Schneider 117-120 in Brine and Minton 2008). This has emerged in the form of both 
photographs and film footage which capture my participation; strengthening and 
potentially distorting my recollection of the live performance. Nevertheless, my 
variation on IPA, adopting both the position of the participant and the researcher, has 
the advantage that I can never be wholly divorced from the experience itself because the 
experience belongs to me.  
 
In recognising the limitations of my participatory experiences as primary research, I 
also wanted to incorporate the views of the artists responsible for making these works. 
This perspective was readily available from Gómez-Peña and Abramović, who have 
both authored several books and are frequently documented by others, as well as being 
                                                          
17 “The document performance” is a concept defined by Rebecca Schneider which distinguishes that the 
documentation of a performance is a performance in its own right. As such, it is received by an audience 
in its own time and space, while maintaining a connection to the original event. See (Schneider 117-120 




regular users of online social networks. Gob Squad, however, are not as well 
represented by publications; thus, to maintain a balance between the artists that feature 
in this study I requested an interview with core member, Sharon Smith.  
 
The 50-minute interview with Smith took place via Skype (see appendices), and 
usefully informs the writing throughout chapter five. It could also be said that this 
research method corresponds with IPA as a form of ‘collaborative knowledge 
production’. IPA regularly employs individual interviews, lasting typically forty-five to 
sixty minutes. The style of questions is often self-selecting to enable a particular 
perspective, and they focus on the participant’s sense-making of their experience (J. A. 
Smith, Flowers and Larking 2009: 49). However, I conducted a structured interview 
with Smith, to cover a range of different aspects concerning participatory performance. 
Still, at the same time, this approach converged with IPA in the way that both Smith and 
I shared our individual readings of the two case study productions, and in turn 
interpreted each other’s perception of those experiences. 
 
The combination of research methods applied during this study aim to investigate 
participatory practice in live art on a number of different levels. Together, they enable 
moments of comparison, connection and departure between these perspectives, to reveal 
new understandings of this exciting and emergent field of performance. 
 
1.4 Why Live Art?                                              
“Live art” is a slippery term which avoids simple categorisation, partly as a 
consequence of its “liveness”.18 It was first introduced by Lois Keidan in a strategy 
                                                          
18 “Liveness” itself is a difficult term and one that has been debated, most notably in the seminal 
contributions by Peggy Phelan’s 1993 study Unmarked: The Politics of Performance and Philip 
Auslander’s 1999 book Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture. 
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document that she authored in 1991 for the Arts Council of Great Britain. Here she 
outlined current practices, provisions and issues for live art, and notably adopted the 
term “live art” to define a set of practices and cultural strategies that were apparent in 
the UK at the time. While the artists at the centre of this study are not full-time UK 
residents, all of them have been major contributors to the live art scene in the UK. It is 
to Keidan that I turn, as Director of the Live Art Development Agency (LADA), for a 
workable definition: ‘Live Art is a research engine, driven by artists who are working 
across forms, contexts and spaces to open up new artistic models, new languages for the 
representation of ideas and identities, and new strategies for intervening in the public 
sphere’ (Live Art Development Agency 2016). The emphasis on research and newness 
in this ever expanding field continue to locate its practices at the cutting edge of 
contemporary performance and the visual arts.  
 
In an article for The Guardian (2015), Keidan describes live art as ‘the research lab 
for mass culture’ and suggests that ‘if you want to know what the mainstream will be up 
to in 10 years’ time, just look at what Live Art is doing now’. I propose that the artistic 
models, languages and strategies for engaging the audience that are pioneered within 
live art provide us with a unique vantage point for determining new understandings of 
audience participation. Changes in audiences themselves, their expectations, needs, 
sensibilities and boundaries, have meant that artists have had to reconsider their role and 
that of the spectator in performance. Adrian Heathfield (2004) identifies immediate, 
immersive, and interactive art as some of the recurrent lines of practice and thought to 
define the contemporary live art scene. Following Heathfield, these new forms 




necessitate a review of the concepts of embodied existence and relation that have so 
intrigued the practice of experimental performance (Heathfield 2004: 8).  
 
 
1.5 Tracing the Origins of Participation in Live Art 
 
In the late 1990s the development of new interactive technologies created a wave of 
mediated and virtual art projects where participation occurred remotely. However, as 
Gómez-Peña has noted, the performance artist Stelarc’s early warning in the 1990s that 
‘the body (was) becoming obsolete’ has proved unfounded (2005: 25-26). Instead, 
virtual reality appears to have fuelled audiences’ appetite for “real” intervention with 
“real” bodies. As Gómez-Peña states: ‘It is simply impossible to replace the ineffable 
magic of a pulsating, sweaty body immersed in a live ritual in front of our eyes’ (Ibid). 
Similarly, Heddon and her co-authors suggest that: ‘The intimacy proffered by live 
performances has previously been framed as “real”, and a deliberate intervention into 
and resistance to the “virtual” relationships engineered via digital interfaces such as 
Facebook and Twitter’ (2012: 121). Matthew Reason also asserts that: ‘participation 
enables theatre to (re)assert its essential liveness, in opposition to mediatisation, with 
interactivity and immersion very much dependent on spatial and temporal co-presence’ 
(2015: 273). At the heart of this research, are participatory works that attempt to create a 
real exchange of selves within the shared time and space of performance.19 Richard 
Schechner interprets the rebirth of participatory practice in the 1990s by acknowledging 
that: ‘The theater is a particularly sensitive measurement of social feeling and action. It 
is also a holdout, technologically speaking: the last of the hand-crafted entertainments’ 
                                                          
19 Auslander’s Liveness (1999) unravels the way in which theatrical immediacy is seen to authenticate a 
performance as a representation of real life. However, he argues against the presupposition that the live is 
real and the mediatised is unreal. 
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(1994: 45); while the resurgence towards participation in live art, at the turn of the 
Millennium, was partly in response to what was becoming an ever increasing mediated 
and de-politicised society. It was also fuelled by a growing desire amongst artists to 
connect with their audience, at a time when there were few performance spaces and 
limited funding available for live art.  
 
Home Live Art (HLA), founded by Laura Godfrey Isaacs in 1999, was an important 
step in the development of the participatory revival. In its original conception it was 
Godfrey Isaacs’ own family house in Camberwell that was the site of HLA’s public 
exhibitions and art projects. HLA’s Salon Series (2000-2005) focused on ‘intimate 
works that explored the unique domestic context, the relationship between art and life, 
and the dynamic between site, performer and audience’ (HLA 2012). It became an 
important stage for both emerging and established artists including Kira O’Reilly, 
Bobby Baker, Marisa Carnesky and Helena Goldwater, as a major commissioning body 
for live art with national significance. What is pertinent for this thesis about HLA is its 
emphasis on participatory practice as an underlying principle.20 For this reason, it used a 
non-institutional space to bring art and life together in a new relationship, pushing the 
boundaries of artistic practice and redefining the roles of artist and spectator. The 
domestic setting of Godfrey Isaacs’ home negated the familiar rules of engagement that 
are usually found in a gallery or performance space. Spectators were encouraged and 
more inclined to roam around the space and interact with the exhibitions and 
performances taking place. 
                                                          
20 See Home Live Art 2016. 
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Along with HLA, LADA should also be acknowledged for its influential role in 
promoting participatory practices. Since its conception in 1999 it has been instrumental 
in curating a number of high profile public events and exhibitions that have taken live 
art to a wider audience. These have frequently featured artists at the forefront of 
spectator-participation, including patrons Gómez-Peña and Abramović. One such event 
was the Live Culture (2003) exhibition at the Tate Modern, where I first encountered La 
Pocha Nostra.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Expanding on the emergence of participatory practices on the UK live art scene, this 
section illustrates how there is a rich history of audience participation within 
experimental performance practices.21 In particular, as Erika Fischer-Lichte highlights, 
the performance experiments of the late 1960s and early 1970s provided the foundation 
for later artistic models between artist and spectator (2008: 44). I propose that by 
looking back at these earlier manifestations of participation, it develops our 
understanding of how the field has evolved into what it is today. I also suggest that there 
are lessons to be learnt from these performances, in terms of the possibilities and 
limitations of participation. Yet, I wish to stress that this investigation does not profess 
to be a historical study into the emergence of participatory performance, and this is by 
no means an exhaustive account. Audience participation has a long lineage, which has 
usefully been documented in Josephine Machon’s Immersive Theatres: Intimacy and 
Immediacy in Contemporary Performance (2013), Bishop’s Participation (2006), 
Rudolf Frieling and Boris Groys’ The Art of participation: 1950 to Now (2008), and 
                                                          
21 Techniques and sensibilities associated with participatory practice have existed in a broad range of 
rituals and theatre practices. Josephine Machon helpfully traces this inheritance, see (2013: 28-40). In 
particular, she highlights the Modernist period, specifically the emergence of interdisciplinary practice 
and the ‘development of a sensibility’ (Goldberg 1996: 46: 9 in Machon 2013: 29).  
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Susan Kattwinkel’s edited collection Audience Participation: Essays on inclusion in 
performance (2003). 
 
It is widely acknowledged that some of the most pioneering experiments with the 
audience began in the “Happenings” of the late 1960s and 1970s, which were founded 
in New York and expanded to Europe and the UK.22 What is significant about these 
works is that in almost all happenings there was an attempt ‘to alter the audience-
presentation relationship, as we have generally known it, and to use this relationship 
artistically’ (Kirby 1995 [1965]: 14). This impulse stemmed from a desire to increase 
the immediacy of the event and to heighten the spectator’s attention (Ibid).   
 
Allan Kaprow is recognised as a leading figure in happenings, but he also produced 
what he referred to as “activities”. As Laura Cull explains in her 2011 article: 
‘Attention-training: Immanence and ontological participation in Kaprow, Deleuze and 
Bergson’, these undertakings often took place in private houses, similar to HLA. The 
activities were written scores that invited participants to carry out various mundane 
actions and interactions that were ‘made strange through a variety of compositional 
devices’ (Cull 2011: 80). In the beginning the activities consisted of ‘mindless’ tasks 
where the outcome was predetermined (Ibid., 85). However, Kaprow evolved his 
practice to become: ‘a process of co-authorship through which an audience is actively 
“collaborating in the art making and meaning making process” (Kaprow 1991: 52), 
where “meaning” is understood by Kaprow as “lived change” or “experienced insight” 
rather than interpretation’ (Cull 2011: 85). Cull locates Kaprow’s use of audience 
engagement at the extreme end of a continuum of participation (2011), with the artist’s 
                                                          
22 See Michael Kirby’s definition of “Happenings” (1995 [1965]: 3). 
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role as the author reduced to a minimum and the spectator given the maximum amount 
of responsibility possible for determining the direction of the work (Ibid emphasis 
original).  
 
Cull also highlights how Kaprow became aware that looking or “attention”23 is 
different when the audience is simultaneously involved in the production of the work 
(2011: 86). He states: 
 Watching and listening in the midst of doing is very distinct from the 
 specialized observations of a physically passive audience (only the mind is 
 awake for a traditional audience, at best; and it has no responsibility for the 
 actual work. It can only judge). (Kaprow 1986: unpaginated in Cull 2011: 86) 
 
Therefore, Kaprow redefined the role of the audience as the ‘direct, physical 
involvement’ of those who wish to take part in the action (Ibid). He perceived of their 
attention in action as what he terms “experienced insight”, which resists any mind-body 
distinction and constitutes embodied thinking: ‘Meaning is experienced in the body, and 
the mind is set into play by the body’s sensations’ (Ibid). His reconceptualising of 
participation as a form of knowledge production that is felt is indicative of participation 
as a phenomenological experience. It also converges with Gómez-Peña’s hope that after 
the performance is over a process of reflection is sparked in the spectator’s psyche 
(2005: 25).  
 
Happenings and activities are a direct antecedent of “performance art”, and it is 
within this tradition that we find further ground-breaking forms of spectator-
participation. Yoko Ono’s Cut Piece,24 provides one of the first powerful examples of 
one-to-one performance, albeit in front of a watching audience. During this artwork the 
                                                          
23 See section 2.9 for Cull’s appropriation of Henri Bergson’s writing on “attention”, to reconsider the 
relationship between participation and observation. 
24 Cut Piece premiered at Yamaichi Concert Hall, Kyoto, in 1964. 
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audience is invited to individually come up on stage to cut a small piece of the artist’s 
clothing to take away with them (Frieling, Groys 2008: 108). Documentation of the 
performance (photographs and video) depict Ono sitting motionless, modestly 
attempting to cover her exposed breasts with her hands. Art Critic, Martha Schwendener 
has described the piece as ‘more like a rape than an art performance’ (in Bryan-Wilson 
2003: 103). Reflecting on the experience, Ono states:  
It was a form of giving, giving and taking. It was a kind of criticism against 
artists, who are always giving what they want to give. I wanted people to take 
whatever they wanted to, so it was very important to say you can cut wherever 
you want to.  … That’s a form of total giving as opposed to reasonable giving 
like “logically you deserve this” or “I think this is good, therefore I am giving 
this to you.” (Ono in Perry R and Elliott T 1967: 26–27) 
 
She reproduced the performance several times with significant alterations, and it was 
reprised in 2003 at Paris’s Ranelagh Theatre, indicative of a renewed interest in these 
earlier participatory works.   
 
Schechner and his company The Performance Group (TPG) were also influenced by 
Kaprow’s experiments with participation, as well as drawing on Schechner’s own 
research into ritual, particularly Arnold Van Gennep’s The Rites of Passage (1960).25 
Schechner believed that the audience should take a more active role within 
performance, subsequently TPG created several infamous participatory performances; 
the most famous of which is Dionysus in 69 (1969). According to Schechner, the group 
didn’t plan the audience participation beforehand; it just developed in a way that meant 
that nearly all of the scenes required some level of spectator involvement (Schechner 
1994: 40). However, the audience did not always participate in the way that Schechner 
and his collaborators imagined. Spectators frequently abused their new found freedom, 
                                                          
25 Arnold Van Gennep’s The Rites of Passage (1960) are defined in section 3.9. 
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and there were complaints that female performers felt victimised and sexually exploited 
(Schechner 1973: 42 in Fischer-Lichte 2008: 42). On one occasion a group of college 
students kidnapped the performer playing Pentheus to prevent his sacrifice to Dionysus, 
resulting in arguments breaking out between many spectators, and Pentheus being 
dumped on Grand Street and refusing to return to the performance (Schechner 1994: 
41). Schechner states:  
 I remember my confusion about the performance. The Group was upstairs 
 scrubbing off stage blood and arguing with spectators, including the Queens 
 College “kidnappers.” I was elated that’s something “real” had happened. I 
 didn’t think it was wrong that the students planned their actions. After all, if 
 the performers rehearse, why shouldn’t the audience? And I was excited by  
 the aftermath: the discussions, the confrontations, the meeting between 
 performers and spectators on new ground. At that time I didn’t know the depth   
       of hurt and anger that some performers felt. (Ibid)  
 
I wish to suggest that it is the promise of something “real” happening that makes 
participatory work an exciting proposition for both artists and spectators.  
 
For Schechner, participation in Dionysus in 69 adopted a democratic process that 
envisaged spectators as co-subjects, allowing them to contribute to the story rather than 
obediently comply with a predetermined set of instructions. Consequently, it heightened 
the spontaneity and liveness of the event, and produced strong reactions in both 
spectators and performers. But, it also emphasised the potential pitfalls of operating an 
open model of participation. While the redistribution of power may give life to the 
emancipated spectator, it can simultaneously render the performer powerless. As 
Schechner tells us, ‘most of the performers had had it with participation’ by the time 
that Dionysus in 69 finished its run that summer (1994: 44). Consequently, in TPG’s 
1970 production of Commune, he had altered his approach to focus on the performers’ 




Continuing with the legacy of participatory performance in the 1970s, Chris Burden's 
1971 Five Day Locker Piece26 is identified by Zerihan as the first recorded one-to-one 
performance which excludes a watching audience (Zerihan 2006: 7). Zerihan states: 
‘Confining himself, without food or drink, to a two by two by three foot locker for five 
days established an environment that his audience read as encouraging their 
communication with him in a secure and outwardly intimate space’ (2006: 4).  Zerihan 
argues that the relationship established between artist and spectator in Locker Piece 
provides a useful analytical framework for exploring the complicated dynamic of close 
interaction in contemporary one-to-one practices.   
 
Burden’s later work Doomed (1975)27 gained much notoriety as a crucial lesson in 
the way that spectators engage with art. What is poignant about this forty-five hour and 
ten minute work is that it ended at the moment of participation. In this piece, Burden set 
a clock on a wall for midnight and lay down on the floor under a sheet of glass that was 
leaning against the wall. Burden remained still (unavoidably he soiled his pants) as 
viewers came and went. His discomfort was finally relieved when a young museum 
employee, Dennis O’Shea, placed a container of water within Burden’s reach. In 
response to this small but meaningful act, the artist stood up, smashed the clock with a 
hammer and left the gallery. In Doomed we see how the conventional distance between 
artwork and viewer can prevent spectators from acting on their own ethical 
responsibility.  
 
                                                          
26 Five Day Locker Piece was performed at the University of California, Irvine, as part of Burden’s 
master’s thesis. 
27 Doomed was performed at the Museum of Contemporary Art in Chicago. 
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This brings me to one of the most infamous examples of audience participation in 
contemporary performance, Abramović’s Rhythm 0 (1974).28 This artwork has become 
a cautionary tale for artists working with participation. It is difficult to think of a more 
shocking demonstration of what a participatory audience can do. In this work there were 
72 items displayed on a table, including objects of desire and objects of pain. The artist 
invited spectators to use these items as they so wished for the duration of six hours. By 
the end of the performance, Abramović was naked, her skin was slashed and wounded, 
and a loaded gun had been held to her head (Goldberg 2001: 165). This piece suggests 
the potential dangers of participation, as Abramović tells us: ‘if you leave it up to the 
audience, they can kill you’ (Abramović et al: 2002: 29).   
 
My tracing of the origins of participation in live art has revealed how the democratic 
relationship between artist and spectator, advocated in the experiments of the 1960s and 
1970s, was undermined by the way that democracy could descend into rebellion and 
abuse. Therefore, Ono’s notion of participation as an act of ‘total giving’ has largely 
been replaced by artists as a form of ‘reasonable giving’. Nonetheless, although artists 
working now may be more wary of the risks of participation, recent models of practice 
take the audience to new limits. This thesis will demonstrate how the participatory 
practices cultivated by artists today continue in the footprints of the earlier pioneers of 
participation; however, it also signifies that the social and cultural context, formal 





                                                          
28 Rhythm 0 was performed at Studio Morra in Naples. 
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1.6 Introduction to Case Studies: Guillermo Gómez-Peña’s La Pocha Nostra,  
      Marina Abramović, and Gob Squad  
The case study artists and performance groups at the centre of this study have been 
selected because they epitomise some of the most striking and complex examples of 
recent participatory practice in live art. Importantly, I have also experienced their work 
first-hand, which enables me to offer both an embodied and academic response to their 
work. Given that the impetus for this research project arose from my experience as a 
participant-spectator in La Pocha Nostra’s work, they were a clear choice as a case 
study. Additionally, the subsequent encounters that I have had with their practice, most 
notably as a collaborator, have offered me a unique insight into the emergent processes 
and effects of participation, from all sides of the performance border. One particular 
area of interest in their work is the presence of a performing-spectator and a watching-
spectator, specifically how these roles relate to one another and to the practice. Another 
prominent characteristic is the way in which participation has been adopted as an 
instrument to mobilise the audience into engaging with the social and political concerns 
of the company. Indeed, while all of the case studies are socially engaged to some 
degree, La Pocha Nostra overtly frames their work as politically activist art, and it is 
this which underpins their modus operandi. 
 
The group was founded in 1993 by Guillermo Gómez-Peña, Roberto Sifuentes, and 
Nola Mariano and they have an office based in San Francisco. Their projects range from 
performance solos and duets to large-scale performance installations using video, DVD, 
photography, audio, and cyber art (Gómez-Peña 2005: 77). La Pocha Nostra are 
described by Gómez-Peña as: ‘a conceptual “laboratory” – a loose association of rebel 
artists thinking together, exchanging ideas/aspirations, and jumping into “the abyss” 
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together’ (2005: 78).  Although the company are officially based in the US, they have 
had a substantial live art presence in the UK since 1999. 
 
Audience participation is a notable feature within La Pocha Nostra’s performances 
and is employed to directly engage spectators with border politics. Borders, both 
physical and conceptual, hold much significance for Gómez-Peña, and much of his art is 
created in response to his own struggle crossing the boundary between Mexico and the 
U.S, as well as challenging borders that exist politically, culturally and artistically. 
While Gómez-Peña’s art originates from his own Latino perspective, it becomes 
localised for the audience of his practice, as they witness the border being brought into 
the mainland, metaphorically speaking. The main participatory element happens 
towards the end of La Pocha Nostra’s performances in the form of an evolving human 
mural with participant-spectators, resulting in some of the most extreme scenes of 
spectator-participation found in live art.  
 
The company refers to their large-scale performance installations as “interactive 
rituals” or “community rituals” for the new Millennium, indicative of participatory 
performance as a contemporary form of social ritual, discussed further in chapter three. 
This is one way in which La Pocha Nostra’s artistic model of participation shares 
formal qualities with the earlier works of both TPG and Abramović. However, unlike 
Schechner, they do not attempt to establish a democratic relationship between all 
participants as co-subjects, nor do they overtly pressure and manipulate the spectators 
into participating. Instead, the co-creators are guided to participate under the watchful 
and overarching direction of Gómez-Peña and his company. Similar to Rhythm 0, there 
are multiple levels of participation employed in this work, as participants are 
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encouraged to take on both subjective and objective roles. Nonetheless, whereas 
spectators of Rhythm 0 oscillated between participating in the action and spectating 
from the sidelines, La Pocha Nostra have developed a third mode of engagement in the 
form of  the watching-directing-spectator, who offers live commentary and suggestions 
for the diorama.  
 
A further aspect where these interactive rituals meet with Rhythm 0 is through the 
use of objects. But, in La Pocha Nostra’s productions the emphasis shifts from the 
artist’s body to the spectator’s body, as participants are invited to utilise a range of 
props, costumes and artefacts to re-invent their identities. This move represents a key 
development in the practice of participation; however, it has led to criticisms regarding 
the exploitative potential of using other people’s bodies to complete the work (see 
Bishop 2008; see also Jen Harvie 2013).  
 
The way that La Pocha Nostra expands earlier models of participation through their 
theatrical manifestations of postcolonial theory comes out of Gómez-Peña’s unique 
approach to performance activism and knowing use of theory, discussed further in 
chapter three. Gómez-Peña has written extensively on his practice and the role of rebel 
artists within an oppressive culture, most notably in his books (see 2000, 2005 and 
2011). This thesis will make considerable use of his 2005 publication Ethno Techno, 
which was written during the period in which the case study performances were 
produced. Furthermore, this text outlines the political and philosophical considerations 
that underpin his work, and serves as a declaration to participatory spectatorship as 
embodied knowledge production. I propose that it is the extreme transformation of 
participant-spectators, and their intense corporeal interactions with each other that 
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makes La Pocha Nostra’s performances so distinctive. This thesis will examine the way 
that these interactive rituals challenge the limits of participation and demonstrate its 
transformative capacity to evoke social change. My investigation will focus on three of 
La Pocha Nostra’s performance works: Ex-Centris (2003), Mapa Corpo 2 (2006) and an 
untitled performance installation at the MOCA in Tucson, Arizona (2007). 
 
Marina Abramović is the second case study artist under discussion, specifically her 
performance installation, 512 Hours (2014), which provides a compelling and complex 
example of participation as a live exchange between bodies. Born in Belgrade in 1946, 
she crosses over from the earlier generation of performance artists to the contemporary 
live art scene. Experimenting with audience participation for over forty-years, 
Abramović has produced many game-changing artworks that have re-written the rules 
of what constitutes the bond between artist and spectator. Along with Rhythm 0, 
artworks such as Imponderabilia (1977), The House with the Ocean View (2002), and 
The Artist is Present (2010) offer notable examples of how the artist has redefined the 
way that the audience encounters art. The self-proclaimed “grandmother of performance 
art” has more than deserved her place in participatory performance history; thus, it is 
surprising that more has not been written about her practice in the wave of publications 
on participation. This may of course be because scholars feel that the celebrity-artist 
receives enough attention from the media and the general public. Abramović openly 
champions the role of the spectator as co-creator, proposing that: :  
The public has to take a much more interactive position, has to become more of 
an experimenter and, together with the artist, has to develop the illumination of 
the state of mind, where … the transmission of pure  energy and a kind of 




One can chart the development of this philosophy through her practice, culminating in 
512 Hours (2014), which frames “the public as [the] main work” (Abramović in 
KunstSpektrum 2014).  
 
512 Hours premiered at the Serpentine Gallery in the summer of 2014, where 
Abramović performed from 10am to 6pm, six days a week for 64 days. Chapter four 
analyses my encountering of this work, specifically looking at the relationship between 
participation and presence. Like the other case studies in this thesis, the inclusion of 
both a performing-spectator and watching-spectator was significant to my experience, 
and further develops my writing around “the paradox of participation”, introduced in 
chapter three. In addition, I highlight Abramović’s presence as a celebrity-artist and her 
ability to draw unparalleled audience figures to participation. The chapter looks at how 
512 Hours acts as a spectacle of sociability, offering a form of socially engaged live art 
which uses participation to unite the public and channel spectators’ passive resistance. 
Similar to Gómez-Peña’s troubles crossing the border of Mexico, Abramović’s non-
acceptance of borders can be directly related to her personal experiences growing up in 
Yugoslavia's repressive Communist dictatorship. Yet, while the performance art that she 
was making in the 1970s was clearly underpinned by political and social activism, this 
has become less explicit over the years with many of her more recent and most 
infamous works being predominately cathartic in tone. In this way, the research will 
consider how Abramović’s approach towards participation has developed into one of 
‘reasonable giving’. 
 
The final case study to inform this investigation is the performance company Gob 
Squad. In their book Gob Squad and the Impossible Attempt To Make Sense of It All 
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they state that: ‘Gob Squad has been interested in hauling the audience out of its passive 
observational role since the beginning. With each new project we have worked on 
further developing our relationship to the audience’ (Gob Squad 2010: 86). The seven-
member, German-British troupe was founded in Nottingham in 1994, but are now 
primarily based in Berlin. Gob Squad’s Simon Wills identifies their practice as a hybrid 
of both performance art and theatre, stating: ‘Gob Squad often falls between those two 
things. We have a sense of drama and theatricality, but we also feel very in touch with a 
visual power and an atmospheric sensibility’ (Banks 2013). Therefore, they usefully 
meet with the histories, theories and conversations that span across these disciplines. 
This is informed by the interdisciplinary constitution of the group, as members have 
backgrounds in an array of creative arts. At the core of Gob Squad’s work is their 
interest in ‘where theatre meets art, media and real life’29 (Gob Squad 2016a), which 
eventually led them to look to the audience. In their exploration of ‘[e]veryday life and 
magic, banality and utopia, reality and entertainment’ (Ibid) they have adopted several 
different models of spectator-participation. Their first substantial work to directly 
involve spectators was Room Service in 2003, in which the four performers’ only mode 
of contact to the outside world was a phone line to the audience. More recently their 
method of participation has focused on “remote acting”. This process requires the 
participant-spectator to wear a pair of headphones through which they will receive 
instructions on how to act. It is employed during their productions of Kitchen (You’ve 
Never Had It So Good) (2007), and in the two works that my analysis will concentrate 
on: Western Society (2013) and War and Peace (2016).  
 
                                                          
29 Gob Squad’s work frequently embodies the debate launched by Phelan and Auslander, concerning 
liveness as real and the mediatised as unreal.  
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Significantly, Gob Squad directly calls attention to the presence of the performing-
spectator and the watching-spectator. However, unlike spectators in the previous case 
study works, Gob Squad’s audience meet with Rancière’s notion of “the emancipated 
spectator” set free from their seat in a darkened auditorium, which offers another 
perspective on how his philosophy might be advanced in the context of live art. 
Moreover, the way that participants are referred to as VIPs and given special treatment 
generates a thoughtful dialogue with discussions and debates that surround the status of 
participation as a place of privilege. While Gob Squad’s work is not as intensely activist 
as La Pocha Nostra’s performances, contemporary social and cultural politics pervade 
their productions and frame audience engagement. Furthermore, the way in which their 
practice works to bring strangers together on stage, parallels Abramović’s impulse to 
connect the public. Nevertheless, whereas Abramović prohibits technology in 512 
Hours, Gob Squad utilise technology to further complicate the meaning of participation 
and how it manifests presence. The performance company are largely omitted from 
much of the discourse on participation, even though they have pioneered audience 
participation in UK-based devised theatre/ live art practice. This research seeks to fill 
that gap and to establish a dialogue with Gob Squad about the role of participation 
within their work. 
 
Together the artists and performances that feature in this thesis will demonstrate that 
participation is a multifaceted process that has the capacity to produce a variety of 
audience responses, which range from obedience to dissidence. In this way, they 
usefully contribute to on-going debates surrounding the aesthetics, politics and 
phenomenology of participation. Moreover, as Keidan suggests, the artistic models and 
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modes of spectatorship founded in live art might also offer an insight into how artistic 
practices may evolve in the mainstream in the years to come.  
 
1.7 Literature Survey on Participation 
Since starting this investigation the growth in popularity of participatory practices has 
become apparent not only in the notable programming of interactive works, but through 
the attention that it has received in academia. In this literature survey I will highlight 
some of the key publications and events that have impacted this emerging field. 
However, limitations of space prevent me from mentioning all of the writings that have 
influenced thinking around participation, even as I write there are publications that are 
newly released or on the horizon.30 Nevertheless, while this overview of research will 
show the ways in which lines of enquiry and debates have developed over the years, it 
also reveals a number of key areas that currently lack sufficient consideration.  
 
First of all, as a general point, although participation is overtly and inadvertently 
touched on within live art publications and journal articles, there is a dearth of literature 
devoted to live art and its audience(s). Thomas Frank and Mark Waugh’s (2005) We 
Love You: On Audiences is an exception; it features a number of discussions on 
audiences that arose out of a two-day symposium held at the Goethe Institut London in 
2004, but there is little by way of critical analysis. Joshua Sofaer’s The Many Headed 
Monster (2009) boxed set lecture addresses the way in which audiences physically 
interact with live art, and includes several seminal participatory works. However, his 
                                                          
30 Noteworthy books that are newly or soon to be released include Adam Alston’s Beyond Immersive 
Theatre: Aesthetics, Politics and Productive Participation (2016b); Helen Nicholson H and Anna 
Harpin’s (eds.) Performance and Participation: Practices, Audiences, Politics (2016); and James Frieze’s 




exploration is limited by the one-hour duration; hence, there is not the space to engage 
with any specific theories or discourses in relation to the practice. There are, however, 
two Study Room Guides on participation housed at LADA: ‘One to one Performance’ 
(2009) by Rachel Zerihan and ‘Making it Your Own? - Social Engagement and 
Participation’ (2009) by FrenchMottershead.31 These personal collections offer 
reflections on selected performances and a list of related materials available in the Study 
Room and beyond. The Guides are a very useful starting point for research into 
participatory practices in live art.  
 
It should also be acknowledged that “live art” is an umbrella term that encompasses a 
range of disciplines; thus, discourse on the field might just as easily be located in 
contemporary theatre, performance studies, and the visual arts more widely. Indeed, 
when one takes an across the arts approach to researching participation a much more 
expansive and contentious theoretical landscape is revealed. In addition, it becomes 
possible to see how notable publications on participation illustrate the ways in which 
conversations and agendas have progressed, notably from aesthetics and politics to 
commercialism and exploitation.  
 
Susan Bennett’s book Theatre Audiences: A theory of production and reception 
(1997) is ‘a testimony to the contemporary emancipation of the spectator’ (Bennett 
1997: 213). She notes that in experimental performance ‘Boundaries between the 
subjects, the creators, and the receivers are no longer distinct and such a move signals a 
                                                          
31 FrenchMottershead are a UK-based company founded by artists Rebecca French and Andrew 
Mottershead in 1999. They have been at the forefront of participatory live art, creating what they term as 
“micro-performances”, which can be understood as small actions, conversations, tasks, performed 




democratizing of the arts’ (Bennett 1997: 10). Bennett’s analysis of spectator 
engagement draws on Daphna Ben Chaim’s study ‘Distance in the Theatre: The 
Aesthetics of Audience Response’ (1984), which proposes that ‘the deliberate 
manipulation of distance is, to a great extent, the underlying factor that determines 
theatrical style in this century’ (Ben Chaim in Bennett 1997: 16). This meets with 
Rancière’s identification of two oppositional approaches to distance, ‘epitomized by 
Brecht's epic theater and Artaud's theater of cruelty. On the one hand the spectator must 
become more distant, on the other he must lose any distance’ (Rancière 2007: 272). 
This thesis will demonstrate how the question of distance and its effect on audience 
reception has foregrounded many of the debates surrounding participation.  
 
Curator and art critic Nicolas Bourriaud’s influential book Relational Aesthetics 
(1998, 2002) similarly recognises a reconsideration of distance as a critical development 
in the production and reception of contemporary art. Like Bennett he identifies 
democratic concern as the motivation for a generation of fine artists in the 1990s to 
involve the public more directly in their art (Bourriaud 2002: 56-57). Bourriaud broadly 
defines this work as relational art: ‘A set of artistic practices which take as their 
theoretical and practical point of departure the whole of human relations and their social 
context, rather than an independent and private space’ (Ibid., 113). He employs Walter 
Benjamin’s (1935) writing on the phenomenon of the disappearance of the aura of the 
work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction to emphasise the significance of 
relational aesthetics:   
 The public is being taken into account more and more. As if, henceforth, this 
 “sole appearance of a distance” represented by the artistic aura were provided 
 by it: as if the micro-community gathering in front of the image was becoming 
 the actual source of the aura, the “distance” appearing specifically to create a 




For Bourriaud, there is no intrinsic value in the art exhibited; rather the value lies in the 
set of relations that it generates. While he does not acknowledge performance as a 
relevant form of relational art, the arguments that he presents, as I will discuss shortly, 
have fuelled numerous debates by theorists and commentators on participation across 
the contemporary visual arts (Ibid., 47-48). Therefore, his theoretical ideas and the 
critical responses to them have directly and indirectly impacted upon this investigation. 
  
Although limitations of space prevent a complete analysis of Bourriaud’s theory, 
there are several explanations worth noting. As Reason considers, these include that ‘the 
intersubjective encounters prompted by relational art are shared and public’ and the idea 
that ‘they produce potentially politically radical spaces of exchange, but that these are 
provisional and temporary “micro-topias”’ (2015: 273). Indeed, this thesis reveals many 
connections to these elaborations. I would wish to add that it is in Relational Aesthetics 
that we see the foundations for the analysis of participation as a phenomenological 
experience. Here Bourriaud cites Emmanuel Levinas in his theorising of relational art as 
a form with a face: the face being emblematic of the responsibility that we have towards 
others (2002: 21, 24). This line of inquiry also underscores discourse on participation in 
relation to presence and ethics as a form of mutual determination, discussed in chapters 
four and five. Bourriaud also forewarns against the consequences of a proliferation of 
participatory practices. He cautions, with reference to Guy Debord’s (1967) Situationist 
critique, that, ‘[t]he “society of the spectacle” is thus followed by the society of extras, 
where everyone finds the illusion of an interactive democracy in more or less truncated 
channels of communication’ (Ibid., 25-26). Indeed, the significance of Debord’s critique 




Since its publication, Relational Aesthetics has been the focus of much debate, not 
least because Bourriaud’s definition of relational art centres on artworks that he has 
been directly involved with curating and promoting. Reason identifies that, ‘an almost 
romantic exposition of the democratic and emancipatory potential of relational art 
practices’ invites scrutiny, ‘not least that there must necessarily be various degrees of 
intersubjective participation not all of which are equally emancipatory’ (2015: 274). 
This argument underscores my examination of emancipating spectators in live art, and 
the way in which participation can in fact create a new hierarchy of spectatorship.  
 
The most fervent in her criticism of Bourriaud’s theory is critic Claire Bishop. David 
Beech suggests that Bourriaud’s “relational aesthetics” and Bishop’s “art of 
antagonism” represent the two leading, albeit contentious, theories of contemporary 
art’s new social ontology towards an art of encounter (2010: 24). In Bishop’s essay 
‘Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics’ (2004), she questions the types of associations 
being produced in relational art and what democracy means within this context (2004: 
65). She goes on to argue that the interactions produced by relational aesthetics are not 
inherently democratic because they yield an ideal of community with an innate sense of 
togetherness. While these works may include debate and engagement, they adopt a feel-
good position, referred to by Bourriaud as a “micro-topia”.  Therefore, the context of 
the gallery and the community of like-minded art lovers negate the possibility of friction 
or meaningful interrogation of the art (2004: 67). In contrast, Bishop argues for a more 
disruptive and antagonistic form of participation that sustains tensions between 
spectators and context; hence, being essentially more political and democratic (2004: 
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69-79). As such, it would offer a model of practice that acknowledges the divided 
subjectivity of the community of spectators. As Bishop puts it:  
This relational antagonism would be predicated not on social harmony, but on 
 exposing that which is repressed in sustaining the semblance of this harmony.  
 It would thereby provide a more concrete and polemical grounds for 
 rethinking our relationship to the world and to one another. (2004: 79)   
 
Bishop’s notion of antagonism and the related arguments is developed in her 2006 
article in ArtForum entitled ‘The Social Turn: Collaboration and Its Discontents’, and in 
her anthologies Participation (2006) and Artificial Hells (2012). The key debates and 
criticisms surrounding participation that arise in Bishop’s theorising, inform many of 
the arguments that permeate this study.  
 
Participation (2006) is an important book, as one of the first studies dedicated to 
participatory practices within the contemporary visual arts. It is here that Bishop 
continues to unravel the social dimension to participation, by mapping a historical 
lineage and theoretical framework for this practice. In doing so, she rebuffs the 
presupposition that participation is automatically a more active, political and 
emancipatory form of spectatorship. The claims made on behalf of participation are an 
enduring concern throughout my investigation. Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and 
the Politics of Spectatorship (2012) shifts the focus to theatre and performance ‘since 
participatory engagement tends to be expressed most forcefully in the live encounter 
between embodied actors in particular contexts’ (Bishop, 2012: 3). Indeed, Bishop 
proposes a rethinking of the histories and principles of twentieth-century art through the 
lens of theatre, which supports its application in the theoretical framework outlined in 
this thesis (Ibid). The discussions offered in Bishop’s latest critique on participatory art 
have much to offer the key themes to emerge in this study, most notably the tension 
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between aesthetics, ethics and politics. However, other than a couple of references to 
Abramović, the case study artists are not discussed within this compendium of 
participatory performance practices.  
 
Following Bishop’s opening out of discussions on the political and aesthetic 
motivations of social practices, there have been a number of other scholars that have 
moved into this area of interest. Searching for Art’s New Publics (2010), edited by Jeni 
Walwin, examines the distinctions between the artist and spectator, and how the artwork 
and its public are being challenged. Like Bishop, Walwin focuses on social works, but 
the publics that she refers to are mostly from non-art communities. This is in contrast to 
the typically specialist audiences which attend the performances featured in this thesis. 
Nonetheless, David Beech’s keynote essay ‘Don’t Look Now! Art after the Viewer and 
beyond Participation’ informs the way in which I define the audience’s involvement in 
the performances as “participation”, by helpfully unpicking the related terminology. He 
also draws further attention to the claims made on behalf of participation and the limits 
of this mode of engagement.  
 
Emerging from Performance Studies, Shannon Jackson is a leading figure in the 
analysis of the participatory impulse. Her monograph, Social Works: Performing Art, 
Supporting Publics (2011) seeks to explore some of the contradictions, risks and 
resistances to contemporary experimental art-making. In her critique of a range of 
socially engaged art and performance practices she concurs with Bishop’s notion of 
“antagonism” and “social dissensus”, as well as advocating “social coordination”, to  





Another major contribution to literature on socially engaged art and participatory 
practices is Jen Harvie’s Fair Play: Art, Performance and Neoliberalism (2013). In 
common with Bishop and Jackson, Fair Play seeks to evaluate the social and political 
implications of participatory works. However, in response to Bishop’s call for 
participatory art to be contextualised, Harvie frames her discussion with the social and 
material circumstances of the UK, which sets it apart from Jackson’s US-based Social 
Works. By her own admission, Harvie is sceptical about the claims made on behalf of 
participation. Moreover, she questions whether this trend is in fact complicit with a 
neoliberal capitalist culture. To this end, Harvie suggests that these works might ‘offer a 
spectacle of communication and social engagement rather more than a qualitatively and 
sustainably rich and even critical engagement’ (2013: 3). This argument underpins an 
on-going concern in my analysis of the case study performances.  
 
Adam Alston concedes that he owes much to Harvie’s arguments surrounding 
participation, especially in relation to neoliberalism. A number of noteworthy articles 
(2012-2016) and his recently published monograph Beyond Immersive Theatre 
Aesthetics, Politics and Productive Participation (2016b) have quickly established him 
as an authoritative voice on participation. Indeed, Alston’s suggestion that an 
individual’s motivation to participate is frequently fuelled by narcissistic and hedonistic 
desire struck a chord with my own impulse to volunteer. This thesis will make use of 
several concepts emerging from his theorising, specifically “entrepreneurial 
participation” (2013), the “errant spectator” (2016a), and “productive participation” 
(2016b). However, Alston’s writing is largely focused on the politics of immersive 
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theatre aesthetics. It does not talk about live art practices or give much thought to the 
experience itself from a phenomenological perspective.  
 
This differs from Josephine Machon’s earlier exploration of Immersive Theatres: 
Intimacy and Immediacy in Contemporary Performance (2013), which covers a range 
of forms that includes live art, as well as engaging with theories regarding the ways in 
which an embodied experience is constituted. In a detailed survey of the history, theory 
and practice of immersive theatre, Machon offers a lengthy analysis towards a definition 
of this complex and imprecise form. In recent years, there has been a trend to brand any 
participatory performance as an immersive experience, but Machon’s classification 
suggests that there are specific attributes that distinguish immersion. One of the 
characteristics of immersive theatre lacking in the case study works is an ‘in-its-own-
worldness’ quality (Machon 2013: 93). However, they do share a number of central 
features, in particular ‘the emphasis on audience involvement’ and ‘a prioritisation of 
the sensual world’, which enable my analysis of these works to thoughtfully interact 
with Machon’s writing (Ibid., 70). In addition, I also make use of Machon’s first book 
on (Syn)aesthetics (2009). This study underpins discussions on the form of participation 
and how the participant’s sensate involvement is manifested as presence or “prae-sens” 
(Scarry, 1985: 9, 197 in Machon 2009: 25). I have identified presence as an area that is 
currently lacking substantial critique. To this end, my thesis will expand on Machon’s 
insight to offer multiple readings of presence within the situation of participation. 
 
Gareth White’s book Audience Participation in Theatre: Aesthetics of the invitation 
(2013) complements Machon’s research, by filling a particular gap on the processes and 
principles that support the invitation to participate. However, the study does not look at 
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live art; choosing instead to focus on audience participation within applied, social and 
popular theatre forms. The primary concern of White’s book is to unpack the moment 
when a spectator accepts the invitation, and to explore the notion of audience 
participation as aesthetic material. Similar to my study, he draws on the writings of 
Erika Fischer-Lichte and Rancière in his analysis of emancipating spectators. White also 
identifies a number of foundational concepts which touch on my research, specifically 
concerning ritual, risk, and phenomenology. Returning to an emancipated spectator as 
outlined by Rancière, he concludes that: ‘a participant can be a spectator to their own 
actions in a variety of ways … It is in the sheer variety of experiential relationships to 
participatory action that we find a kind of autonomy’ (2013: 206). The tension between 
heteronomy and autonomy informs many arguments within the book. However, White’s 
theory ultimately resides in ‘the continuity of the participant’s social being’, and how 
this can be temporarily enhanced, re-shaped, and exposed by the practices of audience 
participation (Ibid). There are clear overlaps between the hypothesis applied in 
Audience Participation and the arguments within this thesis. Consequently, I employ his 
ideas at various points, to define and flesh out critical concepts. Still, at the same time, 
my investigation extends beyond the invitation and the practices explored by White, to 
offer an alternative theoretical framework for understanding the limits and possibilities 
of participatory performance.  
 
In addition to the works listed above, there have been several notable journal 
publications on participation. In particular, I wish to highlight ‘On Philosophy & 
Participation’ in Performance Research, volume 16, issue 4, December 2011, co-edited 
by Laura Cull and Karoline Gritzner; and a themed section on ‘Theatre Audiences’ in 
Participations: Journal of Audience & Reception Studies, volume 12, issue 1, May 
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2015, co-edited by Matthew Reason and Kirsty Sedgman. The articles that feature in 
these two important collections offer a number of insights that enlighten the discussions 
that develop in this thesis, as well as demonstrating a range of research approaches to 
the study of participation.   
 
The literature survey that I have presented in this thesis evidences a general lack of 
research dedicated to live art and its audience. In contrast, there is an abundance of 
writing on immersive and participatory performance practices, which includes some live 
art but not the performances under discussion in this study. I propose that we are now at 
a juncture where there is a need to drill down into the research, to offer a more detailed 
analysis of the foundational elements that underpin participatory experience. 
Furthermore, the arguments that surround this work are largely directed at the aesthetics 
and politics of the work, rather than their transformative and embodied capacity. The 
theoretical framework to be developed in this thesis will afford special attention to the 
ways in which participatory experience converges with ritual processes; enacts varying 
mutations of bodily presence; and generates a reconsideration of the ethics of 
spectatorship in contemporary performance practice. The discussion will also establish 
that we are reaching the point where spectator-participation might be considered as a 
practice in its own right.  
 
1.8 Map of Thesis and Chapter Overview 
In addressing the principle aim of this thesis to develop a theoretical framework for 
analysing participation within live art, this thesis brings together multiple perspectives 
and critical concepts. Therefore, each of the chapters has its own discursive focus, while 




Chapter two: ‘The Birth of the Participant-Spectator’ begins with a first-person 
account of my experience of La Pocha Nostra’s Mapa/Corpo 2 (2006), this time from 
the viewpoint of a watching-spectator. In the first half of the chapter, I examine the type 
of participation that occupies this study, unravelling a succession of related terms and 
establishing the way that participation exists on a continuum of interactivity. I look at 
the form and formlessness of participation, and the ways in which it can be understood 
as a highly visceral and feminised mode of practice, with reference to the writings of 
Gritzner (2011) and Machon (2009). The chapter acknowledges how the incomplete and 
at times unpredictable form of participation is seen as problematic by both 
commentators and makers of participation. However, I caution against a defined 
“dramaturgy of participation” as proposed by ZU-UK’s Persis Jade Maravala and Jorge 
Lopes Ramos (2016), which I suggest may be reductive and elitist. Still, at the same 
time, I recommend that we do accept spectator-participation as a field of practice in its 
own right, with its own set of practices, needs and issues.  
 
In the second half of the chapter I introduce a number of prominent theories and 
debates that surround participation as a democratic process. The discussion owes much 
to Bishop’s work in its uncovering of the main impulses that prompted the shift towards 
co-production in the contemporary arts. I open out the notion of “the emancipated 
spectator”, which Rancière argues has been interpreted as synonymous with a 
participatory spectator. I draw on Julie Wilkinson’s 2015 essay ‘Dissatisfied ghosts: 
Theatre spectatorship and the production of cultural value’ to validate his suggestion 
that an audience member may in fact be more emancipated from a distant position, 
whereupon they are free to interpret the unfolding performance in relation to their own 
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personal narratives. At the same time, as Wilkinson establishes, the spectator is ‘never 
an isolated subject’ (Wilkinson 2015: 142). The chapter contemplates Rancière’s 
analysis of the way that binary relations have underscored the desire for audience 
participation. Indeed, binaries and borderlines emerge as fundamental concerns for 
participatory practice, and are further explored in the subsequent theories on the 
transformative and embodied capacity of participation. There theoretical perspectives 
can be summarised as Fischer-Lichte’s (2008) envisaging of the “transformative power” 
of participation; Tony Fisher’s (2011) framing of participation as “radical democratic 
theatre”; and Laura Cull’s (2011) notion of “ontological participation” founded as an 
immanent encounter. The philosophies and critiques that arise during chapter two 
provide the basis for a theoretical framework through which to analyse participation in 
the case study works. 
 
Chapter three: ‘Border Crossing and “Interactive Rituals”’ is the most extensive 
section in the thesis, as it brings together the reflections and analysis of all three of my 
encounters with La Pocha Nostra’s practice. The chapter applies and extends the 
theoretical framework that was established in the previous chapter by looking at the 
actual act of participation and the way that it is fostered. The discussion starts in the 
way that all of my chapters begin, with an anecdote. This time I recount my experience 
as an artist collaborator with the company, performing in an untitled performance 
installation at MOCA, Tucson, Arizona (2007). After drawing attention to the way in 
which a participant-spectator appears to be indeterminately between the two sides of the 
performance border, I establish what I am calling “the paradox of participation”. This 
opens up a discussion on the audienceness of a live art spectator, which supports my 
moving beyond Rancière’s reading of an emancipated spectator in a theatre context. 
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This is followed by a closer look at how our “dual citizenship” inside and outside of the 
work coincides with Gómez-Peña’s own border activism. Importantly, it is here that I 
emphasise the interdependency of binary and paradoxical relations in the situation of 
participation, therefore, allowing us to perceive contradiction without taking a side 
(Bateson 2016: 170). I adopt Nora Bateson’s term “symmathesy” as a new concept to 
describe the system of interdependency and mutual learning that occurs during 
participation, and which reflects the complex interactions that take place within these 
live works. (2016: 168). 
 
In the next part of the chapter I take a look at what drives participatory desire and the 
potential resistances to this work, referencing the research of Alston (2013) and Gritzner 
(2011). I will establish how the separation of those that do from those that don’t 
participate can create a hierarchy of spectatorship. I will also highlight another tier in 
the social structure of participation, which has arisen from the emergence of expert 
participant-spectators. I examine how La Pocha Nostra’s practice corresponds to the 
three main impulses identified by Bishop (2006): activation, authorship, and 
community. The focus of the chapter then shifts to an analysis of the performance 
methodologies and processes that work towards emancipating spectators within La 
Pocha Nostra’s performances. It looks at the way in which the company frame their 
productions as “interactive rituals” and “extreme performance games”, and how these 
concepts might be used as a lens through which to examine their work. To this end, the 
chapter identifies several commonalities between ritual processes and the strategies and 
tactics uses by La Pocha Nostra to cultivate participation. The chapter builds towards an 
assessment of the aftermath of participation, in relation to intimacy and the 
transformative potential of these experiences. It is here where I draw an analogy 
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between participatory performance and a one-night stand sexual encounter, and reflect 
on Gomme’s reading of Emmanuel Levinas in her search for intimacy (2015) and Lisa 
Register and Tracy Henley’s ‘The Phenomenology of Intimacy’ (1992). 
 
Chapter four: ‘The Spectator is Present’, starts with an account of my experience as a 
spectator at Abramović’s 512 Hours (2014). My analysis begins with the lengthy queue 
outside of the gallery and the taking of a “selfie”, prompting a discussion on the value 
of being there in the context of Joseph Pine and James Gilmore’s (1999) “the 
experience economy”, drawing on studies by Harvie (2013), Alston (2013), and Noah 
Horowitz (2011) concerning the commodification of art as experience. On entering the 
performance, I turn to Breel’s analysis (2015) in my interpretation of the way that both 
agency and the display of agency are manifested in 512 Hours, and how this meets with 
the notion of emancipating spectators.  
 
Building on from this discussion, the chapter takes up its primary focus of analysing 
the varying representations of presence that are fostered during participation. This 
responds to the lack of sufficient research on this subject that I noted during my 
literature review. I start off by looking at the way that the implied risk and failure 
inherent in participation produces a heightened self-awareness in participants’ expectant 
bodies that founds an intense form of energy, drawing on Alston’s (2013) writing. Next 
in the chapter I determine how the artist “having presence” enables them to channel the 
energy between bodies and influence participation. To this end, I engage with Cormac 
Power’s (2008) research on “auratic presence”, Jane Goodall’s (2008) analysis of “stage 
presence”, and Fischer-Lichte’s (2012) “strong concept of presence”. In the following 
part of the chapter I analyse how participation can constitute an embodied experience of 
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presence, applying Fischer-Lichte’s “radical concept of presence”, Machon’s notions of 
“(syn)aesthetics” and “prae-sens”, and Hélène Cixous’s “écriture féminine” and 
conception that the “eyes are lips” (Cixous 2001: 9). All of these perspectives also 
converge with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s theorising on phenomenology. From a 
different viewpoint, I consider Laura Cull’s (2011) theory of “ontological participation” 
and how presence is embodied through attention in action or looking in the midst of 
doing. Lastly, the chapter will explore the phenomenology of co-presence through the 
lens of participation, drawing on the concepts of Martin Heidegger (1971, 1978), 
Emmanuel Levinas (1969, 1987, 1989), and Simon Jones’s (2012) adoption of their 
theories in relation to participation. 
 
Chapter five: ‘The Ethics of Participation in an “Ethically Imperfect World”’ focuses 
on the ethics of participation in Gob Squad’s Western Society (2015) and War and 
Peace (2016). Ethics was another area that I perceived as a gap in the research on 
participation. My first-person accounts of Gob Squad’s performances underpin the 
developing discussions, which contemplate the ethics of the self and ethics as 
encounter, engaging mainly with the work of Nicholas Ridout (2009) and Erving 
Goffman (1959) amongst others. The first part of the chapter charts the way that 
participatory forms from the late 1990s onwards have cast theatre etiquette or ethics into 
a period of uncertainty, following Caroline Heim’s 2016 study on the Audience as 
Performer. Still, at the same time, I contemplate Heddon and her co-authors’ (2012) 
assertion that there is a strong impulse to ‘give good audience’, and the way that 
participation can invoke the notion of an ‘ideal audience-participant’. I also return to 
participation’s precarious relationship to commercialism and exploitation, considering 
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Bishop’s (2008) arguments concerning “delegated performance” and participation as “a 
luxury game”.  
 
 In the next part of the chapter I contemplate two theoretical positions that work to 
unravel how we interpret ethics in participation. The first emerges from Ridout’s 
writing, specifically his conception of ‘an imaginary “spectator” within us’. The second 
is Goffman’s theory on “the presentation of self”, in particular the “front” that is 
managed by the spectator. Following this examination, the discussion shifts to explore 
Ridout’s notion that “ethics as encounter” underscores the mutuality experienced during 
participation. I also look at Goffman’s theorising of “teams”, establishing that their 
‘reciprocal dependence’ and ‘reciprocal familiarity’ are influencing factors on the 
composition of ethics as encounter. Towards the end of the chapter, I look at what 
happens when ethics are transgressed and participation goes wrong, drawing on 
Alston’s (2016) “errant-spectator”, Ridout’s (2012) “mis-spectator”, and introducing 
my own category of the “dis-spectator”. A key element in this chapter is the interview 
(2016) that I conducted with Gob Squad’s Sharon Smith. 
 
In Chapter Six: ‘Final Conclusions’ I offer an overview of my findings according to 
the main insights that I have gained over the course of my study. In doing so, I discuss 
the implications of my research on the field, while determining that there are still 
several fruitful areas for investigation.  
 
In summary, this introduction to the thesis has set out the parameters of my study; 
tracing the origins of participation in live art and the way in which the field of 
immersive and participatory practices has developed. The map of the thesis indicates 
how I intend to develop a theoretical framework that extends understandings of 
58 
 
participation and addresses the gaps in research, most notably in relation to ritual and 
performance processes, presence and ethics. The chapter demonstrates how the thesis 
uses my own experiences alongside critical concepts and debates, to analyse 























Chapter Two: The Birth of the Participant-Spectator  
 
2.1 The Second Encounter: La Pocha Nostra’s Mapa/Corpo 2 ‘Community Rituals 
for the New Millennium’  
It is June 2006. La Pocha Nostra are closing the PSi #12: Performing Rights 
conference32 with their performance Mapa/Corpo 2 ‘Community Rituals for the New 
Millennium’. From a lectern, Gómez-Peña blesses his space with “sacred spray” and 
drinks from a detergent bottle labelled “Mr Clean” which he spits out at the audience. 
Addressing spectators he poignantly asks: 
 Where is the border between you and me? 
 Between my words and your mind? 
 Between my mouth and your fears? 
 Where exactly is this performance taking place?  
 (Gómez-Peña, 2005: 204) 
 
The speech is followed by a series of interactive acts. The first is an invitation for 
spectators to decolonise the naked body of a female performer “of color”, by removing 
acupuncture needles that each display a miniature US flag, see Figure 2. I cautiously 
stand in line, but the responsibility of carefully removing a needle weighs heavy.  
 
 
Figure 2: An interactive ritual to decolonise a body “of color”. Photo: Julio Pantoja.33 
                                                          
32 The twelfth Performance Studies international conference was held at Queen Mary, University of 
London, 8-11 June 2006. It explored the relationship between contemporary performance practices and 
human rights, asking: ‘What can performance do for human rights, and human rights for performance?’ 





The second interactive act offers Roberto Sifuentes34 as the centrepiece for a human 
alter. He is raised on a platform, ritualistically bathed in blood, and adorned with 
flowers, animal organs and incense. Disabled by a leg brace and bandaged groin, he is at 
the mercy of the spectators, who have been urged by Gómez-Peña to write a response to 
the future of civilisation on his body; a formidable task, see Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: An interactive ritual with Roberto Sifuentes as a human altar. Photo: Julio Pantoja.35 
 
As participants increasingly revel in manipulating the body and props at their disposal, I 
am reminded of Abramović’s Rhythm 0 (1974) and I wonder how far this audience will 
go. My thoughts are broken when an impassioned Gómez-Peña makes his plea: “Is 
there anyone who is willing to co-create with me?” Participants come forward and the 
human mural begins again, but this time I remain as a watching-spectator.  
 
As a series of “tableaux vivants”36 unfold, a white middle-aged male enters the 
performance zone; he strips off, leaving only his glasses on. Next a black thirty-
something woman crosses the border; she pulls down her skirt to reveal her bottom. To 
                                                          
34 Roberto Sifuentes is a founding member of La Pocha Nostra. 
35 The source for the image is the same as Figure 2, see footnote 33.  
36 The term “tableaux vivants” translated from French means “living pictures”. The practice was at its 
most popular during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Its usage as a form of protest in the 
early twentieth century paved the way for its appropriation as a method of political activism within La 
Pocha Nostra’s work. 
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the shifting bodies of strangers, Gómez-Peña asks time and time again for that illusive 
“final image”. Eventually the image is found, but only to be lost a few minutes later, 
and the transient community disperses as quickly as it united. Participants get dressed, 
discuss their experience with friends, and in a somewhat euphoric and slightly displaced 
state they make the journey home.  
 
While my position as a watching-spectator afforded me greater freedom of 
interpretation as I attempted to translate the images; the experience was not as 
compelling as my first felt encounter. Nevertheless, this is not to say that watching-
spectators are passive in La Pocha Nostra’s practice. On the contrary, their looking is 
recognised as a form of participation, as they are encouraged to act as co-directors and 
auditors of the emerging tableaux vivants through their suggestions and affirmation. 
During these occasions, the watching-directing-spectator, observed by Gómez-Peña and 
the remaining onlookers, momentarily becomes a performing-spectator. However, even 
though observing the human mural challenged my interpretive skills, I must concede 
that I may have engaged further with the performance if I had been more 
communicative. If there is a main principle for spectatorship in La Pocha Nostra’s 
interactive rituals, and arguably any form of participatory practice, it is this: the more 
that is given in participation, the more that is taken in participation, for both the artist 
and the spectator. 
                                                                                                                                                 
2.2 Introduction 
In chapter two I continue to lay the foundations for a theoretical framework through 
which to analyse participatory live art. The chapter serves to uncover the nature, 
purpose and potential impact of participation on contemporary performance practices. 
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Echoing the politically activist agenda that underpins La Pocha Nostra’s interactive 
rituals, a principle concern throughout the chapter is the rhetoric of participation as a 
democratising of the art-making process. To this end, my analysis engages with several 
important and complex debates that elucidate the potentialities and limitations of 
participation for the spectator, and the effect that it has on the relationship between 
aesthetics, politics and social relations. The research draws on a range of critical 
concepts arising in the work of authors including Claire Bishop, Jacques Rancière, 
Erika Fischer-Lichte, Gareth White, Josephine Machon, and Laura Cull.  
 
The first part of the chapter deals with the nature of participation by unravelling 
definitions, levels of interactivity, and form. This works to determine the kind of 
participation under discussion in the thesis, and the potential issues and debates that it 
provokes. The examination commences by examining the different terms for audience 
involvement in performance. Resulting from this, I establish that the mode of 
spectatorship cultivated in the case study works is a special form of “participation”, 
which is distinct and ‘goes beyond’ the more typical definition of the term (White 2013: 
4). In the next section, I analyse the level of participation in operation, applying the 
model provided by Ronald J. Pelias and James VanOosting (1987) to propose that 
interactivity exists on a continuum. This leads to a discussion on the form and 
formlessness of participation, which highlights how participation can be seen to display 
characteristics indicative of a feminised style of practice. It is at this juncture that I 
challenge Persis Jade Maravala and Jorge Lopes Ramos’ (2016) proposal that we need 
to establish a “dramaturgy of participation”; while suggesting that we do need to 




The second part of the chapter focuses on theories concerning the established 
relationship between participation and political empowerment. It starts off with Claire 
Bishop’s (2006) theorising on the artistic impulses and political claims made on behalf 
of participation towards a democratising of the arts. This is followed by an examination 
of a number of pertinent theories on participation, including “the emancipated 
spectator” as outlined in Jacques Rancière’s writing, and discourse concerning the way 
that participation may challenge binary relations and borders within contemporary 
performance. I consider the arguments put forward by Rancière and other commentators 
to dismantle the presupposition that a participant-spectator is an emancipated spectator, 
establishing that there can be more than one way of setting the audience free. To this 
end, I draw attention to the embodied and transformative capacity of participation, 
emphasised in the writings of Erika Fischer-Lichte, Tony Fisher, and Laura Cull. All of 
these theories, albeit founded on different philosophical viewpoints, are a testament to 
the way in which participation can challenge borders and binary relations, most notably 
between the artist and the spectator. Therefore, although this chapter evidences that 
there are limitations to participation as a democratic and emancipatory act, it also 
demonstrates how crossing borders can open up our consciousness to alternative 
political and social realities, even if only for the duration of the performance.  
  
2.3 Towards a Definition 
In the next three sections of the chapter, the discussion focuses on the nature of 
participation within participatory live art, engaging with ideas from a range of 
performance studies and contemporary visual arts scholars. I will begin by looking at 
the thorny terms that are used to describe the direct engagement of the audience in the 
development of a performance. However, as Gareth White (2013) recognises, all 
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audience members are participatory, from the physical act of purchasing their ticket and 
taking their seat in the auditorium; to their spontaneous reactions throughout the 
performance and their commitment to see the piece through to the end, or to slip out at 
an opportune moment (White, 2013: 3-4). From an earlier generation, Susan Bennett 
(1997) similarly maintained that the audience has always been ultimately in control of a 
performance with the power to attend or not; therefore, the responsibility awarded to 
spectators during audience participation is merely a development of this role (1997: 18). 
Nevertheless, as we saw in my tracing of participatory practices, experimental 
performance has blurred the boundaries between the makers and the receivers of 
performance, signalling a democratising of the arts and bringing about a significant 
change in performance and related theory (Ibid., 10).  
 
Since the proliferation of participatory practices there have been a number of 
definitions used to classify the various forms of audience engagement in performance. 
David Beech (2010) summarises these concepts as: participation, collaboration, 
interaction and co-operation; which he suggests should be examined as a structured set 
of relations that are best understood in terms of each other. Accordingly he asserts that:   
 Interactivity has two means, which tend to be conflated in discussions of 
 interactivity in art: (1) acting with each other and (2) (especially in  computer 
 science) responding to the user. Participation means having a share, taking 
 part or being part of a whole. Collaboration (broken down as co-labouring), 
 means working together, as does co-operation. (Beech in Walwin 2010: 24) 
 
Despite clear distinctions between these related terms, Beech observes that discourse 
tends to be reduced to a single focus: how much an audience is active within the work 
and at what point in the process that activation occurs (Ibid). He notes that Bishop 
(2006) helpfully establishes a clear difference between participation and interactivity 
(Beech 2010: 25). For Bishop, interactivity, especially in the context of digital 
65 
 
technology, can be understood as merely involving the activation of an individual 
spectator, whereas participation also has a social function (2006: 10). Indeed, it is this 
emphasis on the social experience that Beech argues is one of the key arguments to give 
participatory work its prominence within the contemporary arts (Beech 2010: 25).  
 
White broadly defines audience participation as simply ‘the participation of an 
audience, or an audience member, in the action of a performance’ (White 2013: 4).Yet, 
he also draws attention to a special kind of participation that is ‘exceptional’, and that 
‘goes beyond’ what we imagine that we should feel and do as a spectator, and this 
experiential difference is not only perceived by the doer, but also by those that witness 
the participation (Ibid). He is careful to mark this form of participation as different from 
the typical interactions and permitted behaviour that we have come to expect in a 
performance situation. According to White, ‘the action of performance’ has at least two 
dimensions: ‘everyday social action’ and action within the ‘extra-everyday space of the 
performance’; which he suggests become blurred when audience participation is 
present, as participants shift between and at times coexist within both realms (2013: 5). 
It can be said, therefore, that participation produces a complex form of “relational 
aesthetics”, to borrow Nicholas Bourriaud’s term. Furthermore, as White suggests, 
participation might be seen to function as aesthetic material, particularly in the way that 
the spectator becomes the artist’s medium (2013: 9-10). 
 
In the introductory chapter, I highlighted a recent fashion to brand all participatory 
work as “immersive”. An example of this is the way that Myf Warhurst's review for 
Marina Abramović’s 512 Hours (2014) in The Guardian refers to the piece as 
immersive art. As I noted earlier, for the most part the case studies in this thesis do not 
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fully denote the characteristics of immersive practice distinguished by Josephine 
Machon, particularly in relation to an ‘in-its-own-worldness’ element (Machon 2013: 
93). This is largely because they do not seek to engross the audience within the fictional 
space of a narrative. In the instance of 512 Hours, discussed fully in chapter four, I 
suggest that the gallery space frames the participation as an experiment in art rather than 
the creation of an immersive experience. But, that is not to deny that there were 
elements of an ‘in-its-own-worldness’ belonging to the ethos of the white cube gallery, 
outlined in chapter three, such as the way that the performance operated outside of 
everyday time (no watches allowed) and with its own set of rules. In addition, for those 
able to achieve a state of mindfulness, an ability to become “imaginatively immersed”37 
was possible. 
 
Like 512 Hours, La Pocha Nostra’s Ex Centris (2003) and Mapa Corpo 2 (2007) 
were visibly framed by an exhibition/performance space, negating the possibility of 
forgetting that it was a work of art. Nevertheless, the “total” environment created during 
these performance installations produces a “heightened state” in the spectator (Gómez-
Peña 2005: 81), which is akin to a type of immersion. The untitled performance at the 
MOCA, Tucson, reflected on in chapter three, had a greater capacity to immerse 
spectators because it was realised in a disused warehouse that enabled the audience to 
more easily re-imagine the location.  
 
Gob Squad’s productions, analysed in chapter five, contain more narrative than 
found in the performances by Abramović or La Pocha Nostra. However, rather than 
                                                          
37 Tassos Stevens, co-director of London-based immersive theatre company Coney, in his keynote lecture 
at the Audience, Experience, Desire Conference at Exeter University, 30 January 2016, discussed the idea 
of being imaginatively immersed as an alternative to being physically immersed. 
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engrossing the audience in a plot, they draw attention to the theatrical frame within 
which participation is performed. Nonetheless, for the ‘remote actors’ who are given a 
role to carry out during Western Society, there is an element of being immersed in the 
instructions communicated.  
 
Overall, although I propose that forms of audience participation in the works under 
analysis are not wholly immersive, the way that they encourage the spectator to 
experience the inside of the performance, by taking part in the action, echoes immersive 
theatre and makes it a useful reference point (White 2013: 16-17). Throughout the 
thesis, I will primarily adopt the term “participation”, rather than “immersive”, to 
describe the audience’s involvement in the case study works. This intersects with my 
research interests in the aesthetic conditions and social dimension of the work, 
emphasised in Bishop’s defining of participation, as well as White’s demarcating of an 
extraordinary form of “participation” that ‘goes beyond’ our typical experience as 
spectators. However, I also acknowledge Guillermo Gómez-Peña’s term “interactive 
rituals” as a potential defining term, in the way that it makes explicit the commonalities 
that these participatory experiments share with ritual. 
 
2.4 Levels of Participation 
Along with the varying definitions to classify participation, there are also different 
levels of activity. The ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’ (1969) offered by Sherry 
Arnstein is one of the more commonly applied spectrums. This eight rung ladder 
outlines varying levels of participation ranging from ‘manipulation’ to ‘full 
participation’. However, the scheme has been criticised by Bishop (2012) for 
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advocating a hierarchy of assessment, according to which the value of a performance 
can be determined by its place on the ladder of participation.  
 
An alternative and less contentious system is the continuum of participation outlined 
by Ronald J. Pelias and James VanOosting in ‘A Paradigm for Performance Studies’, 
published in 1987. This scale spans from the inactive to the proactive, but it doesn’t 
imply an evaluative hierarchy to the same extent as Arnstein.38 In this thesis, the 
performances to be examined mostly demonstrate the third level of participation: 
interactive. At this stage on the spectrum, both performer and spectator can be seen to 
function as co-producers of the experience. Consequently, it is more difficult to 
distinguish between the two roles. However, it should be noted that although 
‘performers maintain the authority to initiate interaction and to select particular subjects, 
the audience is invited to create within an established framework’ (Pelias and 
VanOosting 1987: 224-225). This converges with my analysis of spectators within the 
case study works, who are invited to participate in the performances within a delineated 
structure. The thesis establishes a tension between inviting the audience to directly 
engage in the performance, and putting measures in place to ensure that the participation 
is effectively managed. Furthermore, in chapter four, I stress the perceived possibility of 
failure as a driving force in channeling the hedonistic desire for participation, versus the 
actual possibility of failure given the parameters set out by the artist. 
 
According to Pelias and VanOosting there is also a fourth stage on the continuum of 
participation: proactive, which corresponds to Arnstein’s notion of ‘full participation’, 
and Astrid Breel’s proactive level of agency (Breel 2015: 375, 381) discussed in chapter 
                                                          
38 See Pelias and VanOosting (1987: 224-225) for the full continuum of participation. 
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four. At this level, ‘[t]he question of who is the performer and who is the audience is 
moot; any distinction between performance event and “real life” would be meaningless, 
without referent’ (Pelias and VanOosting 1987: 224-225). I suggest that the sanctions 
imposed on the agency given to the audience in the pieces to be discussed, denies the 
possibility of proactive participation.  
 
Yet, as Matthew Reason contends ‘we should not – at least supposedly – evaluate 
performances as good or not-so-good according to their position on a ladder of 
participation, but because of their aesthetic and experiential qualities’, while he 
acknowledges that ‘[i]n practice, however, this is exactly what is implied by discourses 
that valorise active spectatorship for its own sake over optical passivity’ (2015: 279). 
Indeed, it can be argued that although a participant may be physically activated through 
participation, they may find themselves obediently carrying out the instructions or 
preconceived plans of the artist. For this reason, as Anthony Howell tells us, ‘[t]he 
danger is that while a certain liveliness has been conferred to the artwork, the spectator 
has been reduced to an automaton’ (2000: 64). Therefore, the participant-spectator 
might also be seen as a passive recipient. Similarly, Jen Harvie (2013) argues that 
participation can foster a compliant mode of spectatorship, with performing-spectators 
‘dutifully performing as instructed, when instructed’ (2013: 43). However, Howell goes 
on to say that ‘interaction need not be banal’ and in fact can begin to dissolve or 
question the conventions of performance, such as the performer/spectator relationship 
and seating arrangement (2000: 64-66). This argument underscores my examination of 
the way that participation unsettles binary relations and borders in performance, 
discussed in the second part of this chapter.     
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What will become clear as the thesis progresses is that the redefinition of the 
spectator as participatory has created a whole set of issues regarding the concept of 
performance: 
First, questions of power arise when deciding who (performer and/or audience) 
may be given (or denied) the right to initiate an aesthetic interaction … Second, 
questions of accountability arise when assigning varying degrees of 
responsibility for artistic achievement to performers and audiences … Third, 
questions of evaluation derive from the differences between communal and 
expert standards. What may be sanctioned within the special world of artists by 
their own elite authority may not find general support within a given 
community. (Pelias and VanOosting 1987: 225) 
 
These concerns over power, accountability and value continue to permeate critiques 
about participatory practice, and while the audience for this kind of interactive 
experience appears to be growing, so too do the suspicions of scholars and critics.  
 
2.5 The Form of Participation 
Expanding on the nature of participation, this next section will explore the contentious 
discussions that surround its composition. I suggest that to a great extent the debates 
concerning participatory practices are really a question of form. As Karoline Gritzner 
questions in her article entitled ‘Form and Formlessness: Participation at the limit’ 
(2011): what happens to form when aesthetic autonomy is challenged through relational 
or participatory art? Gritzner observes that discussions on form are pivotal to 
Bourriaud’s theory of relational aesthetics, and shift the focus beyond the social 
dimension of participation towards its aesthetic value (2011: 111). The practices 
depicted by Bourriaud offer inter-subjective encounters within an emergent structure, 
rather than objects that can be consistently reproduced by the artist. In this way these 
relational works challenge the commodification of art as something that accrues value 
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and is sold on. However, as I discuss in chapter four, it can be argued that today’s 
“experience economy” repackages participatory encounters with the consumer in mind.  
 
Gritzner notes that relational form is ‘formless’ by maintaining that, ‘[i]f the 
participants fail or refuse to take part in an event which is essentially about their actions 
and reactions …the event might not take place and its potential might remain 
unexplored, its form unrealized’ (2011: 110). In other words participatory art practices 
only achieve their form through the act of participation. However, Howell cautions that 
by acknowledging the presence of the audience we might undo the artwork’s capacity to 
‘hold itself together’ (2000: 55-56). He argues that instead of art’s ‘self-structuring 
ability to maintain itself’, it becomes reliant on the presence of the audience to find that 
structure. At his most bleak he states: ‘By acknowledging the audience, performance 
can become a parasite’ (Ibid., 56). This echoes Daphna Ben Chaim’s (1984) earlier 
observation that ‘[w]hen distance disappears then art does too’ (cited in Bennett 1997: 
15). Yet, despite Howell’s scepticism, he proceeds to outline how the ‘homeostasis’ of 
an artwork can be preserved through repetition and continuity of experience, which has 
the capacity to unite an audience even if they encountered the work on separate 
occasions (Howell 2000: 66). This unification of spectators through their participatory 
experiences extends the artwork beyond its given time and space. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than on social media platforms, which have become a focus for post-
performance discussion. I will return to this point in chapter four when I examine the “I 
was there” allure of participatory performance. 
 
Nevertheless, as shown by the levels of interactivity, Gritzner identifies that 
participation is not always unpredictable and can be wholly planned out, with 
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prescriptive instructions for the audience to follow (2011: 110). Therefore, it might 
manifest as the paradoxical form of the formless, or in opposition it might present a 
fairly fixed form. In all of the examples under analysis in this thesis, the audience’s role 
is crucial to fulfilling the aesthetic potential of the work. While there might be elements 
that exist on their own terms, the spectator’s participation gives material form to central 
elements of these performances. There is no human mural without the audience (La 
Pocha Nostra). There are no communal displays of mindfulness without the audience 
(Marina Abramović). There is no re-enactment of a family karaoke night from a 
scarcely watched YouTube video without the audience (Gob Squad). As White puts it: 
‘These processes make the audience member into material that is used to compose the 
performance: an artistic medium’; consequently, audience participation becomes 
aesthetic material (White, 2013: 9-10). The issues created by interactivity, noted by 
Pelias and VanOosting, reside in the question of how audience participation is brought 
forth: who has the power and the responsibility for the work, and how do we measure 
the value of this aesthetic material?  
 
I propose that although the case study works are only partially formed, in a material 
sense, before the audience’s participation, their resultant appearance has largely been 
predetermined by the artist responsible. Hence, while they may appear formless, they do 
in fact have form, which is given visibility by the audience. Still, in spite of the fairly 
fixed form within which participation occurs, the performances under discussion also 
retain a space for the spontaneous interactions and even transgressions of their 
spectators, evidenced in the case study chapters. Moreover, this thesis will go on to 
demonstrate that it is the emergent nature of form in participatory performance that 
converges with the evolving manifestations of presence that it brings forth, discussed in 
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chapter four. And, this in turn creates a mutable code of ethics for spectators to 
navigate, discussed in chapter five.  
 
This innate fluidity of form also meets with Machon’s writing on (syn)aesthetic 
modes of practice in relation to the inheritance of a feminised style on (syn)aesthetic 
modes of practice (Machon 2009: 26). Machon maintains that (syn)aesthetic 
performance is characterised as the ‘consolidation of a variety of artistic principles, 
forms and techniques, manipulated in such a way so as to fuse the somatic and the 
semantic in order to produce a visceral response in the audience’ (Machon 2009: 14; 
emphasis original). The way that it coincides with a feminised style is made most 
striking in Machon’s appropriation of Hélène Cixous’s écriture féminine 37 and Luce 
Irigaray’s assertion that ‘form is never complete in her’, as she determines  a ‘feminine 
morphology’ of form which remains in a constant state of becoming (Irigaray, 1999 
[1991]: 55; emphasis original, in Machon 2009: 43). However, I acknowledge that 
establishing a ‘feminised’ style risks reproducing essentialist notions of gender. I am 
also conscious of the way in which this emergent formation of the feminine can be 
perceived as a lack of form, or rather a lack of stability, converging with the image of 
the feminist writer as a ‘madwoman’.38 Moreover, I am wary of a developing dialogue 
on the importance of spectator comprehension and “getting it” in participation,39 as 
what might be seen as an attempt to harden or masculinise this unruly form. While, my 
thesis recognises the potential dangers of participation, I suggest that these are an 
                                                          
37 The term “écriture féminine” literally means “feminine writing”, and was first coined by Hélène Cixous 
in her essay, ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’ (1975). 
38 See Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar (2000/1980) for a detailed critique on the Madwoman in the Attic. 
39 These conversations were particularly prevalent during the conference on ‘Audience, Experience, 
Desire: interactivity and participation in contemporary performance and the cultural industries’ hosted by 
the University of Exeter in January 2016. 
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essential part of its makeup. If you control the form too much, you fix what is inherently 
fluid; thus, you replace participation as a meaningful act with the display or spectacle of 
participation. Nonetheless, in a culture of blogging, where everyone is a self-proclaimed 
art critic, and at a time when funding applications must emphasise the impact of the 
proposed work; relinquishing control of the art is a precarious business. There are other 
parallels to be found between écriture féminine and participation, in particular their 
shared resistance to fixed binary oppositions. Indeed, the thesis will draw on Hélène 
Cixous’s writings in chapter four on presence, and in chapter five on ethics. 
 
Maravala and Ramos of ZU-UK suggest that what is needed to create a more 
responsible form is “a dramaturgy of participation” (2016). These performance makers 
of ground-breaking immersive works such as the infamous overnight trilogy Hotel 
Medea (2006-2012), identify a problem in conventional performance training for actors, 
directors, and writers which does not take into account a live and participating audience, 
stating: 
The supposed freedom offered to audience members, or the ability to interact 
directly with the fictional scenario in question, raises a number of issues. The 
skill and experience required by makers to design such logistics, and for 
performers to manage active audiences in the context of such a proposition, 
would benefit from more rigorous investigation and care. (Maravala and Ramos 
2016)  
 
For Maravala and Ramos this methodology towards immersive and participatory 
performance ‘can, and must, be taught’. Furthermore, it should be steered by established 
practitioners of participatory work, to ‘encourage excellent artistic practice'. It is this 
proposition that I take issue with because it implies a level of quality to be achieved, 
which is buttressed by the proposed requirement for a more formal training approach. 
While I recognise the importance of learning from the practice of experienced makers, I 
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also subscribe to Gómez-Peña’s advice for emerging performance artists to: ‘[r]espect 
your elders and predecessors. Treat us with tenderness, and then, when the time comes, 
kill us ritualistically’ (2005: 186).  
 
It is, for me, the inherent risk and pursuit of innovation, characteristic of these 
practices, which continues to fuel our appetite for these works. If we put too many 
sanctions in place to ensure ‘excellence’ then we may dilute its effect, and thus its 
appeal for both artists and spectators. In this way, participatory practices become for 
contemporary art what reality television has become for broadcasting - fatigued and 
derivative; and what was once surprising emerges as a well-heeled performance device. 
One could argue that a decline in excitement and a manufactured appearance are merely 
symptomatic of participation’s maturity. However, if we accept Lois Keidan’s view that 
live art is the research engine for mass culture, which functions ten years ahead of the 
mainstream, then there is much to be learnt from the way in which live art defiantly 
resists easy categorisation (Live Art Development Agency 2016). Accordingly, live art 
‘offers a space in which artists can take formal and conceptual risks’ and ‘breaks the 
rules about who is making art, how they are making it and who they are making it for’ 
(Ibid). In this way, I suggest that it is in live art where participation may be sustained as 
an artistic experience, rather than as an economical one. Live art’s status as an 
underground and rebellious arts practice serves as a defense against commercialism, in 
spite of the appropriation of performance art by Lady Gaga and Jay Z’s collaboration 
with Abramović on his music video for Picasso Baby (2013).  
 
The danger of adopting a dramaturgy of participation is that by establishing a taught 
understanding of the practice and processes of participation in developing actors, 
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directors and writers, it may encourage a learnt behaviour of “good” spectatorship for 
audiences of this work. As Dominique Pasquier considers in her article ‘“The 
Cacophony of Failure”: Being an audience in a traditional theatre’ (2015), ‘[t]he wish to 
maintain an ascetic approach might therefore put some audiences off from accessing 
theatre for the first time (Bourdieu 1984)’ (2015: 21). The risk is that the exchange 
underpinned by the dramaturgy of participation becomes one of academic perception 
rather than phenomenological experience. Furthermore, it makes the whole proposition 
much more marketable because it removes some of the precariousness that for some 
makes it too perilous. While this may seem to make it more accessible, at the same time 
it renders it even more elitist, as there are those that know the rules (the twists and 
gimmicks) and those that don’t. To distinguish a dramaturgy of participation may return 
the purpose of art to an aesthetic one, rather than as an oppositional space for the 
realisation of alternative social and political realities.  
 
However, we do need to acknowledge the challenge that participation poses for 
directors and performers, and one might argue that these practices would be more 
effective if they were better communicated. Reflecting on my own experience directing 
immersive practice and as a performer with La Pocha Nostra, I have noted particular 
nuances in performer training towards fostering and managing an “active” audience. 
This may include understanding how to identify a willing participant, and managing a 
“difficult” spectator. It may in fact fall to the spectator to provide the ultimate antidote 
to a dramaturgy of participation, as a vital yet unknown element of a performance, 




Even though I am cautious of Maravala and Ramos’s proposal, I am not opposed to 
the sharing of methodologies, and I agree that we must ‘clearly articulate to audiences, 
funders, festivals and especially to artists committed to making such work, just how 
time consuming, expensive and complex a process of creating extraordinary experiences 
for active audiences is – especially when audiences are invited to interact’ (Maravala 
and Ramos, 2016). Furthermore, as Adriana Disman suggests, ‘we need to rethink the 
ways we are asking artists to legitimize and validate their art’ (2015: 48). For these 
reasons, we do need to recognise spectator-participation as a practice in its own right. 
But, we must be careful not to reduce it to a training field of processes and practices that 
limit its creative potential. This doesn’t mean that individual companies and artists 
shouldn’t have their own dramaturgy of participation, and it is evident that Maravala 
and Ramos’s approach offers a thoughtful consideration of the ethics of audience 
interaction. Following Reason, I propose that ‘rather than looking always for 
overarching structures or grand narratives we look first at the particular qualities of the 
encounters and how these are received, remembered and valued’ (2015: 280).  
 
One way of analysing the encounters is through the conceptual frame of Machon’s 
notion of “(syn)aesthetic performance” (Machon 2009: 14), which upholds 
participation’s relationship to a feminised form. This application is supported by 
Machon’s own use of her theory in defining Immersive Theatres (2013). In 
(syn)aesthetics she identifies three tenets of female practice that contribute to its 
categorisation. Firstly, ‘the experimentation with transgressive form and content’ which 
includes embracing hybridized artistic practices; secondly, the ‘explicit use of the body 
in performance’; and finally, a knowing use of critical theory within the artistic practice 
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(Machon, 2009: 26). This thesis will demonstrate how these traits are present in the 
participatory encounters discussed. 
It would appear that form is one of the areas on which critics and scholars of 
participation are divided. For some, its formlessness threatens the concept of how art is 
made and received. For others, this incompleteness enables it to become something else 
at any moment, which makes it a dynamic and potentially transformative mode of 
performance. Importantly, it is the supposed transformative capacity of participation 
which distinguishes it as a vehicle for social and political change. 
 
2.6 The Political Status of Participation 
In order to fully understand the meaning of participation, it is essential to consider the 
established relationship that it holds with political empowerment. Therefore, the next 
five sections will explore the notion of participation as a democratising of the art-
making process, and the way that it affects binaries and borders in performance. 
According to Bishop, Walter Benjamin was one of the first theorists to recognise the 
political status of participation;40 she notes that ‘Benjamin maintained that the work of 
art should actively intervene in and provide a model for allowing viewers to be involved 
in the processes of production’ (2006: 11). For this reason, ‘a paradigm of physical 
involvement’ that sought to bring actors and spectators closer together fuelled the 
experiments of the avant-garde theatre of the ‘60s. Henceforth, participation was 
positioned as the forerunner of social change, which is an idea that persists today (Ibid., 
11-12). Beech observes that participation has been treated as the solution to many of the 
issues surrounding conventional forms of cultural engagement and human relations 
                                                          
40 See Walter Benjamin’s ‘The Author as Producer’ (1934) in Understanding Brecht (1998: 85–103). 
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(2010: 25). Similarly, Helen Freshwater notes that: ‘the belief in a connection between 
audience participation and political empowerment’ is one of the most revered and 
accepted views within theatre studies (2009: 3).  
 
According to Bishop, the realisation of political empowerment through participation 
has largely been interpreted by practitioners in three ways: activation, authorship and 
community (2006: 12). First, activation can be understood as ‘the desire to create an 
active subject, one who will be empowered by the experience of physical or symbolic 
participation’ (Ibid). Moreover, this underpins a prevalent ideology that these 
emancipated spectators will now feel galvanised to establish their own social and 
political existence. Second, authorship or rather the relinquishing of authorial control on 
the part of the artist is recognised as a democratising of the art making process, as well 
as returning ‘the aesthetic benefits of greater risk and unpredictability’ (Ibid). It could 
be said that Roland Barthes’s ‘Death of the Author’ (1967) has since spurred the ‘birth 
of the participant’. This collaborative imagining is seen to arise from and to support ‘a 
more positive and non-hierarchical social model’ (Ibid). Third, community or what is 
regarded as ‘a crisis in community and collective responsibility’ has underlined ‘a 
restoration of the social bond through a collective elaboration of meaning’ (Ibid). While 
these motivations cited by Bishop inform much of the discourse surrounding 
participation, it should be remembered that this list is not exhaustive. Artists use 
participation for a variety of reasons, not least because they want to feel closer to their 
audience as evidenced by the works exhibited at Home Live Art (HLA). Bishop 
maintains that the phenomenon of participation in contemporary culture has weakened 
its position, noting that: 
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[P]articipation is used by business as a tool for improving efficiency and workforce 
morale, as well as being all-pervasive in the mass-media in the form of reality 
television. As an artistic medium, then, participation is arguably no more intrinsically 
political or oppositional than any other. (2006: 11-12)  
 
In addition, recent discourse on the commodification of participatory practices, framed 
by the experience economy, has suggested that these works frequently present a 
spectacle of politics rather than being inherently political. This thesis will follow Bishop 
to consider notions of activation, authorship and community within the case study 
works, to determine how political empowerment has been interpreted within these 
examples of participatory live art. 
 
2.7 The Emancipated Spectator 
One of the most prominent theories to challenge the claims made by participation is 
Jacques Rancière’s writing on The Emancipated Spectator (2007, 2009). In this section, 
I look at the underlying principles of this philosophy; how it corresponds to issues and 
debates that surround participation; and informs the areas to be explored in this study. 
Rancière’s treatise seeks to contest the presupposition that a participant-spectator is an 
emancipated subject. He maintains that the many arguments that have sought to 
undermine conventional theatre practice emerge out of a contradiction that he refers to 
as ‘the paradox of the spectator’: 
There is no theater without spectators … But spectatorship is a bad thing. Being 
a spectator means looking at a spectacle. And looking is a bad thing, for two 
reasons. First, looking is deemed the opposite of knowing. … Second, looking is 
deemed the opposite of acting. He who looks at the spectacle remains motionless 
in his seat, lacking any power of intervention. Being a spectator means being 
passive. The spectator is separated from the capacity of knowing just as he is 
separated from the possibility of acting. (Rancière, 2007: 271-272) 
 
Consequently, he notes that it has been implied that we need a new theatre or rather a 
return to what is perceived as the true essence of theatre, which has been interpreted in 
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two ways. The first is to release the spectator from the position of a passive viewer by 
confronting them with the spectacle of something strange that requires further 
investigation. The second is to ask the spectator to relinquish the role of observer and to 
be ‘drawn into the magical power of theatrical action’ (Rancière, 2007: 272). I propose 
that the case studies at the heart of this thesis exemplify and offer some of the most 
extreme interpretations of both models. Reason considers that ‘in the legacy of an 
overly comfortable binary between active and passive spectatorship’ there is a belief 
that: ‘performances that engage audiences actively through participation also 
emancipate and empower and are consequently radically liberating’ (2015: 272). This 
perspective can be seen to respond to the issue of externality identified in Guy Debord’s 
critique (1967), which proposes that forms of spectacle are the reign of vision and 
vision means externality (Rancière 2007: 274). 
 
Rancière’s philosophy challenges Debord's notion of externality, especially the 
implication that vision separates the viewer from his own being; therefore, rebuffing his 
statement that ‘the more man contemplates, the less he lives’ (Debord 1967: 30 cited in 
Rancière 2007: 274). Bishop points out that it is telling that the three main concerns of 
participation - activation, authorship and community - also appear in the writing of 
Debord, ‘since it is invariably against the backdrop of his critique of capitalist 
“spectacle” that debates on participation come to be staged’ (2006: 12). She notes that 
in the foreground of these discussions is Debord’s contention that, ‘[t]he spectacle - as a 
social relationship between people mediated by images – is pacifying and divisive, 
uniting us only through our separation from one another’ (Ibid). Instead, Debord 
advocates what he terms as “constructed situations”, which advance the Brechtian 
model of awakening the audience’s critical awareness. Subsequently, this redefines the 
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function of the audience from viewer to viveur (one who lives) (Bishop 2006a: 12-13). 
The aim of these situations was to ‘produce new social relationships and thus new social 
realities’ (Ibid). It is significant that Debord locates this arts practice in participatory 
events that use experimental behaviour to ‘break the spectacular bind of capitalism’ 
(Debord, 1967 in Bishop, 2006b: 96).  
 
Current discourse on the commodification of participatory practices suggests that the 
society of the spectacle has in actuality been replaced by a spectacle of sociability and 
politics, or as Bourriaud’s puts it: ‘the society of extras’ (2002: 26). This is a situation 
that is epitomised by our advancement into the era of the social network, whereupon 
web-based platforms like Facebook and Twitter have become the focus of 
communication, relationships, and political debates. However, like social media, 
Gritzner questions whether participation may in fact mask social fragmentation and 
alienation, stating that: ‘[p]articipatory performances may seem to respond to the desire 
for immediacy and relevance but remain, like all art, an illusion, a semblance 
(appearance)’ (2011: 109). The analysis of my encounters with La Pocha Nostra’s 
practice highlights the provisional nature of the relationships and “micro-topias” 
(Bourriaud 2002) formed through participation, discussed in chapter three. This 
demonstrates that while participation may seem to respond to our need for real meetings 
with real bodies, when all is said and done, it is a performance. Reason emphasises 
Rancière’s claim that ‘the audience as active participant is forever in danger of 
becoming lost in a form of “consumerist hyper-activism”’ (Reason 2015: 274).  He goes 
on to suggest that this has ‘echoes of the concept of “false consciousness”, in which the 
consumer is manipulated into imagining that they have choice and power while in fact 
and at the same time voluntarily surrendering their freedoms’ (Ibid). This argument will 
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be brought into focus in my analysis of agency and the display of agency in chapter 
four, drawing on the recent research of Astrid Breel. 
  
The principle of giving the audience agency is largely founded on Rancière’s 
‘paradox of spectatorship’, and a desire to make the spectator more actively engaged in 
the performance. Conversely, the philosopher argues that the opposition between 
looking and knowing is reductive; henceforth, he proceeds to question the whole set of 
relations upon which theatre is based (Rancière 2007: 277). He proposes that rather than 
reinvent the theatre, we should rethink the way in which we value binary pairs, asking: 
What makes it possible to pronounce the spectator seated in her place inactive, if 
not the previously posited radical opposition between the active and the passive? 
... These oppositions - viewing/knowing, appearance/reality, activity/passivity - 
are quite different from logical oppositions between clearly defined terms. ... 
They are embodied allegories of inequality. That is why we can change the value 
of the terms, transform a ‘good’ term into a ‘bad’ one and vice versa, without 
altering the functioning of the opposition itself. (Rancière 2009: 12) 
 
To follow Rancière, a spectator is considered inferior to the performer because they 
simply watch the action unfolding, whereas the performer is physically doing something 
on stage. But, if we rethink the value of these positions, we may suppose that the 
performer is inferior to the spectator because they are physically put to work, whereas 
the spectator is in the enviable position of reflecting on and evaluating the action. The 
opposition and inequality between these two positions remains, but the positions are 
switched (Rancière 2009: 12). However, although this interpretation may empower the 
passive spectator, it is to the detriment of the performer. Rancière asserts that it is not a 
case of reversing these binary positions, but recognising that the structure of these 
oppositions creates two categories: those who possess a capacity and those who do not. 
Subsequently, he proposes that emancipation emerges out of a principle of equality 
between the two sides; beginning with challenging the opposition between looking and 
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acting. Rancière maintains that: ‘The spectator also acts, like the pupil or scholar. She 
observes, selects, compares, interprets. … She participates in the performance by 
refashioning it in her own way … They are thus both distant spectators and active 
interpreters of the spectacle offered to them’ (Ibid., 13). Therefore, according to 
Rancière, a passive spectator is able to actively engage in a performance precisely 
because of their distance from the action; the border provides them with the space to 
make connections between the reality on stage and in their own life. 
 
Yet, a criticism of Rancière’s writing (raised by Freshwater 2009: 17, White 2013: 
22 and Reason 2015: 275) is that there is limited engagement with actual theatre 
practice. Furthermore, as Reason notes, his theory is entirely divorced from actual 
audiences (2015: 275). Julie Wilkinson attempts to address these issues in her analysis 
of Rancière’s envisaging of ‘the spectator as a partner in the interpretation of their 
experience of watching a performance’ (2015: 133). The investigation used creative and 
dialogic research methods including workshops, questionnaires and interviews with 
audience members, to examine how they make connections between their theatre 
experience and their own personal narratives, as implied by Rancière (Ibid., 134). 
Wilkinson’s analysis found that one’s personal narrative is directly affected by a shared 
narrative between spectators, stating: 
[E]very spectator must negotiate not only with the reactions of fellow audience 
members at a particular performance, but with sets of unspoken but shared 
cultural values, with powerful emotional and social significance. These 
tramlines of collective memory underscore our personal associations.  
Rancière’s active spectator is never an isolated subject. (2015: 142)  
    
This notion of a shared narrative corresponds to Nicholas Ridout’s “ethics of 
encounter”, discussed in chapter five, which draws on the writing of Levinas (1969, 
1989) to establish that ethics may be less about the self and more about someone else.  
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Wilkinson’s study bears out Rancière’s argument that spectators can be imaginatively 
emancipated through their active translating of the performance, which enables them to 
shape their understanding of the images presented in relation to their own personal 
narrative. Nevertheless, the research also draws attention to the fact that there are shared 
cultural values and narrative conventions which undermine the agency of the watching-
spectator and affect the way in which we process the experience. This challenges 
Rancière’s proposal that a spectator is ‘an actor in his own story’ (Rancière 2007: 279 
emphasis mine), and suggests that a more radical emancipation of the spectator is 
needed if they are to be free from a culturally imposed narrative.   
 
The duality between the spectator and actor roles, implied by Rancière, converges 
with Caroline Heim’s writing on the Audience as Performer (2016) which suggests that 
in mainstream theatre ‘there are two troupes of performers: actors and audience 
members’ (Heim, 2016: 4). She establishes that just as the actors are playing a role on 
stage; the audience are playing the role of the audience. Furthermore, while there is a 
tendency to consider those observing as being in a position of judgement as they 
critique the merits of the performance, the actors are similarly critiquing the 
performance of the audience: ‘the actors are the audience’s audience’ (Ibid., 22). Heim 
highlights the backstage and dressing room chatter, where actors reflect on what the 
audience is like and how receptive they are to the production (Ibid., 4).This suggests 
that in the mind of the performer, the spectator is conceived as an active participant – 
even if their activity manifests as passivity or even sleep. However, the same may not 
be true in the mind of the spectator, especially if their presence is largely 
unacknowledged for the duration of the performance. The distance between the stage 
and the auditorium might enable the spectator to gain greater perspective on the stories 
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told, but it may also relinquish them of their responsibility to the other side of the 
border. There have been many occasions when I have attended a mainstream theatre 
production and part way through noted a sleeping spectator. As Pasquier observes, 
sleeping is seen by some audience members as a polite way of showing disinterest, 
inasmuch as it doesn’t upset the action on the stage (2015: 229).  
 
According to Anna Fenemore, immersive practices establish performance conditions 
that encourage a state of wakefulness (2011: 43). These tactics preclude the audience 
from disengaging their brain, to encourage active engagement. Consequently, they bring 
the audience much more into the view of the audience’s audience: the performers. The 
presence of the audience is both acknowledged and counted on to realise the form of the 
performance. While the audience for conventional theatre have always ‘held the power 
of making or breaking a play by attendance or abstention’ and are ‘ultimately 
responsible for sustaining the performance’ (Burns 1972: 184-5 in Bennett 1997: 18), a 
play can still function with little to no audience. In participatory performance the 
production is not complete without the input of spectators; they are part of the script, 
they are part of the set, they matter. Moreover, the watching-spectators, who identify 
with the participating bodies as an extension of themselves, are also reminded of their 
own presence and responsibility for the performance. I will provide a detailed 
discussion on the significance of presence and responsibility in relation to participation 
in chapters four and five. 
 
Rancière offers an alternative perspective on the predisposition for participation in 
his assertion that the main focus of dramaturges is to get the spectator to do something, 
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to move from being passive to active, even if they don’t know exactly what they want 
the spectator to do (2007: 277). He observes that: 
[C]rossing borders and blurring the distribution of roles are defining 
characteristics of theater and of contemporary art today, when all artistic 
competences stray from their own field and exchange places and powers with all 
others ... as a means of increasing the power of the performance without 
questioning its grounds. (Rancière 2007: 280) 
 
Similarly, Beech pinpoints an over-emphasis on redressing the power of the author as 
one of the main restrictions on contemporary arts practice (2010: 28). Furthermore, Hal 
Foster warns in his essay ‘Chat Rooms’ that participation is in danger of being pursued 
for its own sake, stating that, ‘we might not be too far from an artworld version of ‘flash 
mobs’ – of ‘people meeting people’ (Foster 2004 in Bishop 2006a: 194). These 
criticisms also converge with conversations on the spectacle of participation (see Bishop 
2006a, 2006b, 2012; see also Harvie 2013). 
 
Beech maintains that it is essential to the critique of participation that we accept it as 
a form of cultural engagement that has its own limitations and subjectivities. This 
begins with recognising that participation requires the participant to accept the 
parameters of the art event, rather than to evaluate or subvert what takes place (Beech in 
Walwin 2010: 25). One of the most frequent criticisms of participation is the way that it 
often invites the spectator to enter into a predetermined role, which ultimately makes 
them complicit in the work. Therefore, rather than cast as an agent of critique or as an 
emancipated spectator, the participant may in fact be more under the artist’s control than 
from a distant position (Ibid). However, Zerihan notes that part of the excitement of 
participation is ‘the opportunity it affords the spectator to immerse themselves in the 
performance framework set out by the practitioner’ (Zerihan, 2009: 5). Furthermore, it 
is the imposed framework of the performance which permits the spectator to experience 
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emancipation from their everyday self by removing the need to take responsibility for 
their actions. In this way, ‘the performance told me to do it’ becomes a defence against 
outside judgement, and even our own feelings of regret or remorse which may come 
later. This thesis will reflect on the parameters for engagement within the context of the 
case study works, as well as discussing the notion of agency more broadly in chapter 
four. 
 
A further criticism of the claims made on behalf of participatory performance is its 
communitarian potential. Rancière bases his dismissal of this belief on the principle that 
there is nothing more communal about spectators watching a theatre show from them 
watching the same television programme at the same time. This may be especially true 
in the case of reality television shows like the X Factor, where the audience is able to 
react in the real time of the live transmission as if they were part of the live audience, 
who they may also feel akin to. However, Rancière’s argument does not acknowledge 
the relationship formed between the ‘two troupes of performers: actors and audience 
members’ (Heim, 2016: 4). This thesis will demonstrate how performance has the 
power to create a palpable exchange of energy between the performer and the spectator, 
which is particularly discernible when the two are in close proximity. For Rancière, an 
audience’s collective power is brought forth by an equality of intelligences that allows 
spectators to intellectually connect with the work (Rancière 2007: 278). He writes that: 
‘It calls for spectators who are active interpreters, who render their own translation, who 
appropriate the story for themselves, and who ultimately make their own story out of it’ 
(Rancière 2007: 280). However, we have seen that ‘an equality of intelligences’ is in 
actuality constrained by shared cultural values and narrative conventions (Wilkinson 
2015: 142). Nevertheless, as I discussed in chapter one, Rancière’s claim that ‘[a]n 
89 
 
emancipated community is in fact a community of storytellers and translators’ (2007: 
280) may well be realised by scholars in the field of immersive and participatory 
practices, who become narrators of their own embodied experiences of research.   
 
Rancière’s writing influences my analysis of the way in which spectators’ are 
emancipated within the case study performances. Moreover, it underpins my rethinking 
of how we value the two sides of binary relations. Yet, in my consideration of live art, 
this thesis extends the meaning of Rancière’s concept of “the emancipated spectator”. It 
shifts the emphasis from spectators being released from their seat in the audience, to the 
notion of spectators being activated and invited to co-produce the work in some way. As 
such, the study explores the notion of “the emancipated spectator” as a participant who 
is freed from their everyday self and social reality.  
 
2.8 The Transformative Power of Participation 
Erika Fischer-Lichte’s Transformative Power of Performance: A New Aesthetics (2008) 
provides a different reading from Rancière on the potential of participation. Even 
though her theory acknowledges that there are limitations to participation, it advocates 
its capacity to transform participants, binary relations and borders in performance. 
Fischer-Lichte notes several shared practices to emerge out of experiments with actor 
and spectator-participation:  
The staging strategies or game instructions devised for such experiments play 
with three closely related processes: first, the role reversal of actors and 
spectators; second, the creation of a community between them; and third, the 
creation of various modes of mutual, physical contact that help explore the 
interplay between proximity and distance, public and private, or visual and 
tactile contact. (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 40) 
 
The role reversal of actors and spectators, according to Fischer-Lichte, acts as a 
‘magnifying glass’ to bring in to focus the unpredictable process of audience reception 
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(2008: 43). Additionally, she notes that their bodily co-presence in the act of 
participation has the capability to destabilise the dichotomous subject/object 
relationship. This connects to my earlier point regarding the communitarian potential of 
performers and spectators. Fischer-Lichte maintains that unsettling the subject/object 
binary in turn challenges the traditional opposition between art, theatre, and social 
event, which subsequently re-establishes the bond between the aesthetic, social, and 
political in performance (2008: 43-44). This role reversal affords ‘an opportunity for 
actors and spectators to physically experience community with another group from 
which they were originally excluded’, which can have both aesthetic and political 
implications (2008: 55). The notion of groups was previously touched on in relation to 
Heim’s theorising, I will return to the subject in chapter five, where I will apply Erving 
Goffman’s notion of “teams”.  
 
In Fischer-Lichte’s examination of the role reversal of actors and spectators, she 
outlines how it draws attention to the “autopoietic feedback loop” (2008: 40). The term 
“autopoietic” is significant here; ‘auto’ is a derivative of the Greek meaning of “self” 
and ‘poiesis’ is Greek for “creation, production”. The combination of these terms 
produces a concept that refers to a system capable of reproducing and maintaining itself, 
which in the context of this study refers to the performance’s capacity to ‘hold itself 
together’ (Howell, 2000: 55-56). According to Fischer-Lichte the feedback loop is a 
‘self-organizing system’ that incorporates all emerging elements of the performance. 
Central to this process is the emergence of spectators’ actions and performers’ reactions, 
which is more striking in work where participation occurs. The feedback loop relies on 
the mutual interaction between actors and spectators to produce the performance, rather 
than the suggestion that the artist is the sole creator. Fischer-Lichte states:  
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The perceptible workings of the autopoietic feedback loop, apparent in all forms 
of role reversal between actors and spectators, allows all participants to 
experience themselves as co-determinate participants of the action. Neither fully 
autonomous nor fully determined by others … Herein lies a fundamental 
component of aesthetic experience that enables the autopoiesis of the feedback 
loop. (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 164-165)   
 
This notion of the “autopoietic feedback loop” corresponds to my theorising of binary 
relations in the situation of participation as interdependent, applying Nora Bateson’s 
term “symmathesy”, discussed in chapter three. Fischer-Lichte emphasises that it is the 
reciprocal relationship of negotiation between the performer and the spectator in the 
feedback loop that makes transformation implicit, as every turn can also be recognised 
as a transition from one state to another (2008: 50). Also, in chapter three, I determine 
that the improvised decisions between co-participants can be seen to drive the 
“autopoietic feedback loop”. 
 
Fischer-Lichte identifies role reversal as a principle strategy in working towards a 
shared authorial responsibility for performance. Nonetheless, she contemplates whether 
the responsibility of the performance is really equal for both artist and spectators, given 
that the artist is expected to develop the work in the first instance and the audience are 
merely asked to respond to it (2008: 163). Fischer-Lichte suggests that, ‘[it] is essential 
to ask whether role reversal establishes a community of co-subjects or merely recreates 
the old relationship in a new guise’, although she concedes that there is no clear answer 
(2008: 40).  
  
In contrast to Rancière, Fischer-Lichte recognises the communitarian potential of 
theatre (Fischer-Lichte 2005: 23), but she considers that participation (invited or not) 
has the potential to disrupt rather than enhance the feeling of togetherness amongst the 
audience (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 15). Likewise, Howell is concerned that participation 
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can disturb rather than strengthen spectatorship, stating that ‘[i]f individual participation 
is demanded, the audience’s unity may be destroyed’ (Howell 2000: P56).This notion 
underlines Beech’s proposition, drawing on Rancière, that participation can be socially 
divisive, by separating those that do from those that don’t participate (Beech in Walwin 
2010: 25). In this thesis I will establish that participation can create a new hierarchy of 
spectatorship, discussed in chapter three. Furthermore, Fischer-Lichte highlights that the 
early experiments with participation produced ‘short-lived, transient theatrical 
communities of actors and spectators’, as participants were only united through their 
mutual involvement in a set of actions for the length of the performance (2008: 55). 
This coincides with Gritzner’s emphasis on the illusory nature of participation (Gritzner 
2011: 109). Still, all the same, Fischer-Lichte suggests that although short-lived, these 
communities serve to represent the union of the aesthetic and the social in performance. 
While the community may only be realised for an aesthetic purpose, its members 
experience it as a social reality (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 55).  
 
A further development to this argument is the way that a proliferation of social media 
platforms can potentially extend the longevity of a community formed during 
participatory performance. Participants can find sites such as Twitter, Facebook and 
Tumblr places of reunion, where they can experience togetherness once more, through 
their shared retelling of their experiences. In this way, the social reality experienced by 
a community produced during participation is translated into a social media reality. This 
creates a paradoxical arrangement in which the members of that community, who are in 
part motivated by a desire to engage with real bodies, find their connection prolonged 




However, following Rebecca Schneider’s concept of “the document performance” 
(2008), it should be recognised that the community reunited online will not be the same 
community as constituted in the live performance. Firstly, the community brought 
together by a platform such as Twitter will interact within the parameters of that 
particular space, time and ethical code, which is different from the frame of their live 
experience. Secondly, where a performance has been repeated, it may result in multiple 
communities of participants coming together, demonstrated by the Twitter feed for 
#512hours. Nevertheless, while the community manifested online has a different 
constitution to that formed in the live performance, it still functions to bring together the 
aesthetic and the social in performance, as Fischer-Lichte has suggested, albeit in the 
document performance.   
 
Returning to the processes that foster participation, Fischer-Lichte proposes that the 
‘mutual physical contact’ of performers and spectators is capable of collapsing the 
established binary between seeing and touching, and with it ‘a number of other 
interrelated oppositional pairs: public vs. private, distance vs. proximity, fiction vs. 
reality’ (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 62). Her analysis traces the traditional lack of physical 
contact in performance back to the early definition of “theatre” (Greek theatron from 
theasthai = to see, to behold; thea = a view) as a form concerned with seeing. She 
argues that the binary between seeing and touching is still evident in theatre today, as 
theatre (to see) belongs to the public realm, whereas touching is associated with a more 
intimate encounter (2008: 60). However, as chapter four will infer, intimacy in recent 
years has been adopted by the public realm as part of the experience economy. While all 
of the case study performances feature moments of mutual physical contact between the 
artist/performer and the spectator, I suggest that the mutual physical contact between 
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co-participants also challenges the binary of seeing and touching in the context of the 
audience.                                                                                                                           
Fischer-Lichte supports her undoing of the opposition between seeing and touching 
by referring to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished work, ‘The Intertwining-The 
Chiasm’, in which he states: 
We must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut out in the tangible, 
every tactile being in some manner promised to visibility, and that there is 
encroachment, infringement, not only between the touched and the touching, but 
also between the tangible and the visible, which is encrusted in it, as, conversely, 
the tangible itself is not a nothingness of visibility, is not without visual 
existence. Since the same body sees and touches, visible and tangible belong to 
the same world. (Merleau-Ponty 1968 in Fischer-Lichte 2008: 133)   
 
The notion that seeing and touching are inextricably bound together coincides with 
Rancière’s dismantling of the opposition between viewing and knowing. Furthermore, 
Fischer-Lichte implies that this undoing has consequences for the other dichotomous 
relationships in the theatre (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 62), which includes the binary of 
inside/outside of performance. This also offers several points of convergence with 
Cixous’s écriture féminine, particularly her conception that the “eyes are lips” (Cixous 
2001: 9), elucidated in chapter five. Fischer-Lichte’s adoption of Merleau-Ponty’s 
“phenomenology of perception” prepares the way for interpreting participation as a 
phenomenological encounter. Similarly, Machon’s theory of “(syn)aesthetics” is 
informed by Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical modelling of sensory perception. 
Importantly, these discourses will underpin my analysis of the phenomenology of 





According to Fischer-Lichte, when performers and spectators touch each other in 
performance “reenchantment” is made possible, noting that:   
It does not call upon all human beings to govern over nature – neither their own nor 
that surrounding them – but instead encourages them to enter into a new relationship 
with themselves and the world. This relationship is not determined by an “either/or” 
situation but by an “as well as.” The reenchantment of the world is inclusive rather 
than exclusive; it asks everyone to act in life as in performance. (Fischer-Lichte 
2008: 207) 
  
The call for a new set of relations that are inclusive rather than exclusive can be likened 
to Rancière’s argument that there should be greater equality between binary positions. 
However, whereas Rancière proposes a re-evaluation of how we value the two opposing 
sides of relational pairs, Fischer-Lichte identifies a potential model of inclusivity within 
participatory performance. The notion of “reenchantment” - which suggests that we 
were once “enchanted” and no longer are – emerges out of and in response to 
modernity. In particular, it arises from the philosopher Max Weber’s envisaging of “the 
disenchantment of the world”, defined as ‘the knowledge or belief that . . . there are no 
mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, 
master all things by calculation’ (Weber 1946: 139). Fischer-Lichte’s critique suggests 
that crossing borders in performance enables participants to transcend intellectualisation 
and rationalisation to perceive the world anew, with all the magical and mysterious 
energies that it imparts. More crucially, she sees the participant’s reenchantment as a 
doubling process, wherein they take their newfound perception into their own life, 
which in itself destabilises the binary between art and reality. For Fischer-Lichte, 
participation is not simply a matter of crossing borders, rather ‘[t]he border turns into a 
frontier and a threshold, which does not separate but connects. … It is an attempt to 
reenchant the world by transforming the borders established in the eighteenth century 
and opening them up into thresholds’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 204). Fischer-Lichte’s 
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critique on participation underscores my thinking at various points in the study, most 
notably in my analysis of La Pocha Nostra’s practice in chapter three. It is here that the 
constitution of the border as a threshold is brought into focus in my examination of 
processes that work towards nurturing participation, which owes much to Fischer-
Lichte’s analysis. The way that her theory is also underscored by her research on ritual 
(2005) usefully corresponds to my reading of participatory live art through the lens of 
“interactive rituals”. I also propose that Fischer-Lichte’s notion of “reenchantment” 
offers a conceptual frame for understanding participatory live art as a form of 
empowerment that enables alternative political and social realities to come into being.  
 
2.9 Radical Democratic Participation 
To further understand the political potential of participation, this section will explore 
Tony Fisher’s writing on Radical Democratic Theatre (2011), especially his claim that 
it can destabilise existing structures (borders) to open up ‘a space for speech’ where 
alternative forms of social reality might be realised. Fisher maintains that radical 
democratic theatre as a form of participatory performance, neither claims to be 
communitarian, nor insists on the emancipation of the spectator. Instead, he proposes 
that the purpose of radical democratic theatre is ‘the promotion and activation of 
democratic politics’ (Fisher 2011: 23). Central to this agenda is not freedom from 
oppression, as found in Augusto Boal’s43 model of participation, but ‘the destabilization 
of the relational space in which political identities are first configured’ (2011: 15). 
Therefore, the focus of participation moves to equality rather than freedom (Ibid). 
Fisher states: 
                                                          
43 Augusto Boal’s “Theater of the Oppressed” was started in the early 1970s and is a participatory form of 
theatre that stimulates democratic modes of interaction between its “spect-actors”. See Boal (1979) for a 
full account.    
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Radical democratic theatre cannot ‘liberate’ anyone but it can destabilize the 
matrices of a given political distribution and in particular release thereby what 
politics has suppressed – first, antagonism and dissent, and second, forms of 
reciprocal action and empathetic identification on which new forms of sociality 
might be based. (Fisher 2011: 15)  
 
This thesis will explore the way that the performances under discussion disrupt 
established political and social structures. However, as I mentioned in chapter one, 
Bishop has argued that antagonism is frequently lacking in participatory work; 
predicated on social harmony, participation often denies the possibility of resistance or 
meaningful interrogation of the art (2004: 67). Bishop’s argument will underlie 
discussions concerning the agency of the audience and the possibility of dissent within 
the works under analysis. I will also examine how reciprocal action in participation has 
the capacity to bring forth empathetic identification, or what Fischer-Lichte refers to as 
the doubling process of reenchantment.  
 
Fisher recognises that there are a number of shared characteristics between the 
theatre of the oppressed and the more recent model of radical democratic theatre. 
Central to both theatrical strategies is a democratising of the stage space and the 
equality of the performer and spectator (2011: 18). Fisher tells us that for Boal, ‘theatre 
designates a specific structure of domination in which the audience is rendered inert 
insofar as it is the addressee of the theatre spectacle’ (Fisher 2011: 19). The organisation 
of the stage space can then be seen as forming an ‘oppressive relation’, which separates 
‘those who are entitled to act and make decisions, from those designated the recipients 
of those actions’ (Ibid), thus rendering the spectator as passive. This echoes Rancière’s 
assessment that theatre is premised on binary relations that create two perspectives - 
those who possess a capacity and those who do not. Like Rancière, Fisher calls for ‘an 
alternative way of thinking the oppressive relation which takes account of the ambiguity 
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constitutive of social antagonisms’ (Fisher 2011: 21). He suggests that the nucleus of 
radical democratic theatre is the dual process of destabilising the structures of 
domination and opening up new possibilities for political engagement and resistance 
(2011: 24). In this way, I propose that the activist art of La Pocha Nostra epitomises 
radical democratic theatre. 
 
Fisher claims that participation interrogates ‘the arraignment of power’ by opening 
up a ‘space of speech’ (2011: 25). This liminal, albeit temporal, ‘space’ is what gives 
participatory practice its raison d'être, as a place where the everyday is disrupted by the 
‘extra-everyday of performance’, to use White’s language (2013: 5). Fisher maintains 
that: ‘if radical democratic theatre is able to produce political ‘effects’, it is because it is 
able to provide the means for the effective suspension of the conditions of operation 
through which a structure of domination produces its effects’ (2011: 26). However, I 
propose that while participation may have the ability to destabilise established 
‘structures of domination’, it also has the capacity to produce new hierarchies of power. 
This is discussed further in chapter three, where I will also unravel the political effects 
created by La Pocha Nostra’s performances.  
 
2.10 Ontological Participation 
While most of the theoretical perspectives discussed so far have dealt with the political 
dimension to participation, I now wish to highlight Laura Cull’s (2011) concept of 
“ontological participation” which focuses on the experiential aspect of this practice. The 
concept of ontological participation is underpinned by Cull’s reading of Gilles 
Deleuze’s theory of immanence, along with Henri Bergson’s writing on “attention” 
which she conceives as a state of ontological participation that reconsiders the 
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relationship between participation and observation. Furthermore, as intimated in chapter 
one, she identifies Allan Kaprow’s “activities” as a physical manifestation of 
ontological participation, drawing parallels to his concepts of “lived change” and 
“experienced insight”. The term “ontological participation” is used to define a kind of 
audience interaction that manifests as ‘an actual experience (rather than contemplation 
or inference) of [the] metaphysical real, whether we locate this experience in the realm 
of “philosophy”, “art” or life’ (Cull 2011: 80). According to Cull, it is ontological 
participation or taking part in the real that produces what we might recognise as feelings 
and thoughts; therefore, it can be deemed as philosophical in itself (2011: 81).  
 
In a similar way to Rancière, Cull contests the privileging of participatory 
performance, noting that it does not necessarily produce ontological participation. 
Moreover, she similarly reasons that observational forms of theatre are also capable of 
encouraging us to interact in the metaphysical real (Ibid). Following Rancière, Cull sets 
out to further dispel the divide between participation and observation, establishing 
attention in action or looking in the midst of doing as a form of participation (Ibid). 
Later in the essay, she departs from Rancière’s philosophy by disputing the emphasis he 
places on language and narrative, evidenced in his discussion on spectators as active 
interpreters and translators (2011: 87). 
 
Turning to Cull’s interpretation of participation as an immanent encounter, Deleuze’s 
philosophy challenges the way that our understanding of experience is founded on 
binary relations. The notion of immanence is defined throughout Deleuze’s oeuvre, but 
particularly in his last texts where he arrives at the notion of pure immanence. He 
writes: ‘We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not 
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immanence to life … A life is the immanence of immanence: absolute immanence’ 
(Deleuze 2001: 27 in Cull 2011: 82). This proposes that there is only one form of being 
in the world, a single dimension, without the possibility of being ‘outside’ of this 
existence. As Cull notes, an immanent perspective resists the ontological separation of 
thought and being, subject and object, and more broadly, body and mind, self and 
others, theory and practice and so forth (Cull 2011: 82). This destabilising of the way in 
which we understand binaries has resonances with the writings of Rancière, Fischer-
Lichte, and Fisher; however, Cull’s theory of ontological participation is the most 
radical in the way that it rebuffs all forms of separation. For this reason, she identifies 
that: ‘there is something fundamentally participatory about Deleuze’s immanent 
philosophy. Participation comes first, it contends; the organisation (or ‘stratification’) of 
what is into distinct categories or ‘things’ is a secondary phenomenon, and indeed a 
divisive one, that we should seek to undo’ (Cull 2011: 82). In this way, Cull’s argument 
corresponds to my point that in our analysis of participatory performance, we should not 
lose sight of the experience itself. It is in the thought of an absolute state of being that 
Cull finds a clear union between participation and immanence.   
 
The undoing of dichotomous relations also coincides with Deleuze’s synthesis of 
immanence as underpinned by pluralism and difference, which informs Cull’s 
conception of participation as ‘a constantly differing process that actually unsettles our 
powers of recognition’ (Ibid). This assessment contrasts with a phenomenological 
reading that pertains to presence as a self or mutual determining process. In Cull’s 
analysis of Kaprow’s activities she notes that they construct the real in terms of an 
ontology of change or what Kaprow calls “lived change” which is embodied by the 
participant-spectator (Cull 2011: 83). She reflects that: 
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What there is, is change or difference which we take part in ‘automatically’, as it 
were. But art might allow us to feel this participation more deeply, to attend to it 
and indeed, to its ethical and political implications. In turn, both lived change 
and ontological participation are fundamentally embodied activities, but 
crucially, both are also premised on a refusal of any mind/body opposition. 
 (Cull 2011: 83) 
 
On the surface this rejection of a Cartesian dualism41 might appear to correspond to the 
way that Merleau-Ponty undermines the opposition between the visible and the tangible 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968 in Fischer-Lichte 2008: 133). Yet, Deleuze’s concept of 
immanence denies the transcendental logic of phenomenology, which is often purported 
by participation, and is founded on one’s actual bodily relation to the world rather than 
acknowledging an irrational and supernatural element to the experience. Therefore, 
whereas Fischer-Lichte imagines that embodied participation can bring forth ‘the 
reenchantment of the world’, Cull sees it as affording an extended window of 
perception. Drawing on Howard Caygill’s (2011) reading of Bergson, she notes that: 
‘the point is that “we see much more than our consciousness allows us to see” and we 
need to find ways to access that extra-conscious perception (Caygill 2011: n.p.)’ (Cull 
2011: 87). This follows Bergson’s view that ‘[l]ife demands that we put on blinders’ 
(Bergson, 1992 [1934]: 137 in Cull, 2011: 87). For Cull, ontological participation 
cultivates a particular kind of attention which enables the participant to remove these 
‘blinders’. Thus, permitting our capacity for change and to be changed by others; and 
‘growing in the midst of things’ instead of being irrevocably separated from them 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 280 in Cull 2011: 91).  
 
                                                          
41 René Descartes is the most famous proponent of substance dualism, commonly referred to as Cartesian 
dualism after the philosopher, which advocates that the mind and the body are distinct entities. See 
Descartes (1996) for the founding philosophy for this concept. 
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Ontological participation develops and responds to existing critiques on 
participation, most notably Rancière’s writing on the emancipated spectator. 
Importantly, it offers an alternative interpretation of the way in which we perceive 
participation, and emphasises the significance of the experience itself. However, 
reflecting on my own encountering, the discussion on “the paradox of participation” in 
the next chapter articulates my difficulty accepting participation as an immanent 
encounter which denies an outside perspective.  
 
2.11 Conclusion 
In the first half of this chapter we have looked at the varying definitions of audience 
participation to arrive at a special kind of engagement which is ‘exceptional’ and ‘goes 
beyond’ our pre-conceptions of spectatorship (White 2013: 4). It is this form of 
audience participation that is fostered in the works under analysis, which typically 
functions at the interactive level of Pelias and VanOosting’s taxonomy (1987), wherein 
the performer and spectator can be seen to function as co-producers of the experience. 
My analysis has outlined participation as a multi-faceted and contradictory notion that is 
best thought of as mutable rather than as a fixed form. Indeed, Gritzner has suggested 
that participatory art practices only achieve their form through the act of participation. 
This inherent fluidity coincides with a ‘feminine morphology’ of form which remains in 
a constant state of becoming (Irigaray 1999 [1991]: 55 in Machon 2009: 43). Moreover, 
it is indicative of the way in which participation yields evolving manifestations of 
presence and ethics in performance.  
 
Nonetheless, I have highlighted how the idea of formlessness in participation has 
been interpreted by critics as both enabling and limiting. I am wary of Maravala and 
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Ramos’s argument for the dramaturgy of participation and their proposition that 
‘immersive theatre is a skill that can, and must, be taught’ (2016). I propose that if we 
are too instructive on the way that participation operates, it becomes the spectacle of 
participation rather than an actual invitation for spectators to participate in the 
performance in a meaningful way. Yet, I am mindful that we need to accept that 
spectator-participation is evolving into a nuanced area of practice that requires a specific 
set of understandings. To this end, I have suggested that we consider spectator-
participation as a practice in its own right.  
 
In my theorising of the form of participation in the works under discussion, I frame it 
as belonging to a visceral and (syn)aesthetic tradition (Machon 2009). Consequently, I 
identify several characteristics that are consistent with a feminised style, namely 
transgression, hybridity, the explicit body, and embodied theory. These qualities are 
also shared with the broader categorisation of live art practice, and are indicative of the 
way in which participation has emerged out of a performance art tradition.  
 
In the second half of the chapter we looked to Bishop (2006) to uncover the 
motivations and claims made on behalf of participation, and explored some of the main 
arguments levelled against this type of practice. This has included questioning the level 
of activity; the extent to which co-authorship is really shared; and acknowledging how 
participation can be socially divisive, replacing the hierarchy of artist over spectator 
with a pecking order of participant over watcher. I also analyse the communitarian 
potential of participation and its longevity, and how this might be reconfigured and 
extended through the use of social media platforms. On the one hand, I have argued that 
participation as a political and democratic process is a somewhat idealistic view, and 
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one which does not necessarily lead to an emancipated spectator. On the other hand, I 
propose that participation has revitalised the audience’s relationship to performance, 
with the potential to create a ‘space for speech’ (Fisher 2011) where alternative realities, 
relationships and narratives may be realised, if only until the performance has ended. 
  
One of the most pertinent arguments to emerge from this chapter is a disassembling 
of the binary between observation and participation, as it shifts assumptions about 
audience experience and the constitution of performance. Rancière (2007, 2009) 
suggests that we should question how we attribute value to the two sides of oppositional 
pairs, beginning with looking and acting. Fischer-Lichte’s (2008) critique sees the 
mutual physical contact produced by participation, as a way of undoing the related 
dichotomy of seeing and touching, which in turn disturbs the whole set of relations on 
which performance is founded (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 62). Cull’s (2011) theory draws on 
Bergson’s writing and Kaprow’s practice to distinguish a form of “attention” that arises 
from looking in the midst of doing, therefore, combining observation and participation. 
Moreover, she adopts Deleuze’s concept of immanence in her conception of 
participatory experience, to undo the notion of binaries in exchange for an absolute state 
of being (Cull 2011: 82).  
 
On account of these arguments, I maintain that participation as a form of attention 
has the capacity to unsettle the perceived relational foundations of performance. At the 
same time, it should be recognised that for participation to manifest as an embodied 
experience there must be a meaningful investment in the act of doing rather than simply 
viewing the unfolding action. To reiterate my earlier statement: the more that is given in 
participation, the more that is taken in participation. Chapter three will reveal my 
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struggle to deny the existence of binaries in participation, as purported by Cull’s 
ontological participation, particularly the separation of the mind/body and being 
inside/outside of the experience (Cull 2011: 83). However, I support Cull’s line of 
reasoning that to see participation as a series of ‘distinct categories or “things”’ misses 
the point of these complex interactions. To this end, the study proposes that we should 
rethink the relational aesthetics of participation to focus on their interdependency, 
framed by Nora Bateson’s (2016) concept of “symmathesy”, which is outlined in 
chapter three.  
 
In addition to the unravelling of binaries in participatory performance, it would 
appear that the contrasting theories of Rancière and Fischer-Lichte converge to offer a 
fluid notion of the relationship between borders and spectatorship. Fischer-Lichte 
advocates that borders should be turned into thresholds that connect the spectator to the 
transformative possibilities of performance. This standpoint is reinforced by Fisher, 
who imagines a space where established structures of domination are suspended and 
new forms of democratic politics and resistance are opened up. Conversely, Rancière 
regards the border as providing the necessary critical distance for the spectator to 
experience freedom of interpretation, and to make connections between the action and 
their personal narrative. However, Wilkinson has drawn attention to the way that 
spectators are also influenced by cultural convention and the shared narrative of the 
audience; thus they are not an ‘isolated subject’ (2015: 142). Nonetheless, open or 
closed, threshold or barrier, active or passive, by applying the related principle of 
Fischer-Lichte and Rancière and replacing an oppositional structure of “either/or” with 
one of “as well as”, we may allow for the possibility that borders are capable of 
producing more than one kind of emancipated spectator. While this chapter serves to 
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highlight some of the shortcomings of participatory live art, my own experiences and 
the debates surrounding the work bear witness to the fact that this is an exciting place to 
be in art in the twenty first century. As the subsequent chapters testify, these practices 























Chapter Three: Border Crossing and “Interactive Rituals” 
 
3.1 The Third Encounter: La Pocha Nostra’s Untitled Performance at MOCA,  
      Tucson, Arizona (2007)  
It is August 2007. I am sitting on a plane on my way to Tucson, Arizona. I am about to 
embark on a 10-day rehearsal process with La Pocha Nostra as a collaborating artist 
with the company, which will culminate in a performance at the Museum of 
Contemporary Art (MOCA). It is during this performance that I experience spectator- 
participation from the other side of the border. Looking out at the sea of spectators, to 
the cries of Guillermo Gómez-Peña’s familiar plea: “Is there anyone who is willing to 
co-create with me?” my eyes quickly settle on a young woman in a white floral dress 
with a bow in her hair. It was with some trepidation that she left her male companion 
and took my hand. I am in the guise of a twenty-first century blonde-“bomb”shell (see 
Figure 4). My crossed legs conceal my bruised inner thighs (make up) and I am wearing 
a strap-on camouflage decorated dildo. Written down my back are the words 
‘destrucción masiva’, see Figure 5, in reference to the Bush administration’s 
justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
 




Gómez-Peña claims that over the course of their radical performance pedagogy, 
participants can ‘become artistically extroverted within a week’ (2005: 135). In the 
photographs of the MOCA performance, I am barely recognisable from the person in 
the images from Ex Centris. While bare chested in both, I feel less exposed in the role 
of the performer, as my status is fixed and I am able to relinquish responsibility at the 
point in which I wash off my bleeding heart and leave my blonde “bomb”shell behind. 
 
The attendees were not a live art audience but mostly members of the local 
community, who had read in the newspaper that a free public performance was taking 
place in their hometown. Gómez-Peña was sensitive to the non-specialist spectators and 
the demands that he could place on them, and the company supported participants 
during the human mural. Furthermore, my expertise as a participant-spectator served to 
heighten my sensitivity towards the young woman with the bow, as I had an embodied 
perception of her increasing vulnerability and desire for me to take the lead. What you 
see in the documentation of our exchange is a series of images where we are holding 
each other or bound together with rope, see Figure 5. 
 
 




These images do not depict an emancipated spectator; her physicality appears to be 
more passive than active. There is no role reversal, as I feel responsible for her in the 
performance, and the only point in which she lets go of me is when she departs from the 
human mural. She remains in her original dress throughout the performance, limiting 
the transformative effect of her participation. In contrast to my “stylised freak”42, her 
lack of costume evidences a disparity in our roles. Yet, it is precisely because of our 
striking difference – the ordinary in the arms of the extraordinary - that our shared 
experience is even more stirring, which is conspicuous in the documentation. Moreover, 
in the photograph where she is leaving the performance, the hand over her mouth 
suggests that she is trying to come to terms with what she has experienced, see Figure 6. 
However, I am aware that this reading may be influenced by a tendency to romanticise 
the encounter.  
 
 
Figure 6: A participant-spectator post-participation in the human mural. Author’s own image.  
 
                                                          
42 The term “freak” stems directly from Gómez-Peña’s writing and relates to his argument that we are 
installed in what he refers to as “the mainstream bizarre” where radical behaviour, sexual hybridity and 
otherness are stylised and exoticised for daily entertainment. These “stylised freaks” are parodied and 
deconstructed in La Pocha Nostra’s practice, as discussed by Gómez-Peña (2005: 52, 63-64, and 249).     
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It is owing to the documentation that I also recognise that she is wearing a black 
rucksack throughout the improvisation; the decision not to leave it behind symbolises an 
unwillingness to lose her previous identity and perhaps audience-ness, or to remain on 
my side of the border. She is in transit, neither performer nor spectator, but a spectator-
tourist somewhere between the two positions. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
This chapter will examine the processes and practices that enable and trouble spectators’ 
border crossing within La Pocha Nostra’s interactive rituals. The discussion will focus 
on how participation is fostered, the moment of participation, and what it feels like from 
both sides of the border and from the position of being indeterminately in-between the 
two. It is in this chapter that I will analyse my three-way encountering of La Pocha 
Nostra’s performances, by applying the theoretical framework outlined in chapter two 
and critical concepts emerging from the writing of scholars such as Victor Turner, 
Richard Schechner, and Rachel Gomme. The chapter will investigate the ways in which 
these performances correspond to and extend the debates that surround participation.  
 
The analysis will begin with my third encounter, as I examine the way in which the 
participant-spectator inhabits a dual position both inside and outside of the performance, 
applying the concepts of Karoline Gritzner and Gareth White. I will refer to this 
predicament as “the paradox of participation”, and outline how it complicates and 
usefully informs participation. The duality purported by this situation poses a challenge 
to Laura Cull’s notion of “ontological participation” in which there is only a single 
dimension to experience. This leads me to draw an analogy between a participant-
spectator’s duality in performance and Gómez-Peña’s dual citizenship for Mexico and 
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the U.S.  Reflecting on my own experience as a participant-spectator, I will propose that 
the duality of ‘”productive participation”43 is, in fact, an interdependent rather than 
oppositional relationship between the mind and the body. I will also distinguish how 
audience-ness differs across the related fields of theatre and live art, to suggest that the 
role of the spectator in live art, and arguably beyond, is evolving to become increasingly 
mutable. While the paradox of participation presents one of the biggest challenges for 
the analysis of participation, I propose that it also offers a unique vantage point from 
which to consider the performance.  
 
Chapter two outlined Claire Bishop’s (2006) analysis of the artistic motivations for 
making participatory art. However, to understand the growing appetite for these 
performances, chapter three examines the desires and resistances of spectators towards 
participation. In addition, I suggest how participatory live art can represent a ‘limit 
experience’ for some audience members, to use Gritzner’s term (2011: 111). Still, at the 
same time, the discussion will draw attention to an emerging tier of spectatorship: the 
expert participant-spectators and their impact on creating productive participation.  
 
A principle concern for this chapter is to undertake a close examination of La Pocha 
Nostra’s methodology towards participation, with a view to reveal how spectators are 
encouraged and supported to cross the performance border. I will analyse their use of 
the terms “extreme performance games” and “interactive rituals” to define their 
practice; adopting these notions as conceptual frames through which to uncover the 
close bond between participation, ritual, and performance. Drawing on the processes of 
                                                          
43 “Productive Participation” is a term used by Adam Alston to suggest a type of audience participation 
which enhances their involvement and demands that they make, do and feel more. See Alston (2016b: 3-
11) for a full account. 
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ritual and rites of passage, as well as the related writing of Erika Fischer-Lichte (2005, 
2008), the study will distinguish the strategies and tactics that work towards garnering 
the audience’s “special complicity” (Alston 2013: 129; see also Fried 1968: 127) and a 
heightened level of attention that enables spectators to have an embodied experience of 
the performance. 
 
Expanding on the way that participation is generated, the study also explores how the 
three roles - performing-spectator, watching-spectator, and watching-directing-spectator 
- function within La Pocha Nostra’s work. I propose that acknowledging the 
interrelationship between these positions and how they influence participation is pivotal 
to understanding the complex audience dynamic within these works. To this end, I will 
establish that improvisation, reciprocity and “play” are foundational principles in the 
role of the performing-spectator, as well as in the creation of “communitas” (see Victor 
Turner 1982; see also Edith Turner 2005). I recognise that the presence of the watching-
spectator is part of the narcissistic appeal of participation. Still, at the same time, I 
maintain that witnessing the performing-spectators can produce a myriad of emotions 
for those on the side-lines. Furthermore, the notable separation of those that are 
‘participation-rich’ from those that are ‘participation-poor’ substantiates David Beech’s 
suggestion that participation creates a new hierarchy of spectatorship (Beech in Walwin 
2010: 25). Nonetheless, I will argue that this social structure is challenged in La Pocha 
Nostra’s interactive rituals by the watching-directing-spectators. 
 
In the final part of chapter three, I look at the consequences and potentialities of La 
Pocha Nostra’s performances. This directly relates to my on-going questioning of the 
established relationship between participation and political empowerment, and the 
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implied transformative capacity of these encounters. During my analysis, I bring to light 
the issue of care and ethical responsibility in participation, and the limited consideration 
given to the ‘cool down’, to use Richard Schechner’s expression (Schechner 1981: 269). 
I also make a comparison between participatory performance and a one-night stand 
sexual encounter, as a way of considering the role of intimacy within these shared 
experiences. This leads to a more detailed examination of intimacy, applying Gomme’s 
(2015) reflective analysis which draws on the writing of Emmanuel Levinas; and Lisa 
Register and Tracy Henley’s ‘The Phenomenology of Intimacy’ (1992).  
 
Throughout this chapter, I continue to develop a theoretical framework for analysing 
participatory live art. I make particular use of Gómez-Peña’s writing, specifically his 
book Ethno-Techno (2005), which provides a theoretical commentary to the practice 
that features in this study. Moreover, deeper reflection on the three encounters is placed 
in dialogue with the arguments presented, to offer new insights from both inside and 
outside of participation.  
 
3.3 The Paradox of Participation  
Reflecting on my observation that the young woman with the bow appeared to be in 
transit between the roles of performer and spectator, I propose that “the paradox of 
participation” is that as participant-spectators we appear to be on both sides of the 
performance border at the same time. Gritzner establishes in her article ‘On 
participation in Art’ (2011) that although participation can offer an exciting experience, 
it places the spectator in a predicament of occupying two mutually exclusive positions, 
inside and outside of the performance. Therefore, our own self-awareness of what we 
are doing during participation means that ‘consciousness is always somewhere else’ 
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(Gritzner 2011: 136), and in realising this conflict we may become even more self-
aware. Similarly, White acknowledges the continuing role of participants as audience 
members, stating that ‘the participant is simultaneously the performer, the one who 
enacts the performance through choice, the performance that emerges from their own 
body and the audience as they view it’ (2013: 161). This corresponds with Cull’s 
suggestion that participation is not divorced from observation, but instead produces a 
special form of attention that comes from ‘looking in the midst of doing’ (Cull 2011: 
86). Indeed, artists rely on participants maintaining a degree of their audience-ness, as it 
is the special complicity44 that they develop as an audience member which informs their 
improvisation. If we were to forget our audience experience completely, there would be 
no continuity in the aesthetics of the piece and it may develop into something altogether 
different. Conversely, if we are too aware of our audience role, we may feel inhibited in 
our performer role, which may hinder our ability to improvise freely.  
 
Looking back at my own participation in Ex Centris, it was the self-awareness, albeit 
unconscious, of seeing at the same time as doing which informed the way that I 
operated within the human mural. As the audience of my own performance, I felt a 
responsibility to maintain the aesthetic and political agenda that I had experienced 
leading up to my participation. This coincides with Nicholas Ridout’s theorising that 
there is ‘an imaginary “spectator” within us’ (Ridout 2009: 33), which I will return to in 
chapter five. Over the duration of the human mural, I found myself employing the same 
strategy of juxtaposition that I had seen used by La Pocha Nostra. The intensity and 
conspicuousness of my hybrid persona, depicted in Figure 1, attests to the way in which 
                                                          
44 The term “special complicity” was coined by Michael Fried in his analysis of the spectatorship of 




I had developed an affinity with their practice. In the periods of stillness, when Gómez-
Peña, the audience, and the photographers were viewing the final image, I was able to 
see myself both through and reflected in their eyes. Nonetheless, after the event, my 
embodied experience overwhelmed my ability to critique the performance. While I felt 
closer to the practice and its ideology, it was at the loss of my critical distance. Reason 
notes, following Rancière, ‘[e]ngulfed within the work the audience is no longer able to 
see the work, no longer able to question its principles’ (2015: 274). As I highlighted in 
chapter one, writing is one way in which an increasing number of academics in the field 
have attempted to bring together their dual perspective from both sides of the border.  
 
Whereas Cull’s notion of ontological participation challenges the possibility of being 
outside of one’s existence (Cull 2011: 82; see also Deleuze 2001: 27), in my experience, 
this separation was both undeniable and essential to enabling “productive participation”.  
However, I recognise that this assessment may not be true for every participant and as 
critic Lyn Gardner contends, theatre behaviour ‘is a learned behaviour and one that can 
be quickly unlearned’ (2010). As Gómez-Peña has observed, younger audiences already 
see themselves as ‘insiders’ (Gómez-Peña 2005: 54). Similarly, Machon considers that 
the role of spectators within immersive practices has produced an ‘evolvement through 
involvement of a particular kind of audience’ (2013: 73 emphasis original). In this way, 
and given the proliferation of participatory experiences, a single dimension to the 
perception of participation may be an evolutionary possibility for newer audiences. 
 
In developing my analysis of the paradox of participation, I wish to draw a parallel 
between the participant-spectator’s partial belonging to both sides of the performance 
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border and Gómez-Peña’s dual citizenship for Mexico and the U.S. Gómez-Peña 
explains how: 
[w]e exchanged our green card for a gold one, and went from being partial, 
incomplete citizens in Mexico and the U.S. to becoming full citizens in both 
countries. Our rationale for applying was that if our two countries were engaged 
in a seductive rhetoric of “free exchange," it was only logical that all Mexican-
Americans should become dual citizens, and vote in both countries … It was 
only logical that we should demand to be treated as true partners in the project of 
imagining a more enlightened future for both countries. (La Pocha Nostra 2003) 
 
If we consider participation’s rhetoric of a democratising of art as a kind of “free 
exchange”, one can conclude that if we are to be “true” co-creators in re-imagining our 
social and political reality we need to experience full citizenship, while not denying an 
essential duality. One way in which this might be achieved is through greater agency for 
spectators in the production of the performance, which I will discuss in chapter four. 
Another course, however, involves extending our window of perception (Cull 2011: 
87), not by diminishing binary opposites, but by rethinking the way that we perceive of 
the two sides in relation to each other. To this end, I want to propose that we see binary 
relations in participation as interdependent rather than in opposition.   
 
It is at this juncture that I wish to introduce Nora Bateson’s term “symmathesy”, as 
outlined in her book Small Arcs of Larger Circles (2016). Bateson advises that we need 
a new word and concept which ‘highlights the expression and communication of 
interdependency and, particularly, mutual learning’ within living systems (2016: 168). 
She argues that the idea of a system as a series of ‘parts’ goes against living systems 
that incorporate relational and mutual learning contexts, and ‘blinds us to the 
developing interactions that take place in life’ (Ibid., 169). I suggest that participatory 
performance as an emergent form constitutes a living system, acting as a ‘hive of 
communication between and within its living, interacting “parts”’ (Ibid.,168). A 
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working definition of Bateson’s “symmathesy” suggests that it is ‘an entity formed over 
time by contextual mutual learning through interaction’ (Ibid). I propose that 
participatory performance forms a symmathesy in which the symbiosis of binaries work 
together to enable the spectator to make sense of their experience. As Bateson notes: 
‘[t]he ability to perceive paradox, and avoid the impulse to choose a path down one side 
or the other, is essential for our future interactions with complex systems’ (Ibid., 170). 
Therefore, while the inherent duality created by participation creates a paradoxical 
situation, we may understand these experiences better if we accept the ‘parts’ as 
mutually supportive rather than in conflict.  
 
According to White, participation does not extinguish our role as audience, rather 
‘when we become audience members we remain audience members’ (White 2013: 160). 
He maintains that even on the occasions where we might “lose” ourselves in 
participation and forget the “audience-ness” of our experience we will be restored to the 
role of theatregoer on leaving the event and it is from this perspective that we will 
reflect on what happened. While I was returned to my audience status after my 
participation in Ex Centris, it is important to emphasise that the audience-ness of a live 
art spectator is not the same as that of a theatregoer. As Lois Keidan notes, the early 
adopters of live art in the late 1980s and 1990s were ‘audiences looking for risk, 
looking for new ideas’ (cited in Frank and Waugh 2005: 75). Therefore, an expectation 
to be challenged is part of the makeup of a live art spectator. To this end, they have 
developed a mobile concept of their role as an audience member. Consistent with live 
art’s resistance to easy definition and the slippage implied by the “live” element of its 
classification, a live art audience is not confined to a single position. Indeed, their role is 
comparable to Machon’s identification of the transient role of the audience in immersive 
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practices, wherein they may evolve as ‘audience-spectator-watcher-protagonist-
percipient’ (2013: 74). These spectators are also accustomed to being in close proximity 
to the action, where critical distance can be difficult to maintain. Live art is a ‘difficult 
art form’, especially because of the way that it challenges orthodoxies of value and 
artistic traditions (Heathfield in Frank and Waugh 2005: 72-73). In this way, a degree of 
fluidity regarding interpretation is accepted as part of the territory, with most live art 
works considered to be “open” to multiple readings and responses.  
 
Most importantly, a defining feature of live art is its capacity to be felt in the stomach 
and heart, rather than as a form to be looked on. In fact, spectators are often compelled 
to look away. In this manner, the binaries of looking and knowing, seeing and touching, 
observation and participation have always been on shaky ground. Accordingly, live art 
can be seen to actualise Merleau-Ponty’s notion that the ‘visible and tangible belong to 
the same world’ (Merleau-Ponty 1968 in Fischer-Lichte 2008: 133). A live art spectator 
anticipates the potential for an embodied response as well as a critical one, with 
participation merely extending those expectations. In short, a live art spectator does not 
lose their audience-ness when participating because an experiential dimension is an 
accepted part of their audience-ness. Consequently, their restored position post-
participation is one that anticipates processing their experience from both perspectives 
of spectator and performer, outsider and insider, with all the complexity that such a 
position yields. 
 
My analysis of the paradox of participation has shown how the duality of the 
participant-spectator’s role both complicates perception and holds the performance 
together. In this way, I have proposed that by adopting Bateson’s term “symmathesy” 
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and accepting this paradox as mutually supportive, we may gain a better understanding 
of these complex encounters. In addition, the discussion has highlighted how shifting 
expectations of the audience in live art towards co-production has meant that our 
audience-ness must now include the possibility of an embodied experience. Moreover, 
in our continuing role as audience members, we are given new insights, afforded by the 
greater proximity from which we encounter the performance from both the inside and 
the outside. 
3.4 Desires and Resistances 
Up until now, my analysis has focused on the impulses of the artists that make 
participatory work and the claims made on behalf of participation. Turning my attention 
to the spectators, this section will explore their desires and resistances towards 
participation. Alston maintains that hedonistic and narcissistic desire are two principle 
drivers towards participation: ‘hedonistic, because the experiences are often pleasurable, 
with pleasure often sought as an end in itself, as a site of self-indulgence or even 
eroticism; narcissistic, because the experience is all about you, the participant’ (Alston 
2013: 130). Indeed, these desires resonate with my own reasons for accepting the 
invitation during Ex Centris. Firstly, I was consciously aware that co-creating with 
Gómez-Peña at the Tate Modern, in full view of a public audience, offered a unique 
opportunity. Secondly, my prior witnessing had readied me for participation, so when 
called upon by Gómez-Peña I was motivated to share my understanding and extend my 
encounter. To echo Alston, ‘Attention tends to be turned inwards, towards the 
experiencing self, accompanied by a persistent reaching towards a maximization of 
experience, underscoring the potentially indulgent meaningfulness of that “special 
complicity” of Fried’s’ (2013: 130; see also Fried 1968: 127). Lastly, though 
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unaccustomed to participation, my previous performer training had taught me that 
improvisation and performing in general could be a gratifying experience. Still, at the 
same time, the pressure to be spontaneously creative and a predisposition to stage fright 
resulted in some hesitation. However, on this occasion, desire outweighed resistance.   
 
It is also worth noting that who we are with during these encounters is a further 
influencing factor. In the example of Ex Centris, I was attending the exhibition with an 
actor friend and her own volunteering emboldened me to participate. As Dominique 
Pasquier’s empirical research acknowledges, ‘people tend to be highly attentive to the 
reactions of other people in the audience, especially those who accompanied them on 
the outing’ (2015: 226). Conversely, I attended the second encounter performance 
alone; thus, there was neither the encouragement nor the need for mutual knowledge of 
the production.  
 
There is a consensus amongst academics in the field that competition with other 
spectators promotes individualism and works against a feeling of community. Jan 
Wozniak’s article ‘The value of being together? Audiences in Punchdrunk’s The 
Drowned Man’ argues that participation can replicate the feeling of competition and 
anxiety that we experience in modern life (2015: 329). Alston sees competitive 
behaviour within immersive theatre as “entrepreneurial participation” based on self-
made opportunity (Alston 2013: 128). He suggests that those audience members with 
experience, who actively hunt out participatory encounters, such as the illusive one-to-
ones in a Punchdrunk piece, are more likely to reap the rewards (Alston 2013: 133). 
Alston draws on the work of Harvie (2013: 120-1) to align this approach to a neoliberal 
ethos that rewards individualism and creates an ‘uneven distribution of participatory 
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opportunity’ (Alston 2013: 132-133). Notwithstanding the negative and divisive 
potential of competitive behaviour in participation, I propose that competition can also 
be good for participation. It can compel individuals to go beyond their usual limits, to 
up their game and be more adventurous, creative, and present than their co-participants, 
or at the least to meet them at their level of performance. In this way, competition 
between spectators may work to enhance the aesthetics and transformative possibilities 
of the performance. This is even more evident in a specialist audience, where a degree 
of competition may already exist amongst the contingent of peers. In contrast, a lack of 
competition and expertise may limit the participation, as found with the Tucson 
audience at MOCA, who produced a modest human mural in comparison to the one in 
Ex Centris and Mapa Corpo 2.  
 
As a final point on participatory desire, White has suggested that participation itself 
can function as aesthetic material (2013: 9-10), not only for the artist, but also for the 
spectator. To this end, as Alston also recognises:  
The pleasure of participating is often rooted less in the aesthetic stimulus as it is 
in the participatory response that becomes its own site of aesthetic appreciation: 
a site that is both within the spectator and projected outwards through acts of 
participation, which subsequently become sites of reception. (2013: 130) 
 
In sum, the experience of participation is not merely a consequence of the performance; 
rather it is fundamental to our reason for participating (Ibid).  
 
To better understand the range of spectator responses to participation, this section 
examines some of the main resistances and limits to this mode of performance. 
Spectator-participation as a practice has become increasingly specialised and 
demanding alongside the escalating ambitions and innovations of artists. For many 
audience members, participation is a love it or hate it form of spectatorship. Even if you 
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are more inclined to love it, there may still be times when you do not want to 
participate. As Gritzner suggests, a resistance to participation can occur because it does 
not come naturally and requires making an effort (2011: 136). This is especially true of 
a non-specialist audience, who by extension do not necessarily have any performance 
related skills or experience.  
 
Gritzner notes that for some audience members of live art, what is expected exceeds 
what they are willing to give. She refers to this as a ‘limit experience’ that can threaten, 
rather than encourage, participation (2011: 111). Instead of activating the spectator, she 
argues that participation can in fact have a ‘freezing’ effect:  
Participatory art is said to enhance the flow of movement between people, 
facilitate new exchanges, make encounters possible and even restore social 
bonds. But art in which participation is truly the focus of attention ... tends to 
halt the movement of  exchange and appears as the opposite of fluid 
interconnectivity. (Gritzner 2011: 113) 
 
Gómez-Peña openly states that in the final section of La Pocha Nostra’s performances 
they create tableaux vivants with ‘the most responsive and audacious audience 
members’ (Gómez-Peña 2005: 84), but what about those that are not responsive or 
audacious? Echoing Gritzner, if participation goes too far it can bring the spectator’s 
engagement with the work to a standstill. Therefore, rather than engage they step back, 
turn off, or are deterred from attending in the first place. Consequently, as Gomme 
observes, ‘the genuine trepidation of anxious would-be-audiences … manage this risk 
through a variety of conscious and unconscious strategies, only the most obvious of 
which is to avoid it altogether’ (2015: 289). Anna Wilson maintains in her article 
‘Playing the Game: Authenticity and invitation in Ontroerend Goed’s Audience’ (2015) 
that the most resistant act of all may be for spectators not to respond at all to the tactics 
employed to foster participation (2015: 339). In this way, one might consider the non-
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performing spectators as actively resistant rather than passively reluctant. In chapter 
five, I will share the ways in which I consciously avoided being chosen for participation 
in Gob Squad’s performance of War and Peace (2016), drawing on Erving Goffman’s 
1959 seminal text The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. 
 
A further resistance to participation, recognised by Alexander Garcia Düttmann in 
conversation with Karoline Gritzner (2011), is the contradiction of wishing to 
participate at the same time as wanting ‘to be left alone’. He notes that ‘[w]e don’t want 
to be alone, we want to be with others so that we can escape our own stupidity, and yet 
for that very reason, because we want to escape our stupidity, we also want to be left 
alone and not be with others’ (Düttmann 2011: 137). Reflecting on my own 
experiences, whereas the impulse to participate - ‘to be with others’ – in Ex Centris had 
overwhelmed my fear of stupidity, in Mapa Corpo 2 I felt less persuaded to participate. 
I was not sure that I had anything to gain a second time around, and I was wary of the 
mixed feelings that had followed my introduction to participation, discussed later in the 
chapter. Aside from these resistances and limits to participation, it would be fair to say 
that many spectators of live art are drawn to the practice because it challenges 
boundaries and notions of acceptability. Moreover, as the popularity of participatory 
performance has grown, the gap between the artist as a professional and the participant-
spectator as an amateur has closed. 
 
3.5 Expert Participant-Spectators 
This part of the discussion will focus on how the upsurge in participation has given rise 
to a level of proficiency in participatory spectatorship: the expert participant-spectator. 
Increasingly, expert participant-spectators are taking a key role in realising the intended 
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aesthetic of participation. The artist may even call upon them if the interaction is in need 
of artistic intervention. These individuals have developed the knowledge of 
participation and the requisite techniques to improvise and reciprocate at will. However, 
returning to Pasquier’s citing of Bourdieu, discussed in chapter two, the expert 
participants’ ability to maintain a particular aesthetic may put some audience members 
off participating; for fear that, they may not be able to perform at the same level 
(Bourdieu 1984 in Pasquier 2015: 23).  
 
As my experiences of La Pocha Nostra’s performances testify, the context and 
specific audience for these works clearly influences the way that audience participation 
develops. Ex Centris was exhibited as part of the Live Culture event at the Tate Modern, 
organised by the London based organisation LADA. As a result, the audience included 
the significant live art community affiliated to and supported by LADA, several of 
which were also performing at the event. When Gómez-Peña tells us that audience 
members see themselves as ‘insiders’, in some instances they ARE ‘insiders’. For 
example, the artist Marisa Carnesky is captured on camera in the Live Culture film 
(2003), as a spectator who agrees to ‘show her breasts’ and join the human mural. In 
watching the film, I am struck by Gómez-Peña’s whispered conversation with Carnesky 
before she enters the performance: 
 Gómez-Peña: How comfortable do you feel with your body? 
 Carnesky: Yes, very comfortable. 
 Gómez-Peña: Can you show your breasts? 
 Carnesky: Yeah. 
Gómez-Peña: Okay you can come … (the end of the sentence is inaudible, but it   
is a clear invitation to participate) 
 
Carnesky removes her upper body garments at the side of the raised platform, 
and is led up the steps by Gómez-Peña to the human mural. He then applies 
traditional headwear and club-esque sunglasses to Carnesky, and she is left to 




Gómez-Peña’s questioning of Carnesky suggests that he is casting for a specific type of 
performer within the diorama, with the showing of breasts as potential criteria. On the 
one hand, this could be interpreted as an artist exploiting a spectator. On the other hand, 
noting the context and the specialist audience in attendance, one might accept that he is 
merely utilising the talent of his spectators. It is important to mention that I did not 
witness the same level of exposure requested from the non-specialist audience at 
MOCA, Tucson. While Gómez-Peña’s questioning indicates that he did not know 
Carnesky’s artist background,45 there are a number of signs that infer the expertness of 
participant-spectators. These include standing in close proximity to the site of 
participation; attempting to meet the gaze of the artist; displaying an open body 
language; surveying all that is taking place; carrying extra supplies (food, clothes, even 
slippers - 512 Hours) to survive the full experience; and most obviously, greeting the 
artist - before helping the participation along. One of the most infamous examples of an 
expert participant-spectator is captured when Ulay46 sits across the table from Marina 
Abramović in The Artist is Present (2010) at New York’s Museum of Modern Art. The 
video of the couple, reunited after twenty-five years, received over fourteen million 
views on YouTube.  
 
Despite my frequent reluctance to participate, I must concede that I may now belong 
to this category of spectators. This is owing to the experience and knowledge gained of 
the field, but most significantly the time that I spent on the other side of the border as a 
                                                          
45 Marisa Carnesky is a performance artist who has been staging shows for over 20 years. She is most 
famous for her long-running piece Carnesky’s Ghost Train (2004), an alternative theme park ride which 
occupied a space on Blackpool’s Golden Mile until 2014. 
46 Ulay and Marina Abramović were long-term partners in art and love. They famously created a series of 
relational art pieces together during the period of 1976-1988. 
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collaborator with La Pocha Nostra. It was here that I learnt how to differentiate between 
the spectators that are willing to co-create and those that want to be left alone, informing 
my own tactics in the situation of participation. For instance, while attending 
Punchdrunk’s The Drowned Man (2013) my expertness was rewarded with a much-
coveted one-to-one encounter, as I was pulled out of the crowd and taken into a static 
caravan, leaving my female companion behind. Her attempt to follow me was thwarted 
when the caravan door was firmly closed, barring her entry to both the dwelling and a 
more intimate experience. As Beech has noted, following Rancière, rather than being 
inclusive, audience participation can also be socially divisive (Beech in Walwin 2010: 
25). While participation may offer new and exciting opportunities for spectatorship, at 
the same time it carries its own limitations.  
 
3.6 La Pocha Nostra’s Emancipated Spectator  
In chapter two, I signalled that my reading of emancipating spectators in participatory 
live art would move on from Rancière’s concept of “the emancipated spectator”. To this 
end, the focus of this discussion will be how emancipating spectators functions within 
La Pocha Nostra’s work and the way that this is underpinned by the three main 
motivations identified by Bishop: activation, authorship and community (Bishop 2006a: 
12). I have already outlined how a live art spectator is not emancipated in the same way 
as a conventional theatregoer because they have always been afforded greater physical 
and interpretive freedom. Therefore, instead of being released from a seat in a darkened 
auditorium, an emancipated spectator in live art is more concerned with the way that 




La Pocha Nostra’s “ethno-techno” art epitomises the two interpretations of ‘new 
theatre’ identified by Rancière (2007: 272), confronting the audience with a strange 
spectacle and then inviting them to participate in the theatrical action. It also meets with 
Machon’s definition of (syn)aesthetic practice (2009: 26), through the transgressive and 
interdisciplinary form and content; embracing of hybridity in the striking dioramas; and 
embodied use of critical theory. As Gómez-Peña reflects: 
Over the past years, perhaps our most significant contribution to the field has 
been in our hybrid realm of performance/installation. We create interactive 
“living museums” that parody various colonial practices of representation. …  
We “exhibit” our highly decorated bodies sometimes as “specimens” from an 
endangered tribe or “border saints” from a persecuted religion. We surrender our 
will to the audience and assume composite identities dictated by the fears and 
desires of museum visitors and Internet users. (2005: 81) 
 
In my account of Mapa Corpo 2, I described how Roberto Sifuentes was offered as the 
centrepiece for a participatory response to the future of civilisation, see Figure 3. 
However, these acts of surrender are warm ups for the main event when La Pocha 
Nostra relinquish their stage to the audience, discussed later in the chapter. As Gómez-
Peña puts it: ‘We invite them to cocreate the piece and to participate in our “extreme 
performance games” riddled with postcolonial implications. These games are integral 
aspects of our work’ (Ibid., 80). The connection between participation and political 
empowerment within the theatre, noted by Freshwater (2009: 3), is supported in the 
activist art of La Pocha Nostra. As Gómez-Peña states: ‘Challenging the audience to 
choose whether or not to participate in this or that performance game means it becomes 
necessary for them to exercise their civic muscles and political intelligence’ (2005: 83).  
The invitation to co-create is a device to encourage activation, and nowhere is this 




As an extreme performance game the human mural embodies the dogma that 
emancipated spectators will be empowered to create alternative social and political 
relations. Gómez-Peña states: 
My job may be to open up a temporary utopian/dystopian space, a “de-
militarized zone” in which meaningful “radical” behavior and progressive 
thought are allowed to take place, even if only for the duration of the 
performance. In this imaginary zone, both artist and audience members are given 
permission to assume multiple and ever changing positionalities and identities.  
In this border zone, the distance between “us” and “them,” self and other, art and 
life, becomes blurry and unspecific. (2005: 24). 
 
The notion of a “de-militarized zone” converges with Fisher’s imagining of a radical 
democratic theatre that opens up a ‘space of speech’ (Fisher 2011: 25). Additionally, the 
deliberate collapse of binaries realises Fischer-Lichte’s theory, outlined in chapter two, 
that participation can enable human beings to ‘enter into a new relationship with 
themselves and the world’ which is not ‘determined by an “either/or” situation but by an 
“as well as”’ (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 204; see also 2008: 207). The multiplicity of roles 
made available to spectators also has much in common with Machon’s perception of the 
transient role of the spectator within immersive practices (2013: 74). Naturally, the way 
in which La Pocha Nostra’s practice converses with the arguments that surround 
participation is symptomatic of Gómez-Peña’s knowing use of theory to inform their 
work. This was evident during the residency programme that I undertook with the 
company, which included scholars as well as artists. 
 
The importance of sharing authorship and creating a community are paramount in La 
Pocha Nostra’s performances, exemplified by Gómez-Peña imploring spectators to co-
create with him. Indeed, learning to surrender authorial control underpins much of their 
radical performance pedagogy. Gómez-Peña explains how ‘[i]t is important to begin 
questioning the sacred notion of authorship and to establish collaborative and 
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multicentric relationships with our partners in crime’ (2005: 114). The human mural 
serves to create a community of co-subjects, as performing-spectators, watching-
directing-spectators and Gómez-Peña work together to produce the final image. This 
shared authorship with spectators enables the hierarchy of artist over spectator to 
diminish for the duration of the exercise. However, as my analysis will establish, the 
separation of those doing from those looking can produce a new hierarchy amongst 
spectators. Furthermore, while spectators may be invited to co-create the performance, 
authorship is eventually returned to Gómez-Peña in his confirmation of the final image.  
 
3.7 Interactive Rituals 
La Pocha Nostra’s approach to emancipating spectators is framed by their use of the 
term “interactive rituals” to define their work, suggestive of the processes and 
transformative capacity foundational to their methodology. Exploring the lexicon of 
“interactive rituals” reveals how these works have emerged as a response to a perceived 
social crisis within contemporary culture. In chapter two, I referenced Bishop to 
distinguish that “interactivity” concerns the involvement of the spectator physically 
rather than socially, especially in relation to technology-based experiences where it is 
most prevalent. However, the term “interactive” as a prefix to the term “rituals” infers a 
social dimension to the practice, as well as a direct reference to La Pocha Nostra’s use 
of technology within their total environments. More importantly, this choice of 
language acknowledges that these ritual performances are taking place at a time when 
networking technologies have transformed communication, and virtuality is a part of 
our everyday reality (Castells, 2010: xvii). As Gómez-Peña states:  
The illusion of interactivity and citizen participation has definitely changed the 
relationship between live art and its audience. Audiences are increasingly having 
a harder time just sitting and passively watching a performance, especially 
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younger audiences. They’ve been trained by TV, SuperNintendo, video games, 
and the Internet to “interact” and be part of it all (2005: 54).   
 
Likewise, Gardner observes that audiences ‘now increasingly expect to get the 
opportunity to play, genuinely interact, curate their own experience of the work and feel 
that their presence really does make a difference’ (Gardner, 2010). This is particularly 
poignant in the context of political unrest where ‘interactivity and citizen participation’ 
for many people feels like an ‘illusion’. As Gómez-Peña reminds us, ‘[o]ur 
unprecedented emptiness and acute social crises cannot be “healed” by institutionalized 
religion’, hence, it is in ‘[a] participatory ritual performance through which we get to 
experience (or rather to believe we are experiencing) an intensified sense of ourselves 
and of the many worlds we have lost for good’ (Gómez-Peña, 2005: 62).  
 
Despite the inherent bond between participation, ritual and performance, there has 
been little analysis of participatory practices through the lens of ritual. Fischer- Lichte’s 
2005 book Theatre, Sacrifice, Ritual: Exploring Forms of Political Theatre determines 
that theatre is inherently participatory, citing Max Hermann’s proposal that it is ‘a social 
game – played by all for all. A game in which everyone is a player – participants and 
spectators’ (Hermann 1920 in Fischer- Lichte 2005: 23). It is significant that Gómez-
Peña also refers to their interactive rituals as “extreme performance games”, which 
coincides with his view that younger audiences are being ‘trained’ by video games. One 
of the unifying features of participation, ritual and performance is the way in which they 
serve to bring people together in a shared experience. A shared experience has long 
since been in the fabric of what constitutes performance, but typically refers to the 
collective encountering of the audience. In participatory performance, this sharing 
extends beyond those in the audience, to the exchange that takes place between the artist 
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and the participant-spectator. Furthermore, the experience is one that is embodied rather 
than perceived from a more distant perspective.  
 
Turner’s statement that ritual is ‘complex and many-layered’ can easily be applied to 
participatory performance, given the various debates and paradoxical perspectives that 
characterise this practice (Turner 1982: 82). Yet, according to White there is a difficulty 
in applying ritual concepts arising from anthropology to a theatrical situation because 
they ‘will not have the weight and consequence’ and  ‘the participants will probably not 
be permanently transformed by the experience either in their own minds or in the eyes 
of society’ (White 2013: 140; see also Fischer-Lichte 2008: 175-176). Looking back on 
my participation in Ex Centris (2003), although I would not go as far as to say that I was 
forever transformed by the experience, it was this encounter that led to my eventual 
journey to Arizona. To this end, my symbolic border crossing in the fictional space of 
Ex Centris brought me closer to the very “real” borderline that permeates all of Gómez-
Peña’s art. In turn, La Pocha Nostra’s radical performance methodology and the daily 
news stories that infiltrated our rehearsals of Mexicans that had been shot crossing the 
state line, gave the politics of border crossing an unforgettable immediacy, which is 
visible in my blonde-“bomb”shell persona (see Figures 4 and 5). This demonstrates 
how the aesthetic of La Pocha Nostra’s practice is permeated with the social, becoming 
a ‘metacommentary on the major social dramas of its social context’ (Schechner and 
Appel 1990: 15). Therefore, corresponding to Turner’s concept of “social drama”, 
which he suggests arise out of a perceived crisis within the social system. Turner 
proposes that there are facets of social drama that can be seen as forms of conflict-
resolution that aim to address the ‘disharmonic’ processes in the social fabric (Turner 
1986: 74). This quality is actualised in the human mural, as a theatrical strategy that 
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attempts to resolve social inequality by offering a different reality, which is 
consolidated in the sought-after final image.  
 
Another angle on this debate, however, arises from Bishop’s article ‘The Social 
Turn: Collaboration and its Discontents’ (2006b), which reflects on participation’s 
preoccupation with social relations and a shared construction of meaning as a defining 
feature and driving force in its popularity. She follows Rancière to suggest that ‘the 
aesthetic doesn’t need to be sacrificed at the altar of social change because it already 
inherently contains this ameliorative process’ (2006b: 183). Rancière’s argument 
establishes that the ‘aesthetic regime of art’, as understood in the West, is founded on 
the contradiction between art’s autonomy and heteronomy or rather its blurring of art 
and life (Bishop 2006b: 183). Bishop maintains that to unravel or ignore this complex 
bond is to miss the point of art, as the aesthetic is ‘the productive contradiction of art’s 
relationship to social change, characterized by that tension between faith in art’s 
autonomy and belief in art as inextricably bound to the promise of a better world to 
come’ (Bishop 2006b 185). This paradoxical relationship between autonomy and 
heteronomy in art is symbolised in both the form and content of La Pocha Nostra’s 
human mural. Firstly, the form displays the sovereignty of individuals’ improvised 
decisions, at the same time their actions are informed by a special complicity with the 
aesthetic, and the suggestions of Gómez-Peña and the watching-directing-spectators. 
Secondly, the content presents an unorthodox utopia that is free of outside constraints, 
while simultaneously proposing a ‘better world’ through a kind of ‘reverse 
anthropology’, where the dominant culture exchanges places with the margins (Gómez-




Drawing on queer theorist José Esteban Muñoz’s writing, the human mural is 
foundationally political, as it enables us to catch sight of possible worlds ‘not-yet-
conscious’; thus, revealing the ‘anticipatory illumination of art’ (Muñoz 2009: 3). It 
follows the belief that opening up new ways of knowing is essential if we are to bring 
about political change (Ibid., 29). This meets with the premise that underlines La Pocha 
Nostra’s practice that ‘[i]f we learn to cross borders on stage, we may learn how to do 
so in larger social spheres’ (Gómez-Peña 2005: 78-79). However, the discussion on 
intimacy, towards the end of the chapter, proposes that the real transformative capacity 
of these experiences lies in the way in which they open up new ways of knowing the 
self. Overall, the interactive rituals of La Pocha Nostra are indicative of an affinity 
between ritual, performance, and participation, and serve to reinforce the bond between 
the aesthetic, social and political in art.  
 
3.8 The Rules of the Game 
Wilson maintains that ‘every participant is playing the game set out by the company by 
simply entering the theatre space’ (2015: 338). Expanding on the ways in which La 
Pocha Nostra’s use of participation meets with features of ritual, I will analyse how 
their ‘game instructions’ and ‘staging strategies’ in participation typically work towards 
establishing the three processes of role reversal, the creation of a community, and 
mutual physical contact (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 40 emphasis original). Fischer- Lichte 
resolves that:  
[i]t is the bodily co-presence of actors and spectators constitutive of performance 
which allows it to come into being. … The spectators are regarded as co-players, 
as participants. It is they who also contribute to the creation of a performance by 
participating in the game, i.e. by their physical presence, their perception, their 
responses. … The rules according to which it brought forth can be regarded as 





I propose that the rules of La Pocha Nostra’s extreme performance games are what 
make their interactive rituals so distinctive. In addition, these rules set out the 
parameters for “an aesthetic of risk” (Hans Lehmann 2006: 186-187 emphasis original), 
replacing the safeguard that was once provided by the distance between the audience 
and the performer with a structure that delineates the boundaries for the performance.  
 
While rules are instrumental in offering a scaffold for participation, nonetheless, the 
way in which we act within that framework allows unparalleled understandings and 
implications to emerge (Turner 1982: 79). Present in all forms of ritual and 
performance, rules suggest a code of behaviour for participants that will enable the 
event to continue in a particular way. Theatre-going is entrenched with rules: from 
choosing a specific seat where you will be placed for the duration of the event, to 
making sure that your mobile phones are switched off before the production begins. 
When we commit to purchasing a ticket for a performance, we enter into a visible 
contract with the venue and the practitioner. This may include written guidelines given 
as part of the ticket transaction, such as the right to refuse late entry; or instructions 
given pre-performance, which may be communicated through written or spoken text; or 
recognisable signals offered during the performance, for example when the curtain 
closes and the theatre lights are turned on to indicate an interval in proceedings. Yet, 
there are also implicit codes of behaviour, which have more to do with tradition and 
cultural convention than explicit rules. Indeed, these play a vital role in upholding the 
shape of the performance and coercing us into being a “good” spectator.  
 
In La Pocha Nostra’s practice, it is evident that both explicit and implicit instructions 
prime the spectator for participation and suggest the limit of their involvement; though 
135 
 
not to the exclusion of spontaneity and transgression. At first glance, like most live art 
works, the rules appear more relaxed than found in conventional theatre. For instance, 
spectators are often encouraged in durational performances to come and go at will. 
However, a deeper analysis reveals that in actuality the rules are far more demanding 
than the behaviour traditionally expected of a spectator and can include an ability to 
improvise; to establish a high degree of attention that closes off self-consciousness; to 
remove your clothes; and to adopt a fictional “stylised freak” persona. Reflecting on my 
three encounters, the participants - myself included, did ‘dutifully [perform] as 
instructed, when instructed’ (Harvie 2013: 43). Nonetheless, the human mural’s 
improvisatory form and the spontaneous instructions offered by the watching-directing-
spectators enable both parties to transgress the performance framework, albeit under the 
watchful eye of Gómez-Peña. One must also allow that part of the appeal of La Pocha 
Nostra’s practice, following Zerihan (2009: 5), is the opportunity to adopt the 
superfreak identities and radical behaviours that are encouraged within the structure 
provided. As a result, the rules are there to emancipate the spectators from their 
everyday selves, if not from the performance itself. 
 
The most striking form of game instruction comes directly from Gómez-Peña as he 
initiates the human mural. Appealing for spectators to co-create with him, the artist’s 
charismatic stage presence conveys this request more as a command than a question. 
This is reinforced by the way that he repeats the plea until enough participants have 
accepted the invitation. While I suggest that the invitation comes out of a genuine desire 
to democratise the process by sharing authorial control with the audience, it is not an 
invitation that the spectator can easily refuse. Resulting from Gómez-Peña’s verbal 
request, we see the emergence of the role reversal of performer and spectator. On entry 
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to the performance space, the spectator’s role is reframed, which in turn re-frames the 
role of the artist. While the performing-spectators become engaged in a process of 
improvisation and reciprocity, Gómez-Peña becomes their audience. Echoing Fischer-
Lichte, the aim of this tactic is not simply to show participant-spectators a display of 
role reversal, but for them to physically experience this change (2008: 40). That said 
neither of their original roles is entirely extinguished, with the participants unable to 
fully lose their audience-ness, and Gómez-Peña’s exaggerated use of costuming and 
exuberant persona marking his behaviour as a performance. Furthermore, Gómez-
Peña’s directorial role in his management of the live and participating audience ensures 
that he never surrenders his role completely to the spectators.  
 
The improvisation is partly predestined through further verbal instructions that utilise 
participants’ special complicity and steer them towards a particular aesthetic. This was 
illustrated by the way that both Carnesky and I realised La Pocha Nostra’s signature 
style of bare chested women, wearing indigenous clothing and armed either with a 
weapon or at the very least a look of defiance. Once the human mural is underway, 
more instructions follow, but this time in the form of suggestions offered by the 
watching-directing-spectators, incited by Gómez-Peña. These directions can be themes 
that act as a stimulus for the diorama, or may offer an attempt to complicate or enhance 
the image; cries of “more tension” and “more violence” seem to be popular comments. 
This tactic invites greater co-authorship in the images presented, and is consistent with 
the notion that the audience’s presence matters. It also provides a mechanism for 
involving the less adventurous spectators, who did not wish to cross the border into the 
performance but still want to actively engage in the work. This is not to say that an 
observational role within the human mural is passive, as the shared authorship of 
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performing-spectators, watching-directing-spectators and Gómez-Peña safeguards a 
spontaneous and uncertain trajectory for the diorama, which makes translating the 
images a challenging undertaking for those watching.  
 
Yet, while the development of the human mural is an unpredictable process 
consistent with a feminised style wherein ‘form is never complete’ (Irigaray, 1999 
[1991]: 55; emphasis original, in Machon 2009: 43), it is contradicted by the emphasis 
on reaching a final image. This fixing of the form is reinforced through subsequent 
documentation, for example, my participation in the final image during Ex Centris 
appears in two book publications, and was captured in the Live Culture film of the 
event, which has now made its way to Vimeo. The lesson learnt: what happens in 
participatory performance does not necessarily stay in participatory performance.   
 
It is not just verbal instructions that shape the human mural, but also the selection of 
props and costumes available, which impose a particular aesthetic. These items are 
carefully selected by La Pocha Nostra, loaded with symbolic and political implications 
that converge with themes such as “Hollywood gone-wrong” or “a postcard to the 
Pope” (Gómez-Peña 2005: 122). Spectators will witness variations on these types of 
themes in the dioramas that precede the human mural, setting the agenda for 
participation. The props and costumes are part of the framework set out by La Pocha 
Nostra to allow spectators to immerse themselves in the fictional characters that dwell 
within the ‘imaginary zone’. As Sophie Nield considers in her 2008 article ‘The Rise 
and Fall of the Character called Spectator’:  
Without the protective apparatus of characterisation, rehearsal, fictive otherness, 
perhaps we risk staring into the black hole of the theatre itself, mute, stage-
affrighted, awakening to the actor’s nightmare of being on the stage and not 




Spectators enter unknown territory when they join a live human mural because it arises 
out of the unpredictable suggestions from the watching-directing-spectators. Therefore, 
their ‘super freak’ personae offer a form of refuge within an aesthetic of risk.  
 
The props and costumes used in the human mural are often recycled from previous 
performances, as Gómez-Peña explains: ‘the more we use our performance “artifacts” 
the more “charged” and powerful they become. Recycling is our main modus operandi’ 
(2005: 22). As a result of this process, each human mural is imprinted with the 
memories of previous encounters, offering a continuation of those experiences. More 
importantly, this serves as a point of recognition for previous participants, enabling 
them to revisit their own experience through the experience of another.  
 
3.9 The Space for Participation 
Building on the game instructions that set out the framework for participation, this 
section will elaborate on the influence of spatial concerns and ‘staging strategies’. Let 
us begin by examining how the performance spaces themselves are inscribed with rules, 
expectations and conventions. The performance space for Ex Centris, a white cube 
gallery at the Tate Modern, contains an innate ideology that is famously traced by Brian 
O'Doherty in his book Inside the White Cube: The Ideology of the Gallery Space (1999). 
He states:  
A gallery is constructed along laws as rigorous as those for building a medieval 
church. The outside world must not come in, so windows are usually sealed off. 
Walls are painted white. The ceiling becomes the source of light. … The art is 
free, as the saying used to go, “to take on its own life.” … Indeed the presence 
of that odd piece of furniture, your own body, seems superfluous, an intrusion. 
The space offers the thought that while eyes and minds are welcome, space-




Adopting this line of thought, closed off from the outside world the gallery gave me 
dispensation to act in ways that were beyond my ordinary behaviour. To this end, the 
space acted as an agent towards an aesthetic of risk and the extreme scenes of 
participation that would emerge. Additionally, gallery going typically encourages 
submissive complicity, as viewers dutifully direct their gaze from one work of art to the 
next. Therefore, although separated from my responsibilities outside of the gallery, I felt 
an obligation to accept the invitation to participate. Paradoxically, what was invited 
departed from the normative gallery going convention of welcoming ‘eyes and minds’, 
to embracing my whole body. 
 
Comparatively, the warehouse space for my third encounter was a very different kind 
of environment, far less explicitly or implicitly governed. Owned by MOCA, Tucson, it 
was a messy space that offered a labyrinth of different rooms, with neglected junk lying 
around the place. This created a veritable playground for the collaborating artists 
working with La Pocha Nostra, as we had a myriad of spatial possibilities and artefacts 
to enhance and complicate our performance material. The possibilities that the space 
afforded the makers was also replicated in the possibilities that it offered spectators, 
particularly as it was impossible to distinguish what was part of the performance and 
what just happened to be there. It was largely void of the usual gallery infrastructures, 
and the audience were neither gallerygoers nor theatregoers. Instead, the local 
community had been mobilised by the press coverage and free admission. Hence, the 
warehouse was free from institutional constraints and an abundance of learnt behaviour, 
which created a more “open” space. This contributed to spectators’ immersion within 




The presence of a DJ, dark cavernous spaces, and the musical descent into drum and 
bass are indicative of the way in which La Pocha Nostra’s performance/installations 
parallel rave and club culture. Indeed, they directly reference these movements in their 
use of the theme “An apocalyptic rave” and in the moniker of “cool” sunglasses (a 
known fashion accessory for clubbers) that permeate their images. As an aside, I 
propose that there are numerous similarities between the ethos, desires, experiences and 
consequences present in rave and club culture, and those cultivated by immersive and 
participatory performances. It is worth noting that companies such as Punchdrunk and 
Gob Squad are part of the 1990s and early 2000s clubbing generation. However, the rise 
of participatory performance is in contrast to the demise of clubbing. Importantly, the 
decline of superclubs in the UK, is largely a consequence of their super-corporate 
absorption into the experience economy, and serves as a warning of how 
commercialism can elevate and destroy a subculture. In the next chapter, I will look at 
how participatory performance functions as part of the experience economy.  
 
Synonymous with a clubbing experience, the Tucson spectators roamed freely 
around the warehouse, coming and going as they pleased for around three hours. In 
doing so, they appeared to be discovering the rules as they went along. In particular, I 
recall a moment when a female spectator was testing the boundaries of how close she 
could come to me by standing directly in front of the ‘CAUTION’ tape that sealed off 
the area where I was performing. Each time I approached the tape she searched for my 
eyes and moved nearer. While the word ‘caution’ advised the spectator to stay back, she 
seemed to revel in the idea that the boundary could be pushed (literally). Reflecting on 
the performance, I was attracted to the space precisely because it was off limits to the 
roaming audience. The visible boundary would preserve the images that I wanted to 
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present and enable my performance to continue without outside interference. To this 
end, the spectators’ emancipation had resulted in my incarceration. However, rather 
than feeling oppressed by the ardent spectator, I felt empowered. The close proximity of 
her gaze and attention was palpable and served to heighten my own presence. I will 
expand on the manifestation of co-presence in chapter four. Our encounter ended when I 
lowered my body under the tape to escape the confined space, and disappeared down a 
passageway. In this moment, it was apparent that our relationship to the boundary (tape) 
that separated us was not equal. In following an unwritten code of conduct, the division 
had prevented her entry, whereas I was able to traverse it at will. In this way, admittance 
to participate in the performance or lack thereof comes from a mixture of audience 
complicity and artist discretion. While extreme performance games may grant more 
freedom than in a traditional performance context, it is clear that performers and 
spectators do not play by the same rules.  
 
What has emerged from an anthropological perspective in relation to participation is 
that there is a spatial dimension that is fundamental to spectators’ separation from their 
previous reality and potential transformation. This process converges with the three 
phases of ethnographer Arnold Van Gennep’s The Rites of Passage (1960): rites of 
separation from a social role or situation; threshold or liminal rites enacted in the 
transitional space between states; and rites of reincorporation into an established order. 
As White notes, in “rites of passage” and in “liminality” there is a ‘set of procedures 
that use sequences of frames that mark off times and places as “special”, and mark the 
people who will inhabit them as special too, leading to behaviour that belongs in this 
time and place and nowhere else’ (2013: 138). For La Pocha Nostra this “special” time 
and place is their ‘favourite part of the performance’ - the human mural (Gómez-Peña 
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2005: 84). Its framing as a “special” or “liminal” place is part of its appeal, it denotes 
that those participants inside the mural are “special”, and gives them licence to behave 
in ways that are outside of their everyday self.  
 
However, to gain entry to this special place, the participant must move from one 
spatial realm to another, as Turner explains: 
The passage from one social status to another is often accompanied by a parallel 
passage in space, a geographical movement from one place to another.  This 
may take the form of a mere opening of doors or the literal crossing of a 
threshold which separates two distinct areas, one associated with the subject’s 
pre-ritual or preliminal status, and the other with his post-ritual or postliminal 
status. (Turner 1982: 25)  
 
Movement is fostered through the promenade staging of La Pocha Nostra’s 
performances. Spectators are encouraged to roam around the ‘living museum’, 
especially during the first hour, to view the dioramas on their own terms. Therefore, 
even before the human mural, spectators are unshackled from a physically inactive 
position, such as that found in a darkened theatre auditorium. The autonomy to wander 
around and take control of their experience prepares them to make the journey towards 
participation and to assume an authorial position as a co-creator. Physically warmed up, 
they are much more inclined to volunteer than if they had been rooted to a seat. Still, at 
the same time, the spectators’ nomadism also creates a decentring process that mirrors 
the notion of participation as a form in flux, and reflects Gómez-Peña’s lived border 
crossing. The term “nomad” might also be exchanged for the term “tourist”. I am 
reminded of the young woman with her rucksack from my third encounter, embodying 
the identity of the spectator-tourist on a visit to the “performative world”.47  
 
                                                          
47 The expression “performative world” is employed by Schechner in his article ‘Performers and 
Spectators Transported and Transformed’ (1981 in Auslander 2003: 270). 
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The spectators’ nomadic existence means that they have no set place to call their 
own, particularly as there are transitory performers who are wandering about amongst 
them. Gómez-Peña is the original nomad and possesses an almost shamanic quality as 
he channels the energy of the performance and directs the action from the floor when 
needed. His spontaneous direction was something that I experienced first-hand in my 
own transient persona during the MOCA performance, typically communicated through 
a whispered request to “activate” a particular space. This approach to directing is critical 
to the way in which the live and participating audience is effectively managed in La 
Pocha Nostra’s performances. 
 
The human mural is the one place where spectators can experience a sense of 
belonging for a given time, usually initiated by Gómez-Peña in the last 30-minutes of 
the three to four hour duration, by which point the atmosphere is much more intense and 
interactive, driven by the throbbing sound of drum and bass. This final participatory 
section provides a striking undoing of the distinction between performance space and 
audience space. The special place for the human mural is often a staged area, but it can 
also take the form of an ephemeral stage as delineated by Gómez-Peña. As White 
describes it, ‘[p]articipation is a bodily activity, in which the location of the body and its 
relationship to the organisation of space is fundamental, and the experience of audience 
participation is an experience of changes in spatiality’ (White 2013: 167). Where 
possible, La Pocha Nostra galvanise one of the raised platforms to display the human 
mural, drawing attention to spectators’ border crossing and role reversal. Nonetheless, 
this arguably implies a new social structure between spectators, as the ‘participation-
poor’ spectators watching from the ground are obliged to look up at their ‘participation-
rich’ counterparts. Following Reason, this literal staging of participation is consistent 
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with the way that ‘participatory practices privilege interaction, doing, engagement, over 
the “detached opticality” that has become synonymous with traditional 
audience/spectator relationships’ (2015: 273). 
 
Fischer-Lichte’s reading of Van Gennep’s rites of passage establishes that traversing 
the performance and audience divide constitutes a transformative process. She states: 
While in the separation phase a boundary is crossed which closes the former 
everyday life from the particular event that is to take place and the usual social 
milieu from others, in the integration phase, a new boundary is drawn. The 
threshold and transformation phase, in its turn, allows for most diverse kinds of 
transgression, and may even be experienced as a total dissolution of all 
boundaries.  It is the dangerous phase, between the old and the new state, the 
phase in which the transformation that should take place may fail. (Fischer-
Lichte 2005: 37) 
 
Applying these stages to the human mural, once a spectator has accepted the invitation 
to participate they enter the ‘separation phase’, actualised by moving into the designated 
performance area. On entering the ‘integration phase’, the participant draws up fresh 
boundaries; as we have seen this may come in the form of a verbal negotiation or their 
choice of costume and props. The ‘threshold and transformation phase’ occurs when the 
participant is fully integrated into the improvisation and they have surrendered their will 
to the unfolding diorama. This can result in a loss of inhibitions; hence, the striking 
appearance of the emergent images. Conversely, in this ‘dangerous phase’ there is the 
possibility that the participant may be unable or unwilling to accept their new role as a 
performer. As Schechner considers: 
A successful performance is one where both the levels of skill (preparers) and 
understanding (partakers) are high and equal. If the partaker expects more than 
the preparer can deliver, the performance is inadequate; if the preparer does 
more than the partaker can savor, the performance is wasted. Low skill matched 




In the improvisation with the young woman with the bow, my embodied awareness that 
she was a nonspecialist spectator led me to set the level of improvisation to meet the 
level of her understanding. Therefore, despite the fact that she looked to me to take the 
lead, as noted earlier, I was able to maintain some equality between our two roles by 
ensuring that I did not demand more than she was willing to give.  
 
3.10 Fostering Participation 
As I have outlined, there are a number of strategies at work to encourage compliance 
within La Pocha Nostra’s work. My interest in this section is to analyse how La Pocha 
Nostra foster a special complicity and a heightened level of attention from their 
audience that anticipates participation. Alston has argued that participation ‘is in many 
ways extorted from the audience, demanding ‘a “special complicity” with an aesthetic 
situation’ (Alston 2013: 129; see also Fried 1968: 127). This is consistent with the view 
that spectators are frequently invited into a pre-determined role, noted in chapter two 
(see Beech in Walwin 2010: 25; Harvie 2013: 43; Reason 2015: 274). Adopting Fried’s 
analysis of spectatorship of minimal sculpture to the situation of immersive practice, 
Alston suggests that a special complicity is cultivated by both the environment and the 
presence of ‘a thinking, moving and potentially speaking actor’ who typically makes ‘an 
ambiguous demand to do something, complete with that demand’s affective capacity’ 
(Alston 2013: 130; see also Nield 2008: 535). As we saw in chapter two, Rancière has 
made a similar criticism concerning the ambiguity with which practitioners approach 
participation (Rancière 2007: 277). However, as I have discussed, Gómez-Peña’s 
impassioned invitation to spectators is underlined by a clear agenda to activate their 




Looking at the way that a special complicity is fostered, a cocktail of technology and 
striking imagery create a mise en scène that primes the spectator for participation in La 
Pocha Nostra’s practice. As Gómez-Peña describes: 
The audience steps into a “total” environment. Our ethnocyborg personae are 
displayed on platforms of varying heights and sizes for three to four hours a 
night, sometimes over a three-day period. Live and prerecorded music, multiple 
video projections and slides, fog, cinematic lighting, embalmed animals, old-
fashioned medical figurines and “ethnokitsch” design motifs all help to enhance 
our “ethno-techno” and “robo-baroque” esthetic and create a “heightened state” 
for the spectator/participant. (2005: 81) 
 
The creation of a heightened state corresponds with White’s reading of participatory 
performance through the frame of ritual, specifically the way in which states of mind 
and body are produced, to play a part in the manipulation of participants and in the 
aesthetics of participation (2013: 114). Gómez-Peña proposes that ‘[t]his heightened 
awareness allows spectators to look at and accept images they would usually reject as 
impossible, distasteful, or unrealistic.  Later on, the audience will recall them and will 
have to deal with their own memories in the “cold light of day”’ (2005: 85). As I have 
already implied, the presence of Gómez-Peña is an influencing factor towards 
determining the audience’s special complicity. This results from the nuances of his 
performance training and his eye-catching use of costuming, particularly the way in 
which he employs gender and ethnic bending in his attire. These elements combine to 
ensure that he has full command of the “live” and participating audience. Chapter four 
will open out discussions on how stage presence is constructed.  
 
Expanding on the way that La Pocha Nostra manage their spectators, Fischer-Lichte 
notes that in the absence of a logical plot or well-developed characters, the audience’s 
attention must restructure itself around different factors including the level of intensity 
of the appearance, deviation, surprise, or conspicuousness (2008: 165 citing Seitter 
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2002: 171-82). Whereas these attributes are characteristic of live art practice, they are 
especially potent in the work of La Pocha Nostra, therefore, creating a performance that 
demands ‘a state of wakefulness’ (Fenemore 2011: 43) and where the audience is 
brought into view. For Fischer-Lichte, the level of ‘intensity of the appearance’ emerges 
from the performer’s ability to transmit energy to the spectators. La Pocha Nostra’s 
radical pedagogy devotes a considerable amount of time to the process of fostering 
energy transmission between bodies; thus, all of their performers, not just Gómez-Peña, 
demonstrate a strong concept of presence. Fischer-Lichte suggests that: 
By setting free forces in themselves and the spectators, the [performer] generates 
a shared energy circulation in the space that can be physically sensed by all. In 
the ecstasy of things, objects are no longer self-contained but step out of and 
exhibit themselves. They appear as particularly intense and grab the spectator’s 
attention. (2008: 165-166) 
 
The way that a shared energy circulation intensifies the appearance of objects, 
converges with La Pocha Nostra’s practice of recycling props in performance. Fischer-
Lichte determines that ‘[s]ince atmosphere is constituted both by the [performers’] 
presence as well as the ecstasy of things, it impresses itself particularly intensely onto 
the perceiving subjects. Atmosphere envelops the subjects who become immersed in 
them’ (2008: 165-166). While Fischer-Lichte’s use of the term ‘ecstasy’ arises from a 
philosophical perspective, the emphasis on transcendence joins with Gómez-Peña’s 
creation of a heightened state.  
 
Another factor in the development of a heightened level of awareness is the use of 
‘deviance and surprise’. According to Fischer-Lichte, this produces ‘a special challenge 
for the spectator’s attention’ as ‘constantly on the lookout for deviation, the spectator 
could still be surprised by its actual, unexpected appearance’ (Ibid., 166). One of the 
clearest ways in which this tactic is manifested in La Pocha Nostra’s work is through 
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the shifts in musical accompaniment, to set the tone and pace of the performance. 
Whereas in the first hour the music is typically slow and classical/operatic in style, by 
the final hour it has evolved into the fast-paced sound of throbbing dance music. The 
fact that a DJ brings about this divergence is also significant, as a symbol of the deviant 
subculture of clubbing. This reaffirms my argument that there are parallels to be found 
between immersive/participatory practices, and rave and club culture. Furthermore, it 
serves as a reminder of live art’s enduring relationship with the club scene, most notably 
with the infamous club night Duckie and the legendary fetish club the Torture Garden.48 
 
Performing as a stylised freak during the MOCA production, I used the element of 
surprise to challenge the audience’s perception of my persona. While I began the 
performance wearing a long red evening gown, this was “lost” over the course of the 
evening, to reveal my black-and-blue body and hidden appendage, subsequently, 
undoing the myth of the twenty-first century blonde “bomb” shell as a “weapon of mass 
destruction”, and constructing a paradoxical image of abuse and control, feminine and 
masculine, sexy and grotesque. This demonstrates how challenging dichotomous 
concepts is an innate theme within La Pocha Nostra’s aesthetic, even prior to 
participation. Importantly, these striking images prepare the audience for the creation of 
their own hybrid personae during the human mural, through which they will embody the 
way that binaries can be ‘blurry and unspecific’ (2005: 24). 
 
Following on from the previous section’s analysis of deviance and surprise, this 
section examines the criterion of ‘conspicuousness’ as a distinguishing feature of La 
                                                          
48 Since the 1990s, Duckie, based at the south London pub the Royal Vauxhall Tavern, and The Torture 
Garden have hosted live art events. Performing artists at these venues have included Franko B, Fakir 
Musafar, Ron Athey, Dominic Johnson, Marisa Carnesky, Ursula Martinez, and David Hoyle. 
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Pocha Nostra’s work. In doing so, I will offer two examples of tableaux vivants staged 
during the performance at MOCA, to demonstrate the way that these remarkable and 
complex images are arresting to behold. In the first example, see Figure 7, my eyes are 
drawn to the Grim Reaper (Perry Vasquez) wearing the virginal white slip, his hands 
appear to be in a position of surrender, perhaps a consequence of his gender bending. 
The bare chested female (Lucy Hutson) wearing a gas mask and restricted around the 
neck with rope also intrigues me; she appears to be hiding her ‘freak’.  
 
Figure 7: A tableaux vivant with collaborators. Author’s own image. 
 
Analysing my persona in the second example, see Figure 8, the cowboy hat, Marilyn 
Monroe-style wig, and ruby glitter shoes - suggestive of those worn by Dorothy in the 
1939 The Wizard of Oz film, offer a combination of iconic references to American 
popular culture. Framed by the American flag held across my body; these symbols work 
together to offer an image that reads, “There’s no place like home”. However, the signs 
are complicated by my just visible nudity beneath the flag; the flowers held between my 
teeth, indicative of the female Flamenco dancer who appears in Rudolph Valentino’s 





Figure 8: A tableaux vivant with an upside down American flag. Author’s own image. 
 
The U.S Flag Code states that the American flag should only be displayed upside down 
as a signal of dire distress in the event of extreme risk to life or property (Title 36, 
Chapter 10, §176. Respect for flag, a). While my presentation of the upside down flag 
for political purposes does not constitute dire distress; it acts as a striking metaphor for 
those risking their lives attempting to cross the Mexican border to the US.  
 
However, I acknowledge that my position as a non-US citizen makes transgressing 
these rules much easier, and perhaps this is part of the reason that La Pocha Nostra wish 
to facilitate cross-cultural collaborations. Gómez-Peña notes how his performance group 
‘[c]ollaborates across national borders, race, gender, and generations as an act of citizen 
diplomacy and as a means to create “ephemeral communities” of like-minded rebels. 
The basic premise of these collaborations is founded on the ideal that “If we learn to 





The signs in the second example converge to symbolise the complexity within 
America’s cultural history, and the presence of danger to marginalised bodies - note the 
gagged female, see Figure 8. Moreover, the way that the flag literally conceals my 
bruised female body, strap-on camouflage dildo, and the words ‘destrucción masiva’ 
etched down my back, is representative of how the Bush administration at that time 
arguably displaced oppressed bodies and the truth, in order to protect its own political 
agenda. La Pocha Nostra’s practice personifies Larry M. Bogad’s notion of “irresistible 
images”, coined as a defining term for the compelling, strange or surprising 
representations that artists and activists create in public confrontation (Bogad in Boyle 
2015).  
 
In addition to the irresistible images of La Pocha Nostra, Fischer-Lichte also 
maintains that:   
Performance allows entirely ordinary bodies, actions, movements, things, 
sounds, or odors to be perceived and has them appear as extra-ordinary and 
transfigured. Performance makes the ordinary conspicuous. When the ordinary 
becomes conspicuous, when dichotomies collapse and things turn into their 
opposites, the spectators perceive the world as “enchanted.” Through this 
enchantment the spectators are transformed. (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 179-180) 
 
I propose that this process is actualised in the human mural, in which “real” people can 
be seen crossing the border into the performative world. Furthermore, their ordinariness 
is amplified by their close proximity to the superfreaks and irresistible images on 
display. In the photographs of the young woman with the bow, her normality 
paradoxically makes her appear exotic, coinciding with Gómez-Peña’s notion of a 
‘reverse anthropology’ taking place within this utopian/dystopian space. However, I 
suggest that audience participation in the human mural is at its most effective and 
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“enchanting” when it transforms the ordinary, not into the extra-ordinary (more than 
ordinariness), but into the extraordinary (unusual).  
 
By redistributing the audience’s attention around the theatrical factors distinguished 
by Ficher-Lichte, La Pocha Nostra produces a heightened level of attention in their 
spectators. This excess of awareness is referred to by Fischer-Lichte as ‘waste’, which 
she identifies as enabling spectators to experience themselves as an “embodied mind” 
within their own presence (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 167; see also 115). Similarly, Gómez-
Peña asserts that ‘performance furthers dialogue by creating various pathways, 
trajectories, and unsuspected intersections which are mostly discovered/learned through 
the body and later circulated through language and action’ noting that ‘[t]his is precisely 
where the true political power of the work lies’ (2005: 83). This coincides with Fischer-
Lichte’s theory that the mutual physical contact between performers and spectators is 
able to reunite the aesthetic, social and political in performance. It also resonates with 
the emphasis on an embodied experience inherent within Machon’s concept of 
“(syn)aesthetic performance”, which she has directly applied to immersive works (2009, 
2013). In addition, Cull’s concept of “ontological participation” from an immanent 
perspective recognises participation’s capacity as an embodied activity to attend to art’s 
political implications more deeply. However, while Gómez-Peña proposes that 
following the participants’ embodied experience ‘a process of reflection gets triggered 
in their perplexed psyches’ (2005: 25), Cull’s theorising suggests that the mind is not 
distinguishable from the body, therefore, reflection is a continuation of the same single 




My analysis of the paradox of participation attests to a duality of experience inside 
and outside of the performance, but rather than perceiving the mind as in opposition to 
the body, I have proposed that these two entities have an interdependent relationship 
during “productive participation”. Furthermore, the synergy between these two elements 
manifests as a third way of being, corresponding to Ficher-Lichte’s concept of an 
“embodied mind”. This psychophysical state increases responsiveness and 
communication between the mind-body system, allowing a deeper understanding of the 
needs and desires of the self. Consequently, this newfound awareness allows the 
participant-spectator to progress to more challenging situations that reward them with 
more gratifying experiences, and transformation even. In addition, I suggest that this 
attribute of interdependency mirrors the symbiotic ethics of performers and spectators, 
examined in chapter five.    
 
3.11 Spectator Roles in Participation   
As I have indicated, there are three roles available to the audience of La Pocha Nostra’s 
performances: the performing-spectator, the watching-spectator, and the watching-
directing-spectator. My concern in this next section will be to take a closer look at how 
those roles function and relate to one another within the human mural. The first of these 
roles to be examined is performing-spectators. For these audience members, 
improvisation lies at the heart of their experience in the human mural, and this in itself 
can offer a transformative capacity. As Machon suggests:  
This rediscovery through active decision making is transformative; in terms of 
the way the individual audience member influences the shape of the ‘show’; and 
transformative, like a rite of passage, where one can be personally and positively 
changed through the thematic concerns of the event, communicated via its 




Reciprocity between the artist and audience is foundational to participatory 
performance, but in the human mural, there is a further contract of mutuality between 
those involved in the developing diorama. The exchange of active decision-making is 
essential to the continuation of an improvised performance, as Keith Johnstone states 
‘[g]ood improvisers develop action’ (Johnston 1989: 95). Typically, accepting each 
other’s ideas during improvisation is challenging for inexperienced improvisers and 
there is a tendency to block the action from developing (Ibid., 94-95). However, as the 
action during the human mural only lasts for the time it takes to assume the suggested 
pose, performing-spectators do not need to sustain a narrative. Nevertheless, a different 
challenge arises in the form of the spontaneous suggestions offered by the watching 
audience, which the participants are expected to respond to at will. They are at the 
mercy of the audience, reaffirming that this is an aesthetic of risk. 
 
Drawing on Johan Huizenga’s article ‘Nature and Significance of Play as a Cultural 
Phenomenon’ (1955), the process of image-making in the human mural can be 
understood as a ‘poetic function’ or rather a ‘ludic function’ of “play” (Huizenga 1955: 
54 emphasis original). Moreover, there are several points of convergence between the 
performing-spectators’ improvisation and Huizenga’s summing up of the formal 
characteristics of play, he states: 
[W]e might call it a free activity standing quite consciously outside “ordinary” 
life as being “not serious”, but at the same time absorbing the player intensely 
and utterly. It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can 
be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space 
according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the formation of 
social groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy and to stress 





Clearly, there are features here that meet with aspects of the human mural such as rules 
and “liminality”; however, now I want to look at how ‘material interest’ and ‘secrecy’ 
function within this work. As I have noted, live art was in part a response by artists to 
rebel against the art market. Following Huizenga, play’s lack of material interest 
supports this opposition to commodification because unlike forms such as drawing, 
painting, or sculpture, nothing tangible is leftover by this mode of artistic practice. To 
this end, as Eduardo Mendieta acknowledges in conversation with Gómez-Peña: 
‘“imagination” becomes a form of resistance. Yes, indeed, to dream, to dare to produce 
art, becomes a form of resistance to the relentless and pervasive commodification of 
everything, even our dysfunctions and most perverse fetishisms’ (Mendieta in Gómez-
Peña 2005: 246). Nevertheless, in the era of “the experience economy”, the 
commodification of participation as experience may well suggest that play is profitable.  
 
The characteristic of secrecy within play, specifically manifested as ‘disguise’, 
coincides with the prominent use of costuming within the human mural. According to 
Huizenga: 
People nowadays try to feel the essence of savage life.  This kind of exoticism 
may sometimes be a little affected…   Modern man is very sensitive to the far-
off and the strange. Nothing helps him so much in his understanding of savage 
society as his feeling for masks and disguise…  The sight of the masked figure, 
as a purely aesthetic experience, carries us beyond “ordinary life” into a world 
where something other than daylight reigns; it carries us back to the world of the 
savage, the child and the poet, which is the world of play. (1955: 55) 
 
This statement has particular resonance with La Pocha Nostra’s practice, as Gómez-
Peña claims that ‘[w]e are now fully installed in what I term the culture of the 
mainstream bizarre’ as such ‘“Alternative” thought, “fringe” subcultures, and “radical” 
behavior, as we knew them, have actually become the mainstream’ (2005: 50-51). This 
poses a problem for La Pocha Nostra, and live artists more broadly, who run the risk of 
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being mistaken for ‘the very stylised freaks we are attempting to deconstruct or parody’ 
(Ibid., 52). Rather than challenging Debord’s “society of the spectacle” (1967), the 
human mural may be swallowed up by Bourriaud’s ‘society of extras’ (2002: 25-26). 
This corresponds with the argument that participatory performance may in actuality 
produce the illusion of sociability and political engagement (see Gritzner; Bishop, 
Harvie). As Gómez-Peña tells us: ‘Nowadays, spectacle replaces content; form gets 
heightened; “meaning” (remember meaning?) evaporates, or rather, fades out; boredom 
sinks in and everybody searches for the next “extreme” image or experience.  Ethical 
and political implications are fading memories of the past century’ (2005: 50-51).  
 
I propose that the ethical and political effects of participation are further 
problematised by the inherent rules of play, which frame and limit agency for the 
performing-spectator. As Huizenga’s asserts: ‘All play has its rules’ and they ‘are 
absolutely binding and allow no doubt’, but more importantly the ‘player who 
trespasses against the rules or ignores them is a “spoil-sport”’ (1955: 44). Therefore, 
once implicated in the human mural it is difficult not to obediently follow the 
suggestions made by Gómez-Peña and the watching-directing-spectators. This is a 
situation exacerbated by the impression that we wish to make on others, discussed in 
chapter five, applying Erving Goffman’s theory on “front” (1959). It also meets with the 
same narcissistic desire and need to be a “good” spectator that motivated the 
performing-spectators to accept the invitation in the first place. In addition, the risk of 
immersing spectators in play is that they may become too involved in the action, and 
lose the ability to reflect on what they are doing, therefore, converging with Rancière’s 
suggestion that, in fact, we may find an ‘active interpreter’ in a ‘distant spectator’ 




To identify the transformative potential of play within the situation of the human 
mural, I will return to the significance of reciprocity and Fischer-Lichte’s analysis of the 
effects of the “autopoietic feedback loop”. She notes that ‘[i]n performance, aesthetic 
experience and liminal experience ultimately coincide due to the workings and effects 
of the “autopoietic feedback loop” and that ‘every turn the feedback loop takes must 
also be seen as a transition and hence as a liminal situation’ (2008: 177-178). Fischer-
Lichte sees these ‘turns’ as emerging from spectators’ actions and performers’ reactions. 
However, I suggest that it is the reciprocal interactions between co-participants in the 
human mural which enables them to ‘experience themselves as co-determinate 
participants of the action. Neither fully autonomous nor fully determined by others’ 
(Ibid., 164-165). These transitions between participants in the act of improvisation drive 
the “autopoietic feedback loop”, and ‘carry a high potential for creating liminality 
throughout the performance’ (Ibid., 178). This experience of liminality is capable of 
affecting changes to the performer-spectator’s body, altering their status, and creating 
communities (Ibid., 179).  
 
Still, Fischer-Lichte notes that the permanence of the transformation will differ 
between participants, and may result in a liminal experience, stating that: 
Spectators could also dismiss their transitory destabilization as silly and 
unfounded when leaving the auditorium and revert to their previous value 
system. Alternatively, they might remain in a state of destabilization for long 
after the performance’s end and only reorient themselves much later upon 
reflection. (Ibid) 
 
In both of these outcomes Fischer-Lichte maintains that the performance constitutes a 
liminal experience; however, she is quick to highlight that liminality in performance 
lacks two qualities that are present when framed as social ritual: ‘durability 
158 
 
(irreversibility)’ and ‘social recognition’ (Ibid). This corresponds to the way that 
Schechner makes a distinction between ‘performances where performers are changed 
“transformations” and those where performers are returned to their starting places 
“transportations”’ (Schechner 1981: 269). I am reminded of when I was returned to the 
audience post-participation in Ex Centris, whereupon I discovered that my newfound 
artist status had expired, as the audience and photographers that had gathered shifted 
their attention elsewhere. Similarly, my community of stylised freaks, formed over the 
course of the human mural, quickly disbanded once the performance was over.   
 
To further understand the notion of community that manifested during my 
participation in Ex Centris, this section will consider the concept of “communitas”. The 
theory of “communitas” was developed by Victor and Edith Turner; it serves to 
distinguish ‘the sense of sharing and intimacy that develops among persons who 
experience liminality as a group’ (E. Turner 2005: 97). In my reflection on participation 
in Ex Centris, I talked about a kind of telepathy that developed between the co-
participants, consistent with Edith Turner’s observation that communitas fosters an 
ability to ‘read each other’s minds’ (E. Turner 2005: 98). Communitas is particularly 
relevant to the activist art of La Pocha Nostra because it ascends ‘1) through the 
interstices of structure in liminality, times of change of status, 2) at the edges of 
structure, in marginality, and 3) from beneath structure in inferiority’ (Ibid). La Pocha 
Nostra’s ‘“ephemeral communities” of like-minded rebels’ (Gomez-Peña 2005: 78-79) 
are representative of the way in which communitas can arise from a position of 
subordination. Nevertheless, as Victor Turner recognises: 
Spontaneous communitas, however, is very difficult to hold on to. … The great 
difficulty is to keep this intuition alive – regular drugging won’t do it, repeated 
sexual union won’t do it, constant immersion in great literature won’t do it, 
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initiation seclusion must sooner or later come to an end.  We thus encounter the 
paradox that the experience of communitas becomes the memory of 
communitas. (Turner 1982: 47) 
 
Similarly, one might also apply the paradox of communitas to the way in which the 
experience of participation becomes the memory of participation, or increasingly the 
documentation of participation. This memory of communitas, described by Edith Turner 
as a ‘gift of togetherness’ with ‘something magical about it’ (E Turner 2005: 98), is one 
of the reasons that spectators seek further participatory opportunities, as a way of 
reliving their original experience. However, an alternative perspective to the realisation 
that communitas is hard to ‘hold on to’, is the notion that these transformative 
experiences can be difficult to shake off and may produce a variety of conflicting 
emotions in the participant.  
 
Contradictory feelings towards participation are also stirred in the second role 
available to audience members: the watching-spectator. I propose that participation can 
produce a myriad of reactions in onlookers towards their participatory counterparts 
including but not limited to: jealousy that they are in a more rarefied position and one 
which affords them special knowledge; relief that someone else has volunteered, 
diverting the pressure to perform; anxiety that a non-professional has been given a 
position of authority and may not be up to the job; excitement at the spontaneity and 
risks implied; empathy, as they were formerly one of us and will be again; inadequacy 
for not being brave or talented enough to partake; admiration for their courage and 
ability to perform; regret and self-reproach for not participating when you know that 
you could have; shock that “real” people would be willing to get up on stage and take 
their clothes off in front of strangers. Indeed, most watching-spectators will experience 
a number of these sensations while witnessing participation, complicating their 
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relationship to the work. Yet, the role of the watching-spectator is a key factor in 
fuelling the performing-spectator’s narcissistic desire for participation, as Gómez-Peña 
tells us: 
[t]hese new audience members are always ready to walk on stage at any 
invitation from the artist and do something, particularly if participation involves 
impersonating other cultures or taking off their clothes. It’s karaoke time. It’s 
like a live computer game with the added excitement that people, “real people,” 
are watching. (2005: 54)  
 
 
Finally, in the third role available within La Pocha Nostra’s practice, the watching-
directing-spectators are able to regain some power back from the performing-spectators, 
without having to cross the border. Embodying Rancière’s concept that emancipation 
establishes equality between looking and acting, the watching-directing-spectators 
demonstrate that looking is acting. Moreover, as ‘distant spectators and active 
interpreters of the spectacle offered to them’ they are free to refashion the human mural 
in their own way (Rancière 2009: 13), while acknowledging Wilkinson’s argument, 
outlined in chapter two, that shared cultural values and narrative conventions may also 
play their part (Wilkinson 2015: 142). While the experience of communitas may be to 
the exclusion of those outside of the human mural, a hierarchical model of spectatorship 
that privileges doing over seeing is disrupted by the inclusion of watching-directing-
spectators. 
 
3.12 Consequences and Potentialities  
Over the last three chapters, and in the discussions still to come, it is evident that artists 
give a great deal of thought to the way in which they prepare spectators for 
participation. However, the same cannot be said for their handling of the ‘cool-down’, a 
term used by Schechner in his 1981 article ‘Performers and Spectators Transported and 
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Transformed’. Writing about the ‘cool-down’ in relation to acting, Schechner observes 
that ‘[g]etting put of the role is sometimes harder than getting into it’ and ‘[w]hat the 
“cool down” does is return the performer to an ordinary sphere of existence: to transport 
him back to where he began’ (Schechner 1981: 269). This necessary process is not only 
applicable to the actor but also to the performing-spectator, who traverses the “ordinary 
world” to the “performative world” and back again. Echoing Schechner, ‘he is 
transformed, enabled to do things “in performance” he cannot do ordinarily.  But when 
the performance is over, or even as a final phase of the performance, he returns to where 
he started. Otherwise he is left hanging’ (Schechner 1981: 270). The job of the ‘cool-
down’ is to allow the performing-spectator to re-enter the ‘ordinary world’. Yet, 
Schechner’s observation that little attention has been given to this area in the field of 
acting, continues into the field of immersive and participatory practices. Indeed, in 
chapter two, I referenced Maravala and Ramos’s assertion that the management of an 
active audience ‘would benefit from more rigorous investigation and care’ (2016); one 
area in which this applies is post-participatory experience. How do artists take care of 
participants after their experience? This is particularly pertinent when working with 
non-professional performers, who may not have the experience or skills to easily get out 
of their role. Furthermore, how do participants take care of themselves while fulfilling 
their responsibility to the performance? It should also be acknowledged that my calling 
attention to the importance of care within this feminised form is consistent with care-
focused feminism,49 and more broadly my consideration of a feminist perspective on 
participation throughout the thesis.  
 
                                                          
49 A branch of feminist thought, which has emerged primarily out of the writings on the ethics of care by 




In my attendance at numerous participatory performances over the last ten years, 
including those under discussion, the only ‘cool-down’ that I have witnessed is in the 
form of the ad hoc “how was it for you?” chat between artists and participants in the 
bar/cloakroom afterwards. More often than not, ethical responsibility for the participant 
ends once the experience is over. In my third encounter, as a performer in the ‘border 
zone’ I had felt an ethical responsibility to take care of my co-participant: the spectator-
tourist. However, when the performance had ended, I left her to find her own way back 
to where she had come from. Typically, spectators post-participation must deal with the 
consequences of their actions alone. The lack of a ‘cool-down’ is a contributing factor 
to the way in which participants take to social media to share their experiences. In this 
way, sites such as Facebook and Twitter become spaces to decompress. Furthermore, as 
I will show in the example of Abramović in chapter four, artists themselves are now 
adopting the use of social media to create a place for reflection (as well as collating 
useful data for funding applications).  
 
For La Pocha Nostra, there is a deliberate attempt to leave the participant ‘hanging’, 
as they intend for the experience to ‘haunt the spectator’s dreams, memories, and 
conversations’ (Gómez-Peña 2005: 25). While this proved to be an effective strategy in 
my case, creating the impetus for this study; it is not without its pitfalls and risks. 
Additionally, these risks can become inflated when the stakes are high such as in the 
activist art of La Pocha Nostra, or when there is a strong immersive or transformative 
capacity.  
 
To further explore the potential after-effects of participation, I will reflect on my 
experience post-participation in Ex Centris. In the Live Culture film footage of Ex 
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Centris, I appear timid and self-conscious, as I attempt to get dressed following my 
participation in the human mural. The frame of performance had given me licence to 
behave in ways that were otherwise outside of my everyday identity. As John Freeman 
notes, ‘body art and performance allow for the possibility of performers revealing 
themselves without the consequences that such revelations would lead to in their daily 
lives’ (2015: 172). However, once the performance had ended, I found myself reflecting 
on my actions. Later that day, when I happened upon Gómez-Peña, I was struck by the 
fact that he did not appear to recognise me; it was as if our exchange had meant nothing. 
In light of this, and as a strategy for unravelling a spectator’s mixed emotions post-
performance, I wish to draw an analogy between a participatory performance encounter 
and a one-night stand sexual encounter.50  
 
Firstly, the motivations of hedonism and narcissism are frequently the catalyst for 
both forms of interaction. In the case of the one-night stand, these desires are often 
fuelled by alcohol, as impaired judgement is known to lead to more risky-behaviour. It 
is worth noting that alcohol is frequently given special provision in participatory 
practice, with the bar offering further opportunities for interaction in both Punchdrunk’s 
The Drowned Man (2014) and Secret Cinema’s The Empire Strikes Back (2015). In 
addition, La Pocha Nostra sometimes set up a bar area, although not in any of the 
productions that I attended. As Gómez-Peña observes, ‘the audience changes as they 
become dramatically less inhibited during and after the ingestion of tropical cocktails or 
                                                          
50 As I discussed in chapter one, in relation to my methodology, I acknowledge that my interpretation of a 
one-night stand sexual encounter is guided by my personal background and experiences, rather than being 
a collective understanding of the term. The way that this term can be viewed differently, depending on 




shots of strong liquor. This scenario allows for a more “revealing” performance’ (2005: 
84).  
 
Secondly, a need for physical intimacy is palpable in both forms of encounter. Aside 
from the fact that intimacy is a complex phenomenon to define, Gomme notes that 
‘[p]opular understandings rest on a generalised assumption of “intimacy” as a desirable 
access to, or sharing of, private aspects of oneself, usually with a singular other’ (2015: 
283). One of the chief complaints made about participation is a dissatisfaction at the 
level of intimacy achieved, which is frequently less than expected and sought after, but 
not necessarily less than what was promised. This is consistent with a one-night stand, 
where intimacy can be intense but at the same time short-lived and insincere.51  
 
Thirdly, the environment leading up to both participation in performance and a one-
night stand works to create a “heightened state” that lifts the individual from their 
everyday reality and lessens their inhibitions. An immersive element, emphasised in 
participatory practice, is largely produced through the ‘in-its-own-worldness’ quality, 
defined by Josephine Machon (2013: 93), which frequently makes use of lighting and 
sound design to enhance the mise en scène or “total” environment. One-night stands 
regularly develop out of contexts such as parties, nightclubs and bars, where the setting 
has been refined to enhance the atmosphere; again lighting and sound are prominent 
strategies here. As Alexander Lambert suggests in his 2013 book Intimacy and 
Friendship on Facebook?, these recreational enclaves can be seen to possess liminal 
qualities such as their ability to produce spontaneous social interaction between 
strangers (2013: 119), akin to the spectator-to-spectator contact produced by 
                                                          
51 This is not to say that one-night stands do not have the potential to be sincere and joyous, precisely 
because of their ephemeral nature. 
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participation. Yet, Lambert reminds us, citing Turner (1969), liminal moments are 
transitory and quickly dissolve when we resume our everyday life (Ibid; see also White 
2013: 140; see also Fischer-Lichte 2008: 175-176).  
 
For this reason, I wish to draw attention to the final point of comparison and the title 
for this study: ‘the morning after (the night before)’. This is a popular expression 
recalled after an evening of drinking, upon which the person must face their hangover 
and the significances of their actions. For participant-spectators, this hangover is an 
after-effect of their ‘hanging’; like those waking up from a one-night stand, they can 
have mixed emotions following their activities including euphoria, embarrassment and 
regret. As I have already intimated, there can also be a comparable feeling of social 
awkwardness on seeing an artist or co-participant outside of the context of your 
experience, especially when they do not remember or acknowledge you. Although 
participatory practice may appear to respond to the desire for intimacy and a “real” 
encounter, it is, in the end, a performance. Actually, as Gomme notes, the participant-
spectator’s ‘most fundamental boundary will be the knowledge that this is a 
performance, an experience [they] can to some extent abstract from “real” life’ (2015: 
290 emphasis original).  
 
For many, a participatory performance encounter is literally a one-night experience, 
and not something to be repeated. This is either because you know that it won’t be as 
exciting the second time around or because you didn’t like how it made you feel the 
first time. Occasionally, however, one-night stands develop into love affairs and 
relationships; hence, we find the emergence of devotee participant-spectators like the 




To further understand the significance of intimacy in participation, my analysis of La 
Pocha Nostra’s performance methodology has revealed many shared characteristics 
with Lisa Register and Tracy Henley’s ‘Phenomenology of Intimacy’ (1992), indicative 
of the potential for intimacy within their work. As Register and Henley identify, 
intimate experiences are structured around seven themes: non-verbal communication, 
presence, time, boundary, body, destiny and surprise and transformation (Register and 
Henley 1992: 472). As we have seen, a number of these themes are factors around 
which spectators focus their attention in La Pocha Nostra’s productions. Reflecting on 
my own experiences with performing-spectators during Ex Centris and the performance 
at MOCA, these elements worked to varying degrees to establish a sense of intimacy. 
Similar to Gomme’s encounter of participation with a stranger, I recall a strong sense of 
co-presence with both of my female co-participants, in a shared experience that was 
‘both spontaneously arrived at and ours alone’ (Gomme 2015: 297). In particular, I am 
drawn to Register and Henley’s paradoxical combination of destiny and surprise, to 
elucidate the way in which these mutual physical exchanges felt strange and at the same 
time natural, even something close to fated. Furthermore, I propose that this notion 
plays a central role in creating a romanticised view of participation in the perceiving 
subject. I am also mindful that in my case this romanticism has increased because the 
interactions were caught on camera, evoking feelings of nostalgia for the intimacy once 
held and now lost. 
  
As Gomme recognises ‘it is only when the two parties are involved on an equal 
basis, co-participants rather than performer and spectator, that something approaching 
shared intimacy begins to arise’ (Ibid., 297). Yet, adopting Levinas’s writing, she 
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elucidates how in participatory performance ‘the relationship with the other is a 
relationship with a Mystery: the other’s entire being is constituted by its exteriority, or 
rather its alterity’ (Levinas 1987: 75-76 in Gomme 2015: 290). Deeper consideration of 
my own encounters reveals that while physically connected to the female in the 
Mexican hat and literally bound to the young woman with the bow, they are always 
outside of my comprehension. Notwithstanding our co-presence as mutual 
determination, my co-participants remain a stranger to me. In the end, as Gomme so 
eloquently puts it: ‘I come up against the utter unknowability of the other in front of me, 
the wall of the other’s face. I am forced to fall back on myself, to engage with the 
resonance of this encounter within me. In such encounters, it must ultimately be myself 
that I come to meet’ (Ibid., 291). This suggests that intimacy in participation may be 
less about an encounter with another and more about an encounter with the self; a 
notion that I examine further in the subsequent chapters.   
 
3.13 Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter has demonstrated that there are numerous paradoxical 
relationships at work within participatory performance practices. The most obvious of 
these contradictions is the way that participants hold the dual position of performer and 
spectator, both seeing and doing, inside and outside of the performance at the same 
time. However, as I have proposed, the mind and the body are not in opposition during 
participation but interdependent, ensuring that we realise our responsibility to the work 
and to ourselves. The mind-body system underlines “productive participation”, 
safeguards the experience, and most importantly, it takes care of the participant. I 
suggest that it is the symbiosis of the mind and body during participation that enables 
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the spectator to become an “embodied mind” within their own presence (Fischer-Lichte 
2008: 115); I will expand on this reading in the next chapter.   
 
My analysis has revealed further contradictions including the interplay between 
autonomy and heteronomy, emancipation and compliance, ordinary and extraordinary, 
experience and memory/documentation, destiny and surprise, self and other. Yet, these 
paradoxical interactions, actualised in La Pocha Nostra’s work, do not represent an 
“either/or” situation in which one side has capacity and one does not. Instead, they 
realise Fischer-Lichte’s theory that participation can bring about a process of 
reenchantment, whereupon we perceive a new relationship to these binary pairs 
premised on a condition of “as well as” (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 207). The border crossing 
of spectators within La Pocha Nostra’s practice is an extension of the blurring of binary 
relations that permeates their aesthetic, to which participants of the human mural 
contribute their own bodies of conspicuous opposition. To this end, as Mendieta 
suggests, “imagination” is a form of resistance (in Gómez-Peña 2005: 246); however, 
we are reminded by Gómez-Peña of the danger that these participatory spectacles may 
be mistaken for ‘another “extreme” variety act in the extensive and ever-changing menu 
of global culture’ (Ibid., 51). 
 
The chapter has noted that participation divides opinion, loved by some and loathed 
by others. I have considered what motivates audience members to participate, 
acknowledging the influence of narcissism and hedonism, recognised by Alston (Alston 
2013: 130). Conversely, I have explored the potential resistances to participation, 
drawing attention to how it can demand more than some spectators are willing or able to 
give. I have also highlighted the presence of expert participant-spectators within 
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participatory live art, and the way that they can influence the process. Addressing 
competition amongst spectators within participation, while recognising the potential 
downsides of this behaviour, at the same time I have suggested that competition can 
extend the potential of participants, and consequently the performance. My analysis has 
emphasised how participation is not just invited, but extorted from spectators through a 
range of strategies and tactics towards garnering a special complicity (Alston 2013: 129; 
see also Fried 1968: 127) with the audience. Furthermore, once embroiled in 
participation the spectator is compelled to adhere to the rules, for fear that they might be 
thought of as a “spoil-sport” (Huizenga 1955: 44) or worst still a “bad” spectator. 
 
On the emancipation of spectators, the discussion has outlined how the motivations 
of La Pocha Nostra meet with those previously identified by Bishop, namely activation, 
authorship and community (Bishop 2006a: 12). Nonetheless, I have established that in 
the context of live art, emancipation has more to do with activating the spectator than 
liberating them from a designated seat. The majority of my examination has focused on 
what transpires during the human mural - the site of the spectator’s activation. In this 
‘border zone’, I have reasoned that authorship is explicitly requested and subsequently 
shared with spectators; however, it is managed and eventually returned to Gómez-Peña. 
As the designers of the framework for participation, ultimately, La Pocha Nostra is 
accountable for the performance. Corresponding to Fisher’s conception of radical 
democratic theatre providing a ‘space for speech’ (Fisher 2011: 25), the human mural 
provides a “demilitarised zone” that encourages alternative representations of identity 
and structures of society to emerge. Nonetheless, this ‘space for speech’ follows, to 
some extent, the script prepared by La Pocha Nostra; inscribed with explicit and 
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implicit instructions and expectations, and “charged” by both the strong presence of 
Gómez-Peña and the performances that have gone before.  
 
Concerning the creation of a community within La Pocha Nostra’s work, I have 
determined that a feeling of communitas emerges amongst co-participants of the human 
mural, but this dissipates when the performance is over. However, the encounter may 
re-emerge as a memory or be relived through documentation. I have established that the 
reciprocal transitions of “play” between participants during the human mural drive the 
“autopoietic feedback loop”, increasing the capacity for liminality and transformation. 
(Fischer-Lichte 2008: 178). However, the physical separation and even elevation of 
those who are ‘participation-rich’ from those who are ‘participation-poor’ can point to a 
new social structure for the audience. Still, the additional role of the watching-directing-
spectator goes some way to complicating that structure by embodying the notion that 
seeing is doing.     
    
In my analysis of La Pocha Nostra’s methodology, I have found many parallels with 
ritual, implied by their own adoption of the term “interactive rituals” to frame their 
“social dramas” (Turner 1986: 74). In particular, I have outlined how the crossing of 
one space to another replicates the crossing of a threshold, therein bringing about a 
process of transformation or more typically “transportation” (Schechner 1981: 269). 
Additionally, I have found common ground between participatory performance and club 
culture, suggestive of a potential area for further consideration. Exploring the way that 
spectators are prepared for their border crossing, I have shown how the characteristics 
of La Pocha Nostra’s performances converge with a set of theatrical factors pinpointed 
by Fischer-Lichte, towards a heightened level of awareness. Indeed, performance 
171 
 
makers may also draw on this set of principles as a potential system towards a 
methodology of participation and the production of “irresistible images” (Bogad in 
Boyle 2015).  
 
Reflecting on the consequences of participation, I have drawn attention to the lack of 
after-care given to spectators post-participation. In my examination of the effects of 
being left ‘hanging’, I have offered the metaphor of a one-night stand sexual encounter, 
to elucidate the feelings that a spectator can experience post-participation. 
Corresponding with Gomme’s analysis, deeper reflection on my own encounters testify 
that it is in the mutual exchange between co-participants, rather than a performer and 
spectator, that a shared experience of intimacy may arise (Gomme 2015: 297). 
Nevertheless, adopting Gomme’s reading of Levinas, the ‘unknowability’ of my co-
participants in the ‘border zone’ turned the shared-encounter back in on itself, to 
manifest as a self-encounter.   
 
In summary, my analysis has demonstrated that border crossing in the interactive 
rituals of La Pocha Nostra is a complex and contradictory process. The strategies and 
tactics that foster and manage the live and participating audience mediate the 
emancipation of spectators. Despite the emphasis on activation, I propose that the final 
image of emancipation in La Pocha Nostra’s extreme performance games is the one 
where spectator-tourists are set free from their everyday selves, even if only to be 







 Chapter Four: The Spectator is Present 
 
4.1 The Fourth Encounter: Marina Abramović’s 512 Hours (2014) 
Standing in the queue for Marina Abramović’s 512 Hours, I note a couple of girls 
taking a “selfie”. They are documenting their place in what the gallery claims is an 
unforgettable moment in the history of performance art.52 The length of the line (see 
Figure 9) and record audience figures, over 125,000 visitors in less than three-months, 
bears testament to Abramović’s celebrity.   
 
Figure 9: The queue for Marina Abramović’s 512 Hours. Photo by: Adrian Searle.53 
 
As I finally, some two hours later, gain admittance to the Serpentine, my hand is 
stamped with the name of the piece and date, 24 August 2014. The act of queuing 
followed by the stamping process is a reminder of my clubbing days; looking down at 
the black ink it would seem that this performance is intent on making a direct 
impression on my body. 
 
Along with my companion and a group of fellow spectators, an assistant gives us a 
pre-performance set of instructions. We are told that there is no talking or whispering 
allowed from the cloakroom onwards.  We are also requested to deposit our belongings, 
                                                          
52 This claim was made on the Serpentine’s signage for the exhibition. 
53 The source for the image is https://twitter.com/SearleAdrian/status/476649600892542976/photo/1 
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including our mobile phone and watch, in the lockers provided. Inside the cloakroom 
there is a large pile of headphones and one of Abramović’s helpers indicates that we 
should put them on. With our lives locked away and our sense of sound cut off, we 
entered the first gallery space. However, to my disappointment, this was at just the 
moment that Abramović seemed to be leaving. Indeed, for the first hour and fifteen 
minutes of my visit Abramović was not in the space:54 her presence all the more notable 
by her absence. I couldn’t escape the feeling that the atmosphere, though expectant at 
the beginning, lacked the kind of heightened energy that she is known to produce or that 
comes from being in the same space as someone with celebrity-artist status. 
 
On entering the performance I am faced with a double paradox. First, as a researcher 
my compulsion to look for “something” is in opposition to achieving the state of 
mindfulness55 that is being sought in the experience. Second, I am met once more with 
the “paradox of participation”, which is particularly striking in this experience because 
spectators are divided into those that are watching and those that are doing. Throughout 
the piece I am constantly torn between observation and participation - not to say that 
these terms are mutually exclusive.  
 
Within a few minutes my ability to observe is radically altered, as along with my loss 
of hearing I am led into the centre of the main room to “the platform”, where a group of 
standing participants appears to be meditating, see Figure 10.  
                                                          
54 In ‘Artist Talk: Marina Abramović in Conversation with Sam Keller’ Abramović explains that for the 
last three-weeks of the exhibition she didn’t work with the public because things happened without her. 
55 Mindfulness is defined by Merriam Webster as: ‘the practice of maintaining a nonjudgmental state of 
heightened or complete awareness of one's thoughts, emotions, or experiences on a moment-to-moment 




Figure 10: The platform. Photo by: Marco Anelli.56 
 
Instructed to close my eyes, all at once I embody the double contradiction of whether to 
remain inside the performance in the art of doing “nothing” or leave my position to 
watch from the sidelines. On the outside, I may be afforded a more holistic view of the 
piece which will enable me to find the “something”; however, by lessening my 
embodied experience of the work I may miss the point of the “nothing”. It was this 
predicament that troubled my engagement with the piece throughout my time at the 
gallery. This tension between seeing and doing was emphasised further when my 
attempts to observe were frequently interrupted by Abramović’s assistants, who 
continued to urge me to engage in the activities. Towards the end of the piece, I began 
to consciously avoid making eye contact with the helpers; defiant in my choice to watch 
rather than participate, and clinging on to whatever freedom I still had left. 
 
4.2 Introduction 
In this chapter I attempt to unravel my encountering of Abramović’s 512 Hours, by 
examining spectator-participation in relation to three prominent facets of the work: the 
cultural value of being there; agency and the display of agency; and most significantly 
                                                          





the role of presence in its numerous guises. These three elements represent some of the 
most contentious and striking interactions with participatory practice, and they are 
especially visible in this durational performance given its emphasis on ‘being present’.  
My argument will demonstrate how multiple articulations of presence enable 
Abramović to develop an intense relationship with her audience, which in turn allows 
them to have a greater awareness of the self, others and the world around them. In my 
analysis ‘being present’ is established as a process and ‘act of persistence’, as the 
philosopher Martin Heidegger determines:  
The word ‘being’ now no longer means what something is. We hear ‘being’ as a 
verb, as in ‘being present’ and ‘being absent.’ ‘To be’ means to perdure and 
persist. But this says more than just ‘last and abide.’ ‘It is in being’ means ‘it 
persists in its presence,’ and in its persistence concerns and moves us. 
(Heidegger 1971: 95)  
 
Therefore, articulated as a fluid phenomenon, presence is susceptible to shifting 
perceptions. This analysis will unravel the varying conditions and terms of presence that 
reveal themselves in 512 Hours and how they converge with the emergent processes of 
participation, and the possibilities and limitations that these experiences produce. 
 
The first part of the discussion begins with the lengthy lines outside of the Serpentine 
and the relationship that participatory practice has with “the experience economy”, to 
use Joseph Pine and James Gilmore’s (1999) term. It draws attention to the way that 
512 Hours is promoted as a unique experience and the perceived cultural value of 
attending an artwork by Abramović. I establish how the “I was there” of participation 
can create its own form of heightened self-presence in the spectator. The discussion 
engages with recent debates concerning the commodification and spectacle of 
participation, citing Jen Harvie, Adam Alston, Noah Horowitz, and Joseph Pine and 




The second part of my analysis expands on the issue of social value by looking at the 
agency afforded to the audience, engaging with Astrid Breel’s current research in this 
area. I examine the “openness” of this work and the choices and freedoms that are 
afforded the audience. I establish the type of agency employed by Abramović to bring 
forth participation and question to what extent this work presents a display of agency 
rather than actual agency. During this discussion I reflect on my own difficulty 
becoming fully engaged in the piece, or what we might think of as “imaginatively 
immersed”.  
 
What follows for the remainder of the chapter is a detailed unravelling of the varying 
modes of presence to yield participation. This begins with an examination of the 
preconception, encouraged by Abramović, that 512 Hours has an inherent capacity for 
failure, which I suggest produces a heightened self-awareness in participants’ expectant 
bodies that founds an intense form of energy. In my analysis I draw on Alston’s writing 
on risk as a fundamental element of spectators’ desire for participatory practice. The 
investigation then turns to the bodily presence of Abramović and how ‘having presence’ 
forms a vital part of participation in the work. I determine the “auratic presence” of the 
artist, to borrow Cormac Power’s (2008) term, and demonstrate how her command of 
theatrical stage presence influences participation, drawing on Erika Fischer-Lichte’s 
“strong concept of presence” and the writings of Jane Goodall. This leads to a 
discussion on the way in which participation in 512 Hours fosters an embodied concept 
of presence or “prae-sens”.57 My analysis will draw on Fischer-Lichte’s “radical 
concept of presence” written as “PRESENCE: PRESENCE”, Josephine Machon’s 
                                                          
57 “Prae-sens” is a term appropriated by Josephine Machon, following Elaine Scarry (see Scarry, 1985: 9, 
197 in Machon 2009: 25). 
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theory of “(syn)aesthetics”, and Hélène Cixous’s “écriture féminine”. Indeed, all of 
these approaches share common ground with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
“phenomenology of perception”. In contrast to these models, I will consider Laura 
Cull’s theory of “ontological participation”, including her thoughts on attention in 
action. This will extend into a further discussion on the phenomenology of presence as 
co-presence through the lens of participation, engaging with the critical concepts of 
Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas, supported by Simon Jones’s reading of their 
work.   
 
This investigation takes an open-eyed look at Abramović’s most recent participatory 
practice, which includes acknowledging the way that her fame may have altered 
perceptions of the work, as well as her own perspective. Yet, despite the potential 
problems that I highlight in this work, I would also want to stress that it is difficult to 
think of another single artist who has contributed more to developing an art of 
participation. According to Abramović, 512 Hours represented an important moment in 
her career, maintaining that she could not have had the confidence to do it before: “to 
create something where there is nothing there” (KunstSpektrum 2014). I managed to 
attend the durational performance on the penultimate day of its run, having avoided any 
reviews or accounts of the piece. After my visit I actively sought out other perceptions 
of the experience, in the media, at the dedicated Tumblr, on Twitter, and from friends 
and acquaintances who had attended the performance. While some of these opinions 
repeated my own concerns with the piece, there were many accounts, particularly on 
Tumblr and Twitter, which suggested that 512 Hours had produced an intense and 




4.3 The “I was there” of Participation 
This section will examine the first manifestation of presence that I witnessed when 
attending 512 Hours, which I have distinguished as the “I was there” of participation. In 
this discussion I will establish how a perceived cultural value in attending Marina 
Abramović’s art produced a heightened level of self-presence in the spectators, 
epitomised by the selfie. Indeed, photographs of hands and wrists carrying the 512 
Hours stamp, which dominate the 512 Hours Twitter feed, are indicative of the way that 
Abramović’s participatory practice has become commodified as experience. In his Art 
of the Deal: Contemporary art in a global financial market (2014), Noah Horowitz 
investigates the extent to which the global art world has become experientialist. One 
aspect that he underscores is the way that the contemporary art experience has become 
an important social occasion (2014: 122). He also perceives this tendency as a touristic 
enthusiasm for experiencing the being there; to look at the art of course, but perhaps 
more significantly to consume the art lifestyle (Ibid., emphasis mine). Following Jen 
Harvie, Alston draws attention to the relationship between immersive theatre and a 
neoliberalist ethos, specifically in the way that it ‘encourages opportunism, the 
perception of personal autonomy and favours those with the capacity to act upon it’ 
(2013: 16).58 However, as I noted in chapter two, 512 Hours does not possess the type 
of ‘in-its-own-worldness’ quality specified in Machon’s definition (2013: 93). 
Nonetheless, echoing Tassos Stevens, I would wish to acknowledge that the 
performance had the capacity to enable participants to be imaginatively immersed, 
resulting from their mindfulness. Alston, citing Baz Kershaw (2001) and Dan Rebellato 
(2009), emphasises the growth of consuming audiences in theatre generally and their 
                                                          
58 See also “entrepreneurial participation” in section 3.4. 
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eagerness for commodities that brag to others that “I was there” (2013: 13). While there 
was merchandise for 512 Hours available, I propose that the selfie (hands and wrists 
more than faces) has become an extension of the commodification of ephemeral and 
experiential art.  
 
Alston suggests that because risk is fundamental to many participatory experiences, 
with the potential for misunderstanding or transgressing the protocols, the “I was there” 
boast might be repackaged as “I dared” (Ibid., 13). In the case of an Abramović 
experience, I maintain that the “I dared” is exchanged for “I met Marina”. What is 
interesting is the way that the two girls taking the selfie wanted to document their 
experience even before they had entered the gallery. This suggests a kind of 
“presentness” located in the past but at the same time looking to the future presentness, 
to the moment when the selfie may be shared, “liked” and “tweeted”. I propose that the 
selfie acts as a form of memorabilia, corresponding to Pine and Gilmore’s assertion that 
people purchase souvenirs (or take photographs of themselves) ‘as tangible artifacts of 
the experiences they want to remember’ (1999: 57). Furthermore, it coincides with a 
desire to show others what we have encountered, to generate conversation and even 
jealousy (Ibid). As I have already highlighted, the proliferation of participatory 
performances has developed concurrently with the explosion of social networks. These 
communication platforms offer an opportunity to socialise our experiences and to entice 
new participants. This has clearly not gone unnoticed by Abramović, evident in her 
uptake of Tumblr to document 512 Hours. 
 
In their book The Experience Economy (1999), Pine and Gilmore propose that we 
have entered a new economic era: “the experience economy”, which seeks to engage 
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consumers in an authentic and personal way. They claim that those that recognise the 
potential for creating compelling experiences will bring forth new economic growth. 
Over the past few decades a flurry of new experiences have emerged (Pine and Gilmore 
1999: 2), most notably in the contemporary visual and performance arts. The concept of 
“commoditisation” is repugnant to most live artists, as an ephemeral art form that has its 
origins in a reaction against the commercial art market. However, an art of experience 
appears to be increasingly privileged over other art forms because of its perceived 
consumer value, most notably by funded galleries. When we are talking about value, it 
raises the question: what type of currency are we dealing with in participatory live art? 
In 512 Hours the admission was free, although various keepsakes62 were available to 
buy. Nevertheless, the performance was financially accessible to all, consistent with the 
rhetoric of participation as a democratising of the arts. This is in contrast to the 
expensive ticket prices for works by immersive companies Punchdrunk and Secret 
Cinema, who even offer enhanced packages with extras to the standard experience. 
However, it should be remembered that the ambitious scale of these productions does 
represent a significant financial investment to be recuperated. While 512 Hours did not 
necessarily accrue value in the monetary sense, at the same time its popularity would 
have had a positive impact on the appeal of Abramović’s artworks more generally and 
the status of the Serpentine Gallery. 
 
Looking at value in another way, Jen Harvie’s Fair Play proposes that participatory 
practices appear to promise social value in two pertinent ways: 
First, they seem to offer widespread constructive social engagement, with 
participants communicating, collaborating, co-creating and mutually supporting 
one another. Second, they appear to extend this invitation to engage socially 
                                                          
62 A vinyl and a book were available to purchase from the Serpentine Gallery. 
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very widely, across all audiences equitably, perhaps even democratically. (2013: 
1-2). 
 
This notion of social value can be seen to be realised in 512 Hours in the way that it 
brought people together who would not ordinarily share the same space, “like a 
Bangladeshi housewife together with a science-fiction writer, with a kid, with a person 
from Gaza with the Palestinians” (Abramović in KunstSpektrum 2014).59 However, it is 
difficult to ascertain how regularly this type of exchange happened over the duration of 
the installation performance, and to what extent this represents a “trophy” example. 
Harvie questions whether these works ‘offer a spectacle of communication and social 
engagement rather more than a qualitatively and sustainably rich and even critical 
engagement’ (2013: 3). This corresponds to Gritzner’s earlier contention that 
participation remains ‘like all art, an illusion, a semblance (appearance)’ (2011: 
109).What is more, Harvie cautions that these experiences in sociability may act as a 
temporary distraction away from more long-standing social structures (2013: 3).  
 
Echoing Harvie, there is no denying that 512 Hours represented a spectacle of social 
engagement, given its scale and notoriety, huge audience lines, large infrastructure of 
gallery assistants, and up to 160 attendees at a time. The social exchanges that formed 
as part of the “public experiment” (Serpentine Galleries 2015) were framed by the 
gallery as art rather than social reality, and were mostly temporary and limited by the 
parameters of the artwork. Therefore, in terms of its social value, there was no explicit 
call to action or dissent in the work; instead the atmosphere was more akin to a utopian 
vision of sociability. While this alternative reality on display in the Serpentine might be 
                                                          
59 It is unclear how Abramović knows the background of the participants, although, as discussed in 
chapter four, the artist did take the time to talk to attendees in the cloakroom after their experience. 
Nevertheless, the way in which she has chosen to describe participants can be seen as reductive. 
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its own call to action, it might also be viewed as masking social fragmentation (Gritzner 
2011: 109). In addition, the state of mindfulness cultivated in the piece and the 
insistence that we lock away our everyday lives would appear to prioritise individual 
experience over collective consciousness. As Machon identifies,60 there needs to be 
“attendant” presence in participatory practice and not just participants in attendance 
(Machon 2016). However, an inability to forget my responsibilities, particularly as a 
mother, made it difficult for me to fully “attend” the event. While I was being invited to 
communicate and engage with those inside the gallery walls, it felt wrong to deny the 
presence of those outside.  
 
Building on from the notion of social value, I will return once more to the creation of 
community within participatory performance. Similar to La Pocha Nostra’s practice, 
and given the durational and come-and-go structure of the event, the communities that 
develop during 512 Hours tend to be transient. However, one exception is the group of 
expert participant-spectators whose attendance establishes a collective consciousness 
through their mutual recognition of expertness. Over the course of my encountering of  
512 Hours I spotted a number of these expert participants. The first sighting was a 
young male who queue jumped and was given immediate access to the exhibition, in a 
manner reminiscent of the VIP guest list of the superclubs of the 2000s. Indeed, his 
attire would not have looked out of place as one of the fashionistas working the door: 
tall, beautiful and heavily made up - wearing all black including a head snood, with the 
exception of a pair of bright pink brogues. He remained present in the performance 
throughout my visit, and spent most of his time at the centre of the platform. At one 
                                                          
60 Machon draws on Stephen Di Benedetto's usage of the term “attendant”. See Di Benedetto (2007: 126). 
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point I observed him watching from the sidelines, when Abramović appeared and a 
knowing exchange resulted in him resuming his place on the front line of meditation. 
Here we see the artist making use of the spectator’s expertise to maintain the energy of 
the piece. Another expert participant-spectator that I witnessed was a middle-aged 
woman who was clearly in the experience for the long-haul. She was wearing her 
slippers, and later appeared with a scarf tied around her eyes and a blanket that she had 
brought along. She appeared to be fully compliant with the tasks and there were no 
necessary reminders from assistants that she should close her eyes (the scarf would see 
to that). She appeared at home in the gallery space, and I wondered how many times she 
had visited and what she had gained in return.  
 
A further community constituted during 512 Hours was those gathered in the queue 
outside. I recall a feeling of camaraderie with those closest to me in the line; people 
saved each other’s place during tea runs and made small talk about the wait. Abramović 
reflects that on the last day of 512 Hours the queuing crowd outside decided to stay 
even when they were told that they probably wouldn’t gain entry, as they wanted to be 
part of the experience and recognised that “waiting is a part of that” (KunstSpektrum 
2014). However, the group can also be seen to echo a social structure where there are 
those waiting to get in, with no clear indication of when that might be because it is 
dependent on someone else’s choice to leave. In this way, a fair democratic experience 
of art might be seen as something to be earned and with a limited capacity, rather than 
instantly obtainable. Once inside the gallery, there is an automatic sense of achievement 
having endured the tedium of waiting, I am determined to get the most out of my 
encounter, after all, haven’t I earned it! An alternative perspective on the queue outside 
is that it is knowingly controlled, mirroring another tactic found in club-culture where 
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the queue is allowed to build up in order to attract more people. This tactic would also 
support Harvie’s notion of participatory performance as a spectacle of social 
engagement (2013: 3).   
 
4.4 Attending to Agency  
 
In the last section, we looked at the cultural, consumer and social value attributed to 
participation in 512 Hours. However, to better understand whether the performance 
offered a genuine experiment in sociability or ‘a spectacle of communication and social 
engagement’ (Harvie 2013: 3), it is essential that we consider the agency afforded to the 
audience. Astrid Breel, referencing Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi (2008), establishes 
that ‘[i]n participatory performance, agency can be said to derive from three aspects: the 
intentional aspect, the bodily sensation, and the reflective attribution’ (2015: 374). 
Starting with intention; for a participant to have agency they must have the capacity to 
make a creative contribution to the work and to make choices. Discussing the role of the 
audience, Abramović says: “[t]hey are arriving into the space with nothing. I’m there 
for them. They are my living material. I’m their living material. And from this nothing, 
something may or may not happen” (Serpentine Galleries, 2015). Yet, despite the 
agency that is implied within this statement, my encountering of the piece revealed as 
many restrictions as there were choices, which included “no talking” and “close your 
eyes”. Mary Richards in her book Marina Abramović (2010) suggests that these kinds 
of statements ‘ask the viewer to enter and engage in a particular sort of way. The 
instructions are not completely open-ended but are designed to push the participant to 
focus in predetermined sorts of ways’ (2010: 55). Therefore, it could be said that 512 
Hours offers the display of agency, rather than a truly agentive experience. Still, at the 
same time, the spectator was able to select their activity, to watch or do, and ultimately 
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to decide when to leave the performance, albeit under the close supervision of 
Abramović’s assistants.  
 
According to Breel, ‘[a]gency is based in perception, which locates it inside our 
individual experience of the world. This means that offering someone agency, such as 
within participatory performance, does not automatically translate into them perceiving 
agency’ (2015: 374). Speaking about the spectator’s role in 512 Hours, Abramović 
insists: 
You are not forced… there is nothing here that you have to do like when you 
come to the Serpentine Gallery you can just observe if you want and do nothing 
of this, or you  can do everything and then observe others, so that freedom is 
very very important. (KunstSpektrum 2014)  
 
However, this was not my perception. Furthermore, Laura Cumming’s review in The 
Observer attests to the way in which the experience could be punishing rather than 
emancipating. She describes how:  
Abramović, or one of the assistants, singles you out of the crowd and moves you 
around the gallery. She does this by taking your hand and drawing you slowly 
but firmly along like a naughty child until an appropriate spot is found. There 
you are stationed – facing the wall, in my case, in punishment position – and left 
to remain. That this is meant to be Zen seemed implicit in the instructions 
Abramović mouthed in my ear. "Relax," she says, taking my shoulders in her 
strenuous grip. I don't feel like relaxing. A minute passes. "Breathe!" she insists. 
Not on your orders, lady (2014) 
 
Over the few hours in which I remained in 512 Hours, I was encouraged to engage in a 
variety of exercises. This included another attempt to commit me to the platform; 
however, this was again in conflict with my desire to observe, as well as an inability to 
turn off my mind. Although Abramović asserts that the audience “are arriving into the 
space with nothing” (Serpentine Galleries, 2015), I suggest that while our mobile 
phones may be off limits, our status exists beyond our Facebook update. As Adrian 
Searle puts it in his review for The Guardian: ‘There is never nothing, always 
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something. Thoughts of bills to pay and world peace. Sexual fantasy, should I try 
Botox, and did I leave the iron on? It is hard to be in the moment. Harder to leave the 
self behind’ (2014). As I sat on a chair, trying my best to empty my mind, I received 
some light shoulder manipulation by one of the helpers, who gestured that I should 
close my eyes. On another occasion, I was guided to walk backwards holding hands 
with a fellow spectator. Nevertheless, although this was a thoughtful experience, I 
couldn’t quite forget the watching-spectators and the potential for doing it too quick/too 
slow/not right. Indeed, the persistent encouragement of spectators to participate in the 
activities might be as much about limiting the number of bystanders as it is about 
activating the audience. While my reflection indicates that I found my experience to be 
more restricting than moving, I was struck by the profound affect that the work had on 
some audience members. These moments included a young woman in a grey tea dress 
completing the walk backwards, at which point she hugged her walking partner very 
closely and began to cry. I also observed a middle-aged man in a red gingham shirt 
meditating on the platform, slowly doubling over as if gravity was pulling him down. 
Following Breel, in all of these instances, an embodied sensation of agency was 
depicted by the spectators through a notable change in their physicality. And, this in 
turn was witnessed by the other audience members, therefore, affecting the aesthetic 
experience as a whole.  
 
Breel maintains that coding agency offers a way of analysing the kind of 
participation that is on offer within a work. She identifies three modes of agency, which 
closely relate to Pelias and VanOosting’s (1987) continuum of levels of participation 
discussed in chapter two. These are: Reactive – answering a question, or responding to a 
trigger, command or request; Interactive – completing a task or undertaking an activity 
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or conversation that involves mutual engagement; Pro-active – displaying self-initiated 
behavior, which may bring consequences outside of the predetermined structure of the 
performance (Breel 2015: 375, 381). In 512 Hours the spectator is for the most part 
offered both reactive and interactive levels of agency, as they are asked to respond to 
the instructions given by the artist and her team, and to engage with others in the given 
exercises. Yet, there were moments of self-initiated action, such as the unprompted hug 
and tears demonstrated by the young woman in the grey tea dress and her walking 
partner. However, although this was not pre-determined, it was still within the realms of 
what could reasonably be expected as an outcome of intensive self-reflective practice. 
During my time in the installation, I did not feel inclined to carry out any pro-active acts 
of agency, due to the limited set of activities being promoted in the work. Breel notes 
that due to its disruptive and subversive potential, ‘[a]rguably, only an act of Pro-active 
agency is a truly “free” expression of agency’; yet, she also recognises that ‘this may be 
less meaningful in the context of the work than an action taken within the structure of 
the performance’ (2015: 381). Therefore, while spectators of 512 Hours are not wholly 
emancipated, as their agency is limited to clearly defined and monitored parameters, it 
is also conceivable that those imposed boundaries actually serve to bring the public 
together. In this way, as Breel’s audience research demonstrates, the level of agency is 
not consistent with how meaningful participation is for the spectator (2015: 378). To 
this end, the simple act of holding hands with a stranger, with the awkwardness that 
direct relational contact imbues, can produce a powerful experience. This is especially 
true if these two strangers happen to be a person from Gaza and Palestine, whereupon 




Stevens maintains that you don’t change people; rather you give a space for people to 
change for themselves (Stevens 2016). In this way, although Abramović’s most recent 
participatory offering might not stage the kind of “antagonism” called upon by Bishop, 
or extend social engagement beyond the walls of the gallery, it does enable 512 Hours 
of space for people to experience change. Certainly, there are many accounts by 
spectators on both Tumblr and Twitter that testify to it being ‘transcendental’ or a ‘life-
changing’ experience (see 512 Hours Tumblr (2014) and #512hours on Twitter). It is 
worth acknowledging the immediacy of the responses captured on social media, as the 
ease of access in the age of the smartphone means that reflection can be shared when the 
experience is still fresh. At the same time social media is premised on a form of 
communication that transforms experience into a sound bite, most notably as a 
Facebook update or tweet. Therefore, it is important to recognise that the accounts given 
on these platforms are partly framed by a superficial culture of self-promotion, which 
corresponds to the “bragging rights” of “I was there” that I discussed earlier.   
 
In developing my analysis of audience agency, I wish to consider the way that 
Abramović affected audience behaviour. After a period of sitting in the cloakroom and 
talking to visitors about their experience, the artist returned to the performance. 
However, there was a palpable shift in energy when Abramović entered the room. I 
witnessed one instance in the space where my companion61 was seated; a silent space 
where participants were either encouraged to occupy one of the seats and close their 
eyes or to slow motion walk. When the recognisable figure of Abramović entered the 
room and whispered to my friend to “close her eyes”, the gallery was scarcely 
                                                          
61 In 512 Hours my attendance with a companion embodied the binary of together and alone, discussed by 
Simon Jones (2012), as we arrived together but were separated by the experience, while never fully 
forgetting our togetherness.  
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populated; but, by the time that she opened them some five minutes later the room was 
full. Similarly, I saw a notable increase in the number of participants meditating on the 
platform after Abramović’s return. Therefore, in contrast to conventional forms of 
performance, the audience appeared to be performing for the artist. Yet, while this 
manifests the role-reversal of artist and audience identified by Fischer-Lichte, the artist 
retained her authority throughout. During my attendance at 512 Hours, I perceived a 
largely compliant and in some instances devoted group of spectators, rather than an 
emancipated audience. The artist’s influence was undeniable; from the lengthy queues 
that stretched outside the Serpentine, to people’s willingness to cede their will to 
Abramović’s commands. As she reflects:  
[A]t the end of the day there would be hundreds of people come and stand. Just 
together. They would never be there together in normal life, in different 
religion[s], different social groups, different ages – they just stand. It was [a] 
really moving experience. For me this changed everything. (KunstSpektrum   
2014) 
 
Consequently, while my examination challenges Abramović’s claims about the work, 
particularly the extent to which it offers freedom to spectators, the impact of the 
experience on some participants cannot be underestimated. 
 
4.5 The Presence of Risk 
In the next part of the argument I will discuss how the implied risks of staging 
Abramović’s public experiment produces a preliminary form of presence that plays an 
important function in fostering participation. As Alston notes, citing David Jubb, the 
artistic director of the Battersea Arts Centre:62 
[R]isk is central to many participatory and immersive experiences: There is first 
of all the risk of not understanding the protocols of a given theatrical practice; 
there is also the risk of participatory rules being unclear … there exists a tension 
                                                          
62The Battersea Arts Centre (BAC) is a leading venue in participatory performance programming. 
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between risk and chaos that is key to navigating participatory risks for audiences 
(Jubb 2012). I  would add that the taking of participatory risks also relates to the 
production of affect and emotion. (2013: 134-135)  
 
Furthermore, I am proposing that the perception of risk combined with a sense of not 
knowing yields greater nervousness and a heightened self-awareness in both the artist 
and participants’ expectant bodies, which creates an intense form of presence. 
Abramović reveals that, ‘when I am performing a piece, anything that happens in that 
moment is part of the piece. You have to be open to accept it, and that has always been 
so nerve racking because you never know how things can go’ (cited in O’Brien 2014: 50 
emphasis original). A relationship between the nervous system and being present is 
emphasised in Jane Goodall’s Stage Presence (2008), focusing on dancer Nijinsky’s63 
claim that ‘[o]ne must be nervous’ (2008: 161). In her essay ‘A Resonant Emptiness’, 
Sophie O’Brien considers that ‘[t]he potential of failure inherent in Abramović’s work 
functions to sharpen her physical and psychological presence in performance’ (2014: 
51). I suggest that the same can also be said of her co-performers: the spectators, whose 
presence is enhanced through their anticipation of the encounter. This expectancy 
resonates with the hedonistic and narcissistic desire that I discussed in chapter three, as 
these participatory impulses produce feelings of excitement and anxiety in the 
participants, with the promise of pleasure, as well as the threat of disaster. In the trailer 
for 512 Hours, Abramović draws attention to the experimental nature of the work, in 
which “something may or may not happen” (Serpentine Galleries, 2015). Similarly, 
O’Brien muses that:  
In the state of imminence before a live performance, we wait patiently amidst 
the residues of the past, inhabiting this present moment of anticipation and 
                                                          
63 Vaslav Nijinsky (1989-1950) was a Russian ballet dancer and choreographer, who is regarded as the 
most famous male dancer of the early twentieth century. See Ramsay Burt’s 2007 The Male Dancer: 
Bodies, Spectacle, Sexualities, pp. 58-84. Also, see Hanna Järvinen’s account of ‘the stardom of Vaslav 
Nijinsky’ (2014).  
191 
 
conjuring up an imagined future. In the case of Marina Abramović’s … 512 
Hours, we are here, prior to the work commencing, frozen in the moment before 
an important event … and one for which there will be no script or plan. (2014: 
15) 
 
Indeed, I concede that in my imagining of 512 Hours I remained too attached to the 
past, specifically Abramović’s previous endurance-based works. Therefore, I was 
initially disappointed when I realised that she was not physically present in the 
performance for the entire duration.  
 
Building on from the way that an emphasis on experimentation creates a level of 
anticipation in spectators, I will return to the significance of the white cube gallery, 
discussed in chapter three. Drawing on Bishop’s cautionary essay, ‘Antagonism and 
Relational Aesthetics’, I propose that Abramović uses the “laboratory” paradigm to 
frame her practice (Bishop 2004: 51). As Bishop observes, there has been a notable 
tendency in the 2000s for European art venues to redefine the white cube model of 
exhibiting contemporary art as an experimental “laboratory” (2004: 51). This is 
certainly true in the case of the Marina Abramović Institute in Hudson, where visitors 
are even required to wear white laboratory coats. Bishop posits that this curatorial 
approach has emerged out a kind of art produced in the 1990s: ‘work that is openended, 
interactive, and resistant to closure’, which she perceives as ‘a misreading of 
poststructuralist theory: rather than the interpretations of a work of art being open to 
continual reassessment, the work of art itself is argued to be in perpetual flux’, and in 
her view this intentional instability can make the work impenetrable (Ibid., 52). It is at 
this juncture that Bishop’s analysis converges with Harvie’s reading of participation as 
complicit with a neoliberal capitalist culture. In discussing ‘the ease with which the 
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“laboratory” becomes marketable as a space of leisure and entertainment’, Bishop notes 
that: 
One could argue that in this context, project-based works-in-progress and artists-in-
residence begin to dovetail with an “experience economy,” the marketing strategy 
that seeks to replace goods and services with scripted and staged personal 
experiences. Yet what the viewer is supposed to garner from such an “experience” of 
creativity, which is essentially institutionalized studio activity, is often unclear. (Ibid) 
 
This argument relates to the earlier discussion concerning agency versus the display of 
agency and the extent to which participation is actually emancipatory and politically 
empowering as opposed to merely the spectacle of those endeavours.   
 
To further unravel the presupposed risk and capacity for failure within 512 Hours, I 
will now question what was really at stake in this performance. While the artist tells us 
that “she could not have had the confidence to do it before: to create something where 
there is nothing there” (KunstSpektrum 2014), I suggest that this statement can be 
challenged in a number of ways. First, the implication that she could not have done this 
before is somewhat misleading, as there are clear parallels between 512 Hours and The 
Abramović Method (2012).64 In the earlier experiment, participant-spectators were 
required to sign an agreement that they would stay in the installation without their 
mobile phones, iPods, computers, cameras and watches for a period of two hours. 
Abramović stated: ‘I have created an installation of objects for human and spirit use that 
the public can interact with in three basic positions: standing, sitting and lying down. In 
doing so, the public becomes part of the work’ (Abramović 2013: 19). Nevertheless, 
despite the similarities between the 2012 and 2015 works, it can be reasoned that the 
                                                          
64 The Abramović Method (2012) was exhibited at the Padiglione d'Arte Contemporanea (PAC) in Milan, 
curated by Diego Sileo and Eugenio Viola. It emerged from the artist's reflections on three of her most 
notorious works: The House With the Ocean View (2002), Seven Easy Pieces (2005) and The Artist is 
Present (2010). It involves “the Abramović method” which is a training process designed to heighten the 
participants' consciousness of their physical and mental state in the present moment. 
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extended duration of 512 Hours increases the potential for varying encounters and 
behaviours to unfold, which creates a greater perception of risk for both the artist and 
audience. As Alston establishes, risk assigns a close bond between the duration, 
unpredictability and daring of a participatory performance (2013: 134). Second, the 
“nothing there” can also be refuted, as I contend that in actuality there was quite a lot 
there, notably the platform and chairs, and earlier in the run there had been beds and rice 
counting. More significantly, I suggest that any impression of “nothing” being there is 
outweighed by the “something” of Abramović, and to this end “something” will happen. 
For even when she is absent, perhaps even more so, Abramović is present. Even though 
she may profess that “the public is [the] main work” (KunstSpektrum 2014), given her 
undeniable popularity it would be short sighted for her not to realise that for many 
people she is the subject/object of the art. Indeed, Abramović’s awareness of her fame is 
evident in the way that she uses her known presence to publicise her art, while also 
demonstrating a desire to be at the centre of the work.  
 
Although the title of the piece suggests very little about the content of the art beyond 
its duration, once inside the gallery it is clear that a particular set of processes and a 
legion of assistants (56 in total – nine each day) have been selected for a specific 
purpose. However, notwithstanding that there are clear parameters for participation in 
place; the un-scripted nature of 512 Hours inevitably brings with it a degree of 
unpredictability and the risk that something could go wrong.65 Tim Etchells notes that 
                                                          
65 In terms of what could go wrong, it is reasonable to consider the possibility of physical injury during 
the mindfulness exercises, especially given the sensory deprivation of spectators. Also, as I have noted, 
the effect of these activities had the potential to produce emotional and physiological reactions in 
spectators, which could put these individuals in a vulnerable state.  
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the performance of presence is located in this uncertainty and potential for failure, 
stating: 
Being present is always a kind of construction. Perhaps we could think of 
presence as something that happens when one attempts to do something, and 
whilst attempting to do that thing you become visible; visible in not quite 
succeeding in doing it, visible through the cracks or the gaps. (Cited in 
Giannachi et al: 20) 
 
In 512 Hours, the emphasis is on the public as the work relies on their attempt to do 
something (even if that something is nothing) in order to give it form; therefore, the 
performance of presence becomes a necessary part of its constitution. The stark white 
gallery spaces of the Serpentine determine that there is no-where to hide, even those 
watching on the side-lines are perceptible. Yet, echoing Etchells, I observed that 
participants became even more visible when they were ‘attempting’ to do something. It 
is in the ‘attempt’ that the possibility of either success or failure is highlighted, as the 
‘doing’ is indeterminate. This differs from more practiced or automatic modes of doing, 
which rely on memory and what Schechner calls “restored behaviour”,66 where there is 
less attempt required. In essence, the more demanding participation is, the bigger the 
attempt needed and the greater the visibility of the performing spectator. In 512 Hours 
spectators are asked to undertake prolonged ritual-based activities, which require a high 
degree of focus, precision and endurance, and to leave their everyday self in the cloak 
room. It was during the slow motion walk backwards exercise that I felt the most 
present, owing to the uncertainty implicit in the task and the possibility of getting it 
wrong in front of an audience. The superfans and expert participant-spectators, 
however, can to a certain extent defy this notion of ‘attempt’ through their familiarity 
                                                          




with the work. In this way, they provide an alternative performance of presence, one 
that is founded on proficiency, sureness and conviction.  
 
Overall, I conclude that while the anticipation of risk heighted the self-presence of 
both artist and spectators, in reality the performance involved a fairly low-level of risk. 
This resulted from the mind-calming activities encouraged within the work, the 
management of the audience, and the devotion of Abramović’s followers. The ultimate 
sign of failure for this public experiment would have been if the public had withheld its 
participation. However, the artist’s popularity insured against this possibility, as 
evidenced in the long wait to gain admission.  
 
4.6 Having Presence 
The previous discussions on presence have been underpinned by spectators’ prior 
knowledge of Abramović and her influence as a cultural figure. It is at this stage of the 
chapter that I take a close look at Abramović’s relationship with her audience and the 
way that she manifests stage presence. Richards considers that for Abramović: 
[T]he experience of the audience should be closer to what she experienced when 
she met with a monk who had just come out of seclusion following a number of 
years spent in a cave. … an experience of great clarity where she ‘just stopped 
thinking’ (Abramović et al., 1998: 404). It is this deep sense of peaceful 
connectivity that Abramović sees as something art should strive for; inner power 
transferred from artist to spectator (Carr, 2002: 57). (2010: 108) 
 
Since the start of her career, Abramović has drawn on her own autobiography, placing 
her body as both the subject and object of the work, and blurring the lines between 
life/art and public/private. As O’Brien writes:  
Performance artists are experienced by the audience as a thing in a permanent 
state of becoming; like an initiate in a ritual, they are suspended in an in-
between or liminal state during the work itself. Furthermore, beyond the 
immediacy of the work, Abramović occupies a complex state: she is between 




Moreover, in her durational practice life is consumed by art, or at the very least 
radically altered by it, hence, the distinction between Abramović the artist and the 
person becomes increasingly difficult to place. This complicated notion of identity is 
epitomised by the artist’s 2012 collaboration with Robert Wilson on The Life and Death 
of Marina Abramović, in which the artist played herself.  
 
The notion of “playing one’s self” is both inescapable and part of the draw in 512 
Hours, given the artist’s celebrity status. It is worth highlighting that Abramović was 
listed in Time magazine’s Top 100 Influential People in May 2014 (O’Brien 2014: 43). 
Her prominence amongst a mainstream audience has been actively pursued by the artist, 
in a bid to promote performance art to a broader public. The most notable examples of 
Abramović crossing over into popular culture include the restaging of The House with 
the Ocean View (2002) for an episode of Sex & The City (2003); her ongoing 
collaboration with Lady Gaga; the restaging of The Artist is Present in the pop video 
Picasso Baby for rapper Jay Z (2013); and recently her partnership with Adidas. While 
this has evidently given her many new followers, it has also induced much criticism that 
the artist has ‘sold out’. Jonathan Jones’s article for The Guardian, ‘Jay Z v Marina 
Abramović: they both used each other’, accuses Abramović of using high profile pop 
collaborations ‘to beam her charisma to the masses and whip up a frenzy of adulation’ 
(2015). It discusses the way that she has cultivated a ‘totally new kind of artistic fame’ 
and refers to her ascent to pseudo-messianic glory, capable of seducing her star-struck 
fans to wait for hours just to be in her presence. Jones poignantly asks: ‘what is the 
cultural price of mass intoxication? Is it a good thing?’ (2015). I suggest that in the case 
of 512 Hours this adulation establishes a special complicity with the practice even 
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before spectators have entered the gallery. This intoxication may also lessen spectators’ 
inhibitions and make risk-taking more likely, especially as there is the potential for 
conversation and perhaps envy to be found. This is of course good for the gallery and 
good for the artist, especially given the significance placed on public engagement. 
However, being under the influence of Abramović may also limit critical judgement; 
consequently, the work may go unchallenged by the mainly compliant audience. Then 
again, as some of the reviews mentioned in this discussion have shown, Abramović 
does have her critics. In fact, the artist received intense criticism in 2016, following 
allegations of racism over comments about Indigenous Australians, written in a 1979 
diary entry that featured in a draft of her forthcoming memoir (Harmon 2016).  
 
I propose that having stage presence is integral to the development of participation in 
performance as it directly affects the artist’s management of the audience. According to 
Patrice Pavis (1987):  
‘To have presence’ in theatrical parlance, is to know how to capture the attention 
of the public and make an impression; it is also to be endowed with a je ne sais 
quoi which triggers an immediate feeling of identification in the spectator, 
communicating a sense of living elsewhere and in an eternal present. (1987:9)  
 
Cormac Power’s term “auratic presence” defines the mode of presence that I have 
alluded to in relation to Abramović’s appeal. Power’s concept derives from the term 
“aura”; although difficult to pin down and with mysterious connotations, it refers to a 
presence that is ‘above the ordinary’ (2008: 47). In this way, it coincides with Walter 
Benjamin’s notion of “aura” in relation to the unique presence of an artwork (Benjamin 
1999: 214). Central to auratic presence is a strong sense of charisma, which in modern 
day usage is expressed through the person as whole rather than as a particular talent. 
Goodall clarifies, referencing Max Weber: 
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The term charisma will be applied to a certain quality of an individual 
personality by  virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as 
endowed with  supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional 
powers or qualities. (Weber 1968: 48 in Goodall 2008: 45) 
 
Returning to Power’s theory, there are two ways in which Abramović’s auratic presence 
is manifested (2008: 47-49). Firstly, it is constructed through the celebrity of the artist 
and the expectations that spectators’ carry with them into their encounter. As I reflected 
on earlier, these expectations have been built on the notoriety of Abramović’s 
endurance-based and in some instances death defying artworks, therefore, correlating 
with Weber’s notion of charisma as pertaining to superhuman qualities. Secondly, 
auratic presence shows itself in the doing of the performance, and not just through the 
artist’s prior reputation. I suggest that Abramović exudes this second appearance in 512 
Hours, through her command of the performance space, and the way in which she 
addresses her audience and holds their attention. 
 
To elucidate this second type of presence, I look once more to Erika Fischer-Lichte’s 
writing, specifically her essay ‘Appearing as embodied mind – defining a weak, a strong 
and a radical concept of presence’ (2012). I suggest that in 512 Hours spectators 
experience both a “strong concept” and “radical concept” of the artist’s presence. In 
defining a strong concept of presence Fischer-Lichte refers to the actor’s ability to 
command the space and to draw the spectators’ total attention, she says: 
Spectators sense a certain power emanating from the actor that forces them to 
focus their full consideration on him without feeling overwhelmed, perceiving it 
as a source of energy. The spectators sense that the actor is present in an 
unusually intense way, granting them, in turn, the intense sensation of 
themselves as present. To them, presence occurs as an intense experience of 
presentness. (Fischer-Lichte 2012: 108-109) 
 
As I have already indicated, from the moment that Abramović walked back into the 
main gallery space of 512 Hours there was a tangible shift in energy, as her presence 
199 
 
was acutely perceived by spectators. This was heightened by the unpredictability of her 
actions, as it was unknown where she would go or who she might engage with next. The 
performance of participation became more visible, as spectators appeared to make an 
extra effort or attempt to be involved, and spaces became a hub of activity when 
Abramović showed interest.  
 
Following Fischer-Lichte’s reading of Eugenio Barba’s research, I offer that 
Abramović’s strong sense of presence is ‘a performative quality, brought forth by a 
particular usage made of the body’ (Fischer-Lichte 2012: 110). Barba’s extensive work 
on presence arose out of his own intense experiences as a spectator of Indian and Far 
Eastern theatre forms. His study concluded that the techniques and practices of these 
performers ‘serve the purpose of generating energy within themselves, which then 
transfers to the spectator’ (Fischer-Lichte 2012: 110). Similarly, “the Abramović 
method”, used at the Marina Abramović Institute (MAI) in Hudson, New York, has its 
origins in the knowledge gained through the artists’ expeditions around the world and 
learnings with Tibetan Monks, Aborigines, and Indian and Far Eastern practices. The 
underpinning principles of these exercises, which form the basis of 512 Hours, are to 
enable the participant to control their perception, build their will power, and to 
concentrate on being in the present moment. As Richards observes: 
Abramović continues to root many of the problems of contemporary Western 
Society in its lack of genuine connection, both to other people and to the larger 
cosmos. … Everyone is too busy; caught up in the cycles of contemporary 
existence that reads inactivity as boredom or laziness. By contrast, Abramović is 
keen to advocate the importance of being free to do nothing in a society that 
seems to be repulsed by this idea. … In this respect Abramović’s ideas can be 
linked to particular processes  associated with Taoism (2010: 56)  
 
Abramović observes that in 512 Hours “you turn into yourself” (KunstSpektrum   
2014), which corresponds with Rachel Gomme’s reflection on the way that participation 
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eventually becomes an encounter with the self (Gomme 2015: 291). Furthermore, I 
suggest that during this process of introversion, energy is produced within participants 
which can also emanate as the strong concept of presence (to varying degrees). The 
level of presence being emitted, results from several factors, noted by Phillip Zarrilli in 
his application of Fischer-Lichte’s theory: 
“[T]he strong concept of presence” is not singular but multiple: the quality, 
valence, and intensity of the actor’s ability to generate an inner ‘energy,’ to 
engage one’s entire embodied consciousness in each performance task, to 
command space and hold attention is always shaped by one’s 
training/experience, as well as the dramaturgy and aesthetic of a specific 
performance. (Zarrilli 2012: 122) 
 
This explains why there were some participants who appeared to be fully immersed and 
present in the exercises; and others including myself, who struggled to find the required 
level of concentration to be embodied in the tasks, therefore, appearing less present. 
Reflecting on my own engagement with the work, although I understood what I needed 
to give in order to receive the transformative potential of the experience, it had been a 
long time since I had undertaken ritual-based and meditative processes and I found that 
I didn’t have the required patience. Richards states that: ‘Abramović embraces 
“boredom” as a necessary stage through which you must pass in order to become 
creative. In “doing” nothing … you can allow sufficient time and space for something to 
happen’ (2010: 56). However, I interpreted my boredom and lack of concentration as a 
failure, which contradicted my self-appointed expert participant-spectator status. Yet, 
while I suspect that I did not radiate a strong concept of presence, a form of 








4.7 Embodied Presence  
Along with the perceptions of auratic presence and stage presence already discussed, I 
also wish to draw attention to the notion of an embodied and sensorial concept of 
presence. To this end, I will continue to interpret Fischer-Lichte’s hypothesis, as well as 
applying Machon’s theory of “(syn)aesthetics”, Cixous’s writings on sensory perception 
and Cull’s concept of “ontological participation”. I propose that an embodied form of 
presence is essential to understanding the transmission of energy between participants in 
participatory live art, capable of determining “presence as co-presence”. In addition, I 
also suggest that this particular experience of being in attendance is what distinguishes 
participatory works as particularly affective.  
 
Echoing Barba, Fischer-Lichte’s analysis of the strong concept of presence 
establishes that it is achieved through the actor’s phenomenal body. She develops her 
reading to consider how this embodiment manifests when the phenomenal and the 
semiotic body of the actor are indistinguishable (Fischer-Lichte 2012: 111). Drawing on 
anthropologist Thomas Csórdas’ (1994) appropriation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology, as well as the writing of philosopher Helmuth Plessner (1970), 
Fischer-Lichte offers a theory of embodied presence in a constant state of emergence:  
The human body knows no state of being, it exists only in a state of becoming. It 
recreates itself with every blink of the eye; every breath and every movement 
bring forth a new body. For that reason, the body is ultimately elusive. The 
bodily being-in-the-world, which cannot be but becomes, vehemently refuses to 
be declared a work of  art, or to be made into one. The actor instead undergoes 
processes of embodiment that bring forth his body anew and, at the same time, a 
dramatic figure. (Ibid) 
 
Nevertheless, Fischer-Lichte also acknowledges that embodied presence can be 
achieved without representing ‘a dramatic figure’, and in this way the definition is 
applicable to Abramović. Moreover, if we consider the idea of Marina Abramović 
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playing the celebrity-artist “Marina Abramović”, it follows that her presence is founded 
on both her phenomenal body and semiotic body. In her theorising, Fischer-Lichte 
contests the presupposition that presence happens when the body and the mind are 
brought together, insisting that the phenomenon of presence actually collapses the 
mind-body dichotomy. As discussed in chapter three, for Fischer-Lichte, when the 
performer exhibits the strong concept of presence through their phenomenal body, ‘the 
mind is embodied and the body is “en-minded”’ (Ibid., 16). In this way, presence is 
consistent with my outlining of a “symmathesy” of participation, to use Nora Bateson’s 
(2016) term.  
 
A development of Fischer-Lichte’s strong concept of presence is her “radical concept 
of presence”, which determines a form of mutual determination between performer and 
spectator. It is underpinned by the argument that when the spectator encounters the 
performer’s strong concept of presence, they identify as an embodied mind within their 
own bodily presence. As Fischer-Lichte puts it: 
Through the performer’s presence, the spectator experiences the performer and 
himself as embodied mind in a constant process of becoming – he perceives the 
circulating energy as a transformative and vital energy. This I call the radical concept 
of presence, written as PRESENCE: PRESENCE means appearing and being 
perceived as embodied mind; perceiving the PRESENCE of another means to also 
experience oneself as embodied mind. (2012: 115) 
 
In 512 Hours the mutual determination of ‘becoming’ is tangible, as spectators 
experience varying degrees of transformation in both themselves and others. I suggest 
that PRESENCE: PRESENCE, with the double of ‘appearing and being perceived as 
embodied mind’, is magnified by the paradox of participation in 512 Hours, in which 




Freddie Rokem’s (2003) writing on “transgressive energies” in performance also 
alludes to a radical concept of presence, which can manifest in watching-spectators. 
Rokem gives the example of an audience member identifying with the presence of an 
eavesdropper in a Shakespearean play, who is chastised for his transgression. In this 
moment, aware that their spectating is also a form of eavesdropping, the audience 
member establishes a process of recognition with the body of the performing spy, who 
they perceive as an extension of themselves. Applying this concept to 512 Hours, when 
a watching-spectator observes a performing-spectator being whispered to or touched by 
Abramović, a doubling process begins. Furthermore, the watcher, recognising their 
mutual audience-ness with the performing-spectator, is induced to make a largely 
unconscious negotiation with themselves, based on a range of emotional and cathartic 
responses (Rokem 2003: 306-307), as outlined in chapter three. This resonates with my 
empathetic experience seeing Abramović instruct my companion to “close her eyes”, 
tinged with a little jealousy. Shortly after leaving the gallery, my friend made a point of 
telling me about her momentary one-to-one encounter, saying: “Marina whispered to 
me”. I am reminded of the potential for participation to be socially divisive, through its 
privileging of some spectators over others. However, perhaps, as Alston suggests, this 
‘uneven distribution of participatory opportunity is what may well render an experience 
… especially meaningful or exciting’ (2013: 133). Furthermore, according to Bruce 
McConachie’s ‘cognitive analysis of spectating in the theatre’, mirror neuron systems 
cause the spectator to mirror and empathise with others, and it is this that maintains 
their interest in the unfolding narrative/sequence of events (McConachie, 2009: 18-19).     
 
Fischer-Lichte proposes that a heightened awareness of one’s own presence as 
manifested through PRESENCE: PRESENCE achieves a rare moment of happiness that 
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cannot be recreated in the audience member’s everyday life, consequently, ‘spectators 
might become addicted’ (2012: 116). She notes, referencing philosopher Martin Seel, 
that ‘we yearn for a sense of the presence of our life’ and ‘want to experience the 
presences in which we exist as sensual presences’ (Seel 2001: 53 in Fischer-Lichte 
2012: 115-116). To this end, PRESENCE: PRESENCE may go some way in explaining 
the rising popularity of more visceral art forms, and the emergence of superfans and 
expert participant-spectators, who seek to recreate their experience time and time again. 
 
Developing on from Fischer-Lichte’s concept of “embodied presence”, there are 
several points of comparison to be found with Machon’s theory of “(Syn)aesthetics” 
(2009), especially her analysis of the “presentness” of sensorial practice. Machon’s 
redefining of visceral performance: ‘encompasses both a fused sensory perceptual 
experience and a fused sensate approach to artistic practice and analysis’ (2009: 14 
emphasis original). Consequently, she adopts Elaine Scarry’s derivation of presence: 
prae-sens, meaning ‘that which stands before the senses’ (Scarry 1985: 197; emphasis 
original, in Machon 2009: 25). According to Machon, ‘[f]undamental to the 
(syn)aesthetic response is the notion that the body is the sentient conduit for the 
appreciation of artistic work in general, and performance in particular’ (2009: 22). I 
propose that this concept is accentuated in 512 Hours, with its emphasis on an 
embodied and individual experience. In addition, the spectator’s experience of the 
performance represents a departure from typical gallery behavior, where appreciation of 
the art is largely based on visual perception. This is resulting from the way that each 
activity demands that the spectator remains in the same space for a prolonged period, 
limiting their mobility; and coupled with an emphasis on participation rather than 
observation. Therefore, instead of objectively measuring the work against a set of 
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recognisable visible qualities; the spectator is forced to re-configure their response to 
the experience. To this end, the wholeness of the spectator’s experience does not derive 
from ‘seeing’ the whole event unfold, but from (syn)aesthetic perception. As Merleau-
Ponty maintains, ‘sensory perception’ is produced ‘with our whole body all at once, and 
which opens on a world of interacting senses’ (2002 [1962]: 255). This is further 
enhanced in 512 Hours given the restrictions imposed on our sensory perception. On the 
platform, with eyes shut and ears closed off, I can no longer rely on my dominant 
senses, rather I ‘turn’ into myself and perceive with my whole body. Stephen Di 
Benedetto maintains that ‘[a]rtists who harness more than our eyes and ears encourage 
us to wake up, to be alert to the world around us … It is an invitation to live, to feel, and 
to be part of a larger community’ (2007: 134). In this way, Abramović’s method of 
participation can be seen to bring forth a heightened sense of “presentness” in both the 
self and others that works towards fostering social engagement. 
 
Machon’s theorising also converges with Fischer-Lichte’s observation that an 
embodied sense of one’s own presence can be addictive. Drawing on neurologist 
Richard E. Cytowic (1994, 2002) and psychologist Alexander Luria’s (1969) research 
into “hypermnesis”, Machon maintains that fundamental to (syn)aesthetics is the idea 
that ‘the original visceral experience remains affective in any subsequent recall’ (2009: 
10 emphasis original). This embodied recalling strengthens our experience, perhaps 
making it even more palpable than in its original perception. It upholds the addictive 
potential of participatory practice, as each time we have an experience it is enriched 
with our previous exchanges. When we have repeated experiences of the same work, as 
is the case with Punchdrunk’s superfans, our reactivated encountering has even greater 
affective clarity. This utterance of a past presence affords the participant a heightened 
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presence in the presentness of the work. I also suggest that documentation can be a way 
of enabling us to relive our participatory experience, through the document performance 
of photographs and video footage, and in the re-telling of our encounter on social 
networks and blogs. 
 
Acknowledging that Machon’s theory of (syn)aesthetics is influenced by écriture 
féminine, it follows that her reading of embodied presence is consistent with Hélène 
Cixous’s writings on sensory perception. A striking example of Cixous’s theorising on 
embodied experience lies in her reflection on the myth of Eden (1991: 136-181). Here, 
she recognises the pleasure to be found eating the forbidden apple by stating: ‘“Bring 
me to your lips”; it is full, it has an inside’ (Cixous 1991: 151 emphasis original). In a 
way that parallels Eve and the apple, I suggest that when a participant-spectator comes 
to physically experience the inside of a performance, both the inside of the participant 
and the performance (apple) feel full; notwithstanding that the participant may feel 
empty later. Echoing Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) writing on the “visible and tangible”, 
Cixous’s concept that the “eyes are lips” also suggests that the inside can be tasted by 
watching-spectators (Cixous 2001: 9). 
 
Another theoretical viewpoint on embodied presence arises in Laura Cull’s notion of 
“ontological participation”, highlighted in chapter two. Her adoption of Allan Kaprow’s 
conception that through participation ‘[m]eaning is experienced in the body, and the 
mind is set into play by the body’s sensations’ (Kaprow 1986 in Cull 2011: 86) 
corresponds to both Fischer-Lichte’s concept of “PRESENCE: PRESENCE” and 
Machon’s appropriation of “Prae-sens”. Reflecting on Cull’s theory, I propose that the 
underpinning philosophy and form of attention in action that is cultivated in 512 Hours 
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works towards accessing ‘that extra-conscious perception’ that Cull envisages (Cull 
2011: 87). However, as I have discussed, an inability to disable a mind/body duality, 
exasperated by the paradox of participation and a resistance to quieten my critical 
consciousness, meant that an immanent encounter eluded me. Nevertheless, I suggest 
that ontological participation offers a useful framework for understanding how 
embodied presence is brought into being during participatory performance. 
 
4.8 Presence and Black Holes 
Expanding on the notion that the experience of participation continues beyond the time 
and space in which it was first encountered, this discussion serves to recognise how the 
extended duration of 512 Hours enables varying mutations of being present to emerge. 
As Abramović retrospectively describes in relation to her collaborative performance 
Nightsea Crossing67 (1981-1987): 
 Presence. 
 Being present, over long stretches of time, 
 Until presence rises and falls, from 
 Material to immaterial, from 
 Form to formless, from 
 Instrumental to mental, from 
 Time to timeless.  
 (Cited in O’Brien 2014: 28 emphasis original) 
 
Applying this formulation of presence to 512 Hours, one might exchange the term 
presence with participation, while acknowledging that the two concepts are inextricably 
connected. I would argue that like presence, it is difficult to sustain precisely the same 
level of participation for any period of time, but this is even more evident where lengthy 
works are concerned. Abramović notes that during 512 Hours some members of the 
                                                          
67 Nightsea Crossing is comprised of twenty-two performances that took place in different locations 
around the world between 1981 and 1987. It involved Abramović and Ulay sitting at a table across from 
each other in silence for a period of seven hours a day. 
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public “would not leave” and were “staying for many hours” (KunstSpektrum 2014). 
Over the course of the performance, perceptions of presence and levels of participation 
inevitably fluctuate, along with shifts in the spectator’s role as both an audience 
member and performer. With regard to the movement from time to timeless in presence, 
I wish to propose that both concepts co-exist in the moment of participation. When 
participating we are in the present time: there is no past and no future, the time is now. 
Equally, because we are ‘doing’ something in the present, we cannot think of time, our 
presence and participation is timeless. When we stop participating and are no longer 
present in the work, we remember time again. Whereupon, we think of our watches 
concealed in the locker room and wonder if it is time to pay those bills, try Botox, check 
on the iron; time to find our everyday self again.  
 
As O’Brien observes, Abramović’s postmillennial works are ‘about making time, 
about creating a conscious awareness and about responding to the audience’ (2014: 29). 
This was evident in the House with the Ocean View (2002), creating a space for New 
Yorkers to reflect post 9/11 and inviting them to engage in an energy exchange with the 
artist. Similarly, the intention behind her infamous The Artist is Present (2012), a 
development of Nightsea Crossing, was to make time to be ‘fully present’, so that she 
could ‘give out unconditional love to every stranger’ that sat down opposite her 
(Brockes 2014). In 512 Hours she goes a step further, by not just asking her audience to 
make time, but to leave their established perception of time behind all together. In this 
way, as O’Brien asserts, ‘Abramović pushes to create “black holes”, where the audience 
can experience the depth of time. This shared experience charges the space with 
psychological and emotional complexities, an energy that is constantly shifting shape 
and dynamics’ (2014: 29). I propose that participation is part of the formation of these 
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black holes, as it transports the spectator into a time of timelessness. Furthermore, 
drawing on Cull’s theory, it could be said that Abramović is attempting to manifest 
ontological participation by collapsing reality into the single dimension of 512 Hours 
which denies the existence of our lives outside. What is interesting about the reference 
to black holes in space is that scientists can't see them, rather the existence of a hole is 
inferred by the effect that it has on its surroundings. I suggest that this observational 
problem can also be said of presence, as an ‘emergent and processual phenomena’ 
(Giannachi et al 2012: 14) that becomes visible through its influencing power. 
 
Abramović’s ability to channel energy is emphasised in Richards’ analysis of her 
distinctive presence, noting that: 
One of the extraordinary things about Abramović is her apparent ability to 
generate and focus her own electromagnetic field during her demanding 
durational performances. While it is not currently possible to provide definite 
evidence of what happens in the performance space, numerous accounts of 
audience members’ experience of her in performance strongly suggest that the 
space, over time, becomes charged by Abramović’s presence. (2010: 53)  
 
This statement resonates with Goodall’s writing on “drawing power”, which establishes 
that Benjamin Franklin’s theories of electricity have been applied to elaborate the notion 
of presence in an actor as accumulated charge. As Goodall states: ‘He divided bodies 
into those “wanting” electrical fluid and those “abounding” with it. Where too much 
electricity was present, it pooled to form a charged electrical atmosphere’ (2008: 
81).This is actualised in the way that, as Abramović puts it: ‘The public become like an 
energy field around me’ (cited in O’Brien 2014: 34 emphasis original). In addition, 
Abramović’s use of ritual-based activities to be undertaken by participants is part of the 
creation of this energy field, underpinned by the belief that repetition ‘generates 
enormous power’ (Ibid., 35). The purpose of the energy field reverberates in two ways 
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with the constitution of presence in her work. First, it connects to the notion of time and 
timelessness, as the artist notes: ‘the space has to be charged differently so you lose this 
concept of time and it is really now, here and now, just here and now … it’s as if it 
expresses something that goes on forever’ (Ibid). This supports the composition of 
presence as an evolving entity, rather than as a fixed construct. The second way in 
which the public acts as an energy field to foster presence is through their co-presence 
or “PRESENCE: PRESENCE”, to use Fischer-Lichte’s term, with Abramović. As the 
artist maintains: ‘they can project onto me like a mirror’ (cited in O’Brien 2014: 34 
emphasis original).  
 
4.9 The Phenomenology of Co-presence in Participation  
In the previous discussions on concepts of presence, I have at various stages intimated 
how presence can also manifest as co-presence. It is at this juncture that I wish to open 
out that argument more fully, by engaging with the philosophical ideas of Martin 
Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas. In doing so, I make considerable use of Simon 
Jones’s essay ‘Out-standing standing within: Being alone together in the work of Bodies 
of Flight68 (2012), which offers a rare insight into the way in which presence manifests 
in participatory live art. Inspired by the writings of Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel 
Levinas, Simon Jones provides the scaffold for a phenomenological analysis of 
presence as co-presence through the lens of participation.  
 
I will begin by unraveling how presence is constructed according to Heidegger and 
Levinas, as read by Jones. Heidegger uses the term “Dasein” to distinguish what I am 
referring to as presence. The essence of the noun “Dasein” means ‘being there or ‘being 
                                                          
68 Bodies of Flight are a contemporary performance company founded by Simon Jones in 1990. 
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here’; corresponding to my assertion that presence has an indeterminate makeup and 
capacity for possibility. It is this perspective that underpins Heidegger’s analysis of the 
potential processes and mutations that may occur in one’s being. Yet, in spite of its 
transformative capacity, Heidegger establishes that presence is embodied, rather than 
existing as a disembodied state or in a different type of form. Still, while inextricably 
bound together, for Heidegger, presence is given primacy over the physical body. That 
being said, it is the inevitable demise of the body that presents the main challenge to 
Heidegger’s ontology, as he puts it: ‘Death is the possibility of the absolute 
impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s 
ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped’ (Heidegger 1962: 
294 in S. Jones 2012: 162 emphasis original). Accordingly, Jones notes that the 
ontological isolation of each person as defined by the individual’s relation to their own 
death, undoes the relational potential of performance: ‘this co-presence can preserve 
nothing but the impossibility of its own becoming’ (S. Jones 2012: 162). In light of this 
sobering contention, Jones turns to Levinas’s amendment to Heidegger’s ontology, to 
establish that performance finds its particular potential in: ‘the participation of the other 
in this problem of the person’ (Ibid). For Levinas, presence is determined during the 
embodied encounter between two persons, whereupon we recognise the totality of 
humanity and its infinity (with all the possibilities that it imbues). As he succinctly puts 
it: ‘The thou is posited in front of a we’; consequently, performance offers a literal 
incarnation of Levinas’s theory (Levinas 1969: 213 in S. Jones 2012: 162).  
 
The significance of co-presence is evident in the structure for 512 Hours, as a piece 
made to accommodate 160 persons at any one time, as well as the relational dimension 
of the activities for participation. I will now turn to Heidegger’s concept of “out-
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standing standing-within” (1978) interpreted by Jones, to provide a framework for 
discerning the way that 512 Hours ‘poses this problem of the other before each other: 
two others mutually recognizing the other othering’ (S. Jones 2012: 170). For 
Heidegger the inter-relationship between the art and its spectators is where the art really 
happens: in its ‘preserving’ by those who did not author the work (S. Jones 2012: 158-
159). Heidegger states: 
Preserving the work means standing within the openness of beings that happens 
in the work. This ‘standing-within’ of preservation, however, is a knowing … 
He who truly knows beings knows what he will do in the midst of them. […] 
[T]he essence of Existenz is out-standing standing-within the essential 
sunderance of the clearing of  beings. (Heidegger 1978: 192 in S. Jones 2012: 
159) 
 
I propose that the platform in 512 Hours exemplifies the notion of “out-standing 
standing-within” as a form of ‘knowing’, while paradoxically constituting a ‘not-
knowing’. Jones considers that:  
the precise definition of ‘knowing’ is also one of difference, of standing out in 
the crowd, of recognising that this very inbetween, across which we come 
together, is also a gap that divides us, an incomplete medium, or rather, a 
bundling media (middles) each with their very own incompleteness … So, this 
‘knowing’ jointly sustains an attending to not-knowing or the issue of knowing, 
that is, performance’s  quintessential work – the problem of the person. (2012: 
159 emphasis original)   
 
This issue of knowing is epitomised by the way that the platform physically brings 
different people face-to-face, but at the same time the incompleteness of the knowing 
turns inwards; thus, the exchange becomes ultimately one with the self. This analysis 
echoes Gomme’s adoption of Levinas’s theory that ‘the relationship with the other is a 
relationship with a Mystery’, discussed in chapter three (Levinas 1987: 75-76 in 




Nevertheless, I am also reminded of Fischer-Lichte’s (2008) argument that in the 
‘mutual physical contact’ between performers and spectators ‘the border turns into a 
frontier and a threshold, which does not separate but connects’ (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 
204). While, I have detailed the problem of the person in my own encountering, at the 
same time I suggest that the knowing that results from participation, albeit limited, 
encourages a greater understanding of the other and as a consequence, the self. In Figure 
10 we can see a literal representation of bodies touching, as two young women are 
holding hands and Abramović has her hand on the shoulder of a young boy; however, 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion that sensory experience is achieved with the whole body (2002 
[1962]: 255) suggests that knowing can also manifest in those not touching, through 
their embodied perception. Therefore, the watching-spectator who is “out-standing” the 
“out-standing standing-within” of the performing-spectator may also experience a 
heightened awareness of self-presence which constitutes its own form of “standing-
within”. Looking at the relationship between not-knowing and knowing through the 
framework of “symmathesy”, I propose that these two conditions are mutually-
determining and underpin the process of identification that pertains to the presence of 
the self and other.  
 
A further appearance of out-standing standing-within relates to the paradox of 
participation: the duality of being both performer and spectator at the same time, as a 
kind of co-presence within the self. This argument is supported by the recognition that 
we recognise our spectator role when we are participating and our performing self when 
we are watching because of the other’s alterity, which we know as both outside of our 
self (out-standing) and deeply implicated in the self (standing-within). Abramović notes 
how:    
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(When we are in-between), this is where our mind is the most open. We are alert, 
sensitive, and destiny can happen. We do not have barriers and we are vulnerable. 
Vulnerability is important. It means we are completely alive and that is an extremely 
important space. This is for me the space from which my work generates. (Cited in 
O’Brien 2014: 51 emphasis original) 
 
Therefore, the way that the spectator oscillates between seeing and doing in 512 Hours 
works towards the creation of an in-between state, which fosters a heightened form of 
self-presence.  
 
This concept of “out-standing standing-within” also correlates with Heidegger’s 
hypothesis of “neighboring nearness” (1971), as discussed by Giannachi, Kaye and 
Shanks (2012), which imagines that: ‘[n]eighborhood, then, is a relation resulting from 
the fact that the one settles face-to-face with the other. … drawn into the other’s 
nearness’ (Heidegger 1971: 82 in Giannachi et al 2012: 10). The way that “neighboring 
nearness” establishes ‘the persistence of “being” across division and differentiation’ 
(Giannachi et al 2012: 11) can be applied to 512 Hours, as a space where people from 
different walks of life and cultural backgrounds can “be together but at the same time 
with themselves” (Abramović in KunstSpektrum 2014). It also joins with Abramović’s 
utterance of co-presence as a mirror image, emblematic of the spectator being drawn 
into the artist’s nearness, as a form of mutual determination. At the same time her 
statement that they ‘project onto me’ (cited in O’Brien 2014: 34 emphasis original) 
speaks to Abramović’s purported capacity to “feel every single person” which she has 
emphasised in numerous interviews, arguably contributing to her own mythology 
(KunstSpektrum 2014; also Studio International 2014). 
 
The realisation of neighboring nearness in 512 Hours is part of a deliberate resistance 
to our reliance on technological modes of engagement and sociability, and their drive 
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for immediacy. Abramović declares that “[w]e are consumption junkies … fucked up 
with technology … we have to go back to simplicity” (KunstSpektrum 2014). Earlier in 
the chapter I highlighted the significance of time on the manifestation of presence; in 
this section, I will expand on that discussion against the backdrop of the immediacy 
perpetuated by contemporary culture and through a phenomenological critical 
framework. Jones notes that the instantaneous responses that we have come to expect 
through our online interactions ‘lends to any exchange the force of a presence’ (S. Jones 
2012: 155 emphasis original), while obscuring encounters that cannot be revealed with 
the same level of promptness. He maintains that:   
This instant gratification reinforces not only ‘the need for speed,’ but the sense 
of belonging inherent in the response made … I exist because I am interacting: 
to tweet or not to tweet, that is the question. The interactive appears to accelerate 
time and condense space: a self-fulfilling immediacy with all the force of touch, 
without a space between, without a channel or medium – im-mediate. (Ibid., 
emphasis original)    
 
It is, perhaps, this desire to continue to exist through interaction that provides the 
impulse for participants to share their experiences on Tumblr and Twitter. However, 
while Abramović’s uptake of Tumblr would appear to embrace the immediacy of online 
communication platforms, this is in contrast to the dogma of 512 Hours to slow down 
time. Separated from their time keeping devices, spectators are encouraged to make 
time to be present. Additionally, the elimination of clock-time can be seen to deny a 
definitive chronology of bodies passing time, and the inevitability of death. In this way, 
the singularity of the spectator’s own presence, with its impending death which undoes 
Dasein/presence, is exchanged for an essential co-presence that is experienced as an 
embodied and infinite facing. However, as I determined in my earlier reflection on 512 
Hours, time became even more present as a consequence of its absence. Moreover, 
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while the performance may deny the passing of time and our eventual demise, the 
galleries closing time of 6pm acts as a constant reminder of the reality of time outside.  
 
The notion of co-presence as an infinite facing is underpinned by Levinas’s writing 
on “the infinity of the Other”, interpreted by Jones as: 
a process of appearing, dis-appearing and re-appearing, inherent in the 
movement towards, thence away from, and re-turning back towards, the other. 
This movement … fundamental to appearance, appearing before the other, even 
appearing on stage, necessitates instability, un-doing and re-doing in its 
insistence on the dynamics of approaching the other, a touching without ever 
reaching, always underway and never undergone, always in action and never 
done. (S. Jones 2012: 164)  
 
The implied processual and emergent nature of co-presence is exemplified in 512 
Hours, as the face-to-face encounters with others are transient meetings that limit the 
possibility of thinking and feeling the other as wholly there. This is a consequence of 
the artwork’s ephemeral nature and the endlessness implied in its essential formlessness 
and extended duration. Nonetheless, this does not negate the meaningfulness of those 
encounters, no matter how fleeting or incomplete they may be. According to Jones these 
face-to-face encounters work in opposition to technological forms of participation in 
which ‘[t]o inter-act with the other becomes a tasking, rather than a being-with’ (S. 
Jones 2012: 156). As such, he borrows Levinas’s principle that: ‘[t]he immediate is the 
face-to-face’ (Levinas 1969: 52 in S. Jones 2012: 157-158). For Jones, it is the inherent 
potential of a face-to-face encounter that upholds “live” performance’s defiance towards 
interactive technologies (2012: 158). However, it is worth noting that for Levinas the 
constitution of presence as face-to-face is not limited to a literal encounter, as he states: 
The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in 
me, we here name face. This mode does not consist in figuring as a theme under 
my gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming an image. 




Still, alternative relational modes of co-presence would need to yield the same 
potentiality of being (S. Jones 2012: 163). Incidentally, Stevens also asserts that 
mediated interaction, such as a series of heated text messages, can be more “live” than a 
banal face-to-face meeting (Stevens 2016). Even so, I suggest that it is spectators’ 
“ontologically pristine”69 face-to-face encountering in 512 Hours that enables 
participation to foster extraordinary exchanges of presence.  
 
4.10 Conclusion 
In conclusion, as ‘an unforgettable moment in the history of performance art’ 512 
Hours embodies the complex interactions and contradictions that accompany the 
politics and aesthetics of participation. Over the course of this chapter, I have unraveled 
my own encountering of Abramović’s public experiment, with particular emphasis on 
the perceived value of being there; agency; and to a greater extent the ways in which 
presence was manifested.  
 
Early in the chapter, my analysis established spectators’ touristic appetite for 
participatory work, and the way that participation has enjoyed a privileged position 
because of its perceived consumer value. I determined how the selfie and the use of 
blogs and social networking sites act as tangible reminders of spectators’ participatory 
encounters, offering further opportunity for spectators to claim “bragging rights”. 
Furthermore, Abramović’s uptake of Tumblr implies that the opportunity to socialise 
our participatory experiences, as well as to entice new participants has not been lost on 
the artist.  
 
                                                          
69 “ontologically pristine” is the term that Philip Auslander uses in Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized 
Culture  (1999) in relation to Peggy Phelan’s valorisation of live performance as separate from mediated 
technologies, outlined in Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (1993). 
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While I have demonstrated how 512 Hours represents a spectacle of sociability 
rather than a more sustainable and critical form of engagement, at the same time the 
extraordinary coming together of people who would not ordinarily share the same space 
can be seen as its own call to action and as a form of passive resistance. Nonetheless, I 
draw attention to the way that both mindfulness and leaving our everyday lives in the 
lockers actually prioritises individual experience over collective consciousness. Indeed, 
my own struggle to forget my responsibilities became a barrier to my “attendant” 
participation in the work.  
 
In my exploration of the emancipation of spectators, drawing on the writing of Breel, 
I reflected on how my agency within the work was limited by the restrictions that I 
encountered, consistent with ‘the display of agency’, rather than as a truly agentive 
experience. Yet, I have also acknowledged that in my own witnessing the bodily 
sensation of agency could be perceived in several spectators’ changed physicality, 
notably affecting the aesthetic of participation as a whole. Therefore, although 512 
Hours does not for the most part foster a pro-active form of agency, it does not 
necessarily make the experience any less meaningful for spectators. While, I conclude 
that participants in 512 Hours are not wholly emancipated spectators because their 
encountering is clearly defined by closely monitored parameters, I propose that the 
imposed boundaries of the performance also act as a mechanism to bring the public 
together.  
 
This brings me to the main focus of the chapter; an analysis of the varying mutations 
of presence that reveal themselves in 512 Hours and their convergence with the 
emergent processes of participation. I have concluded how the “I was there” of 
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participation and the presence of risk produces a heightened state of self-awareness in 
the expectant bodies of both Abramović and her spectators. I established how 
Abramović’s extraordinary presence is a driving factor in the ability to  
influence and manage audience participation, opening out the concepts of “auratic 
presence” (Power), “stage presence” (Goodall), and “the strong concept of presence” 
(Fischer-Lichte). The discussion proceeded to reveal how the artist’s embodied presence 
returns a feeling of embodiment to her spectators, drawing on the corresponding 
theories of “PRESENCE: PRESENCE” (Fischer-Lichte), “prae-sens” (Machon), 
“écriture féminine” (Cixous) and “ontological participation” (Cull). I propose that it is 
through these various utterances of embodiment in 512 Hours, notwithstanding the 
limitations of my own participation, that the spectator is given access to an extended 
window of perception that produces extraordinary moments of engagement. In the next 
part of the chapter, I emphasised the significance of time in Abramović’s practice and 
how this underpinned the emergence of different modes of presence and levels of 
participation. I noted Abramović’s capacity to create “black holes” in which spectators 
can experience the depth of time; and the ability to generate her own “electromagnetic 
field” by channelling the energy of the public.  
 
In the penultimate stage of the chapter, I have outlined the phenomenology of 
presence as co-presence within 512 Hours, engaging with Heidegger’s concepts of “out-
standing standing-within” developed by Jones, and the related notion of “neighboring 
nearness”, as well as Levinas’s consideration of the “infinity of the Other”. I have 
maintained that the platform epitomises “out-standing standing-within” as a form of 
‘knowing’ at the same time as ‘not-knowing’, through its capacity to bring different 
people together, as well as enabling spectators to turn into themselves. Furthermore, 
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“out-standing standing-within” provides a potential framework through which to 
disentangle the act of witnessing and the paradox of participation. I have outlined how 
the supposed suspension of time in 512 Hours, works towards the co-presence of 
spectators in an embodied and infinite facing. Yet, despite the utopian vision of 
sociability on display in Abramović’s practice, 512 Hours brings forth Levinas’s 
“infinity of the Other”, as the passing encounters between strangers negate a complete 
perception of the other as wholly there, in a performance that is ‘always in action and 
never done’ (S. Jones 2012: 164). 
 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how the emergent processes of participation are 
closely tied to the ways in which the spectator is present in 512 hours. The criticisms 
concerning participation, specifically those pertaining to its commodification and value, 
are perhaps as much directed at its popularity than at participation per se. Though I 
acknowledge that we should be aware of the way in which art’s autonomy might be 
compromised by the experience economy; I want to reiterate that it is essential that we 
don’t lose sight of the experience itself and what it can offer the spectator, as one 512 
Hour Tumblr blogger writes:  
 I was present and my presence became  
 the space for others, and my breath 
 became the time for others 
 and I was the mediator and 








Chapter Five: The Ethics of Participation in an “Ethically Imperfect World”  
 
5.1 The Fifth Encounter: Gob Squad’s Western Society 
It is August 2015. I am sitting in the audience for Gob Squad’s Western Society at the 
Southbank Centre, London. In the opening sequence, we are introduced to four naked 
performers: Simon, Sean, Sharon and Sarah. Their only costume is 1970s inspired wigs 
and platform shoes, and they are “dripping in bling”. The premise of the performance is 
that an ordinary and scarcely watched YouTube video of a family karaoke night will be 
re-enacted, to represent a microcosm of Western society in the twenty-first century. The 
set is rearranged to loosely resemble the living room from the video - the site of the 
family gathering; it will also become the meeting place for Sharon’s Mum and partner; 
the imaginary living room of Simon’s thirteen-year old daughter; and the location for a 
reunion between Sarah and her Dad. While attempting to re-enact the seven roles 
depicted on the original video, the four performers concede that they could think bigger. 
It is at this point in the show that Sarah suggests that they “open the border” and give 
some audience members the opportunity to “bask in the glow of the performance”. 
 
The audience is told that that there will be seven golden tickets handed out to 
spectators at random. The lucky winners will be made VIPs and rewarded with 
champagne and chocolates, while the rest of the audience watch from the sidelines. As 
the seven golden tickets are given out, each one represented by a furry toy animal; there 
is a mixture of both delight and fear amongst the audience. The first cuddly toy (ticket) 
lands in the lap of a middle-aged male spectator sitting in front of me, and is met with 
uncertainty as he asks his male companion “Does that mean I have to go up?” Rising 
from his seat, he is applauded by the audience in an act of solidarity: we are with him, 
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even if we have been left behind. I note a young woman visibly waving her hands above 
her head in the hope of either catching a ticket or signalling to Sarah and Sharon to 
throw one her way. And of course, who can blame her for this display of 
“entrepreneurial participation”,70 as Western Society makes it explicit that participant-
spectators are offered special privileges. She may also consider herself to be an expert 
participant-spectator, keen to share her abilities whenever the opportunity should arise.  
Her enthusiasm is recognised with a flying toy carp knowingly thrown in her direction.  
 
During the excitement, I wondered if I should try to win one of the tickets, and if one 
did come my way whether I would accept the invitation.  I knew that by participating I 
would have a more active role in the performance and I would be able to take in the 
view from Gob Squad’s side of the border. Yet, I wasn’t sure that I wanted to make the 
required level of commitment, and once on their side it would be difficult to escape 
unnoticed. From my seat, I had the freedom to watch both the performance and the 
audience around me. I was also able to observe some spectators literally escaping from 
the theatre. For some spectators, Western Society can offer a ‘limit experience’71 
because of the demand to perform on stage for a sustained amount of time 
(approximately one-hour). A few tickets into the selection process and Gob Squad 
suggested that you could decline the invitation by passing the ticket on to someone else, 
although I didn’t witness any decliners. Again, it is important to recognise that for the 
most part this was a specialist audience of contemporary theatre/live art-goers, some of 
whom would have read about the participation in reviews and publicity material, or seen 
it in the video footage available on YouTube. It could be said, therefore, that some 
                                                          
70 See Adam Alston (2013: 128) for a definition of this term. 
71 See Karoline Gritzner (2011: 111) for a definition of this term. 
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audience members already had a special complicity with the performance, which was 
enhanced further by the rapport and suggested border crossing that Gob Squad 
established right from the beginning. On a related note, performing-spectators were 
urged to take their smart phones and media devices on stage with them, perhaps as a 
way of encouraging the dissemination of their experience to other potential spectators. 
  
Approaching the final ticket, a Gob Squad performer compared it to being the “last in 
the team to be picked”, which encapsulates my feeling of anxiety as I waited to see 
which team I would be on. However, this analogy was soon followed with the 
suggestion that “sometimes it’s good to sit in the dark and watch, right?”, and to my 
relief this was to be my fate. One by one each ticket winner arrived on stage and was 
directed towards stage left, which was an off stage (on stage) VIP area that consisted of 
a large table and set of chairs, complete with champagne and chocolates. Here the 
exclusive club of performing-spectators appeared to be cast in their parts and given 
headphones, through which they would receive instructions from the performers. 
Meanwhile, back in the dark, we were being spurred on to sing along and sway our 
arms in the air to Michael Jackson’s Earth Song. 
 
As the re-enactment develops, the Gob Squad performers confess their desire to join 
in. They may tell us that it’s okay to be on the side-lines, but they cannot resist their 
desire to be back on the inside of the performance. One of the performers draws a direct 
likeness between the interaction of strangers at a party and the participant-spectators 
intermingling in the staged family gathering. They observe that these are people who are 
sharing in this unique experience together; people who otherwise may not come into 
contact; people who have left their theatre companions behind to form new bonds in the 
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“new world”. The party on stage becomes a temporary utopia, where cultural and social 
preconceptions no longer have relevance.      
      
In the final scene, as Sarah sings along to Bobby Darin’s The Party’s Over, we are 
given a poignant example of spectators cast as both performing-spectators and 
watching-spectators at the same time, or what we might think of as performing-
watching-spectators. It occurs when the participants are invited to come around to the 
front of the stage to watch a recording of their re-enactment, which is being played in 
slow motion on the screen. As they laugh and look in some astonishment at their 
performance, they appear to be back on the outside looking in. However, they have not 
been returned to their original audience status, as they remain out of their seats and in 
full view of the watching-spectators. While we watch the participants watching 
themselves, they are still performing-spectators, only now they are performing 
spectating. It might even be said that they are mirroring us as spectators; as we were 
once them, laughing and watching in some astonishment at their unfurling performance. 
Yet, the participants’ newly acquired status is acknowledged at the end of the piece 
when they appear in the curtain call alongside the company members to receive the 
audience’s applause. The party is over and my thoughts turn once more to ‘the morning 
after (the night before)’ as I contemplate the implications of “opening the border” in 
what Bishop has come to describe as “delegated performance” (2008). 
 
5.2 Introduction 
In this final chapter I will focus on the use of audience participation in the work of UK 
and German ensemble, Gob Squad, specifically looking at their recent performances 
Western Society (2015) as described above, and War and Peace (2016) recounted later 
225 
 
in the discussion. These performances follow their previous practice wherein ‘the 
audience are often asked to step beyond their traditional role as passive spectators and 
bear witness to the results’ (Gob Squad 2016a). Reflecting on my own bearing witness 
of this stepping beyond, the subject of ethics and its relationship to participation has 
become central to my analysis. In many ways ethics has underscored the numerous 
debates that have already taken place in the study; beginning with my first experience of 
La Pocha Nostra’s work and that request to lose some of my clothes, and later in my 
analysis of the commodification of art as experience. Ethics permeates all aspects of 
participation, from the aspiration to give audience members increased freedom and the 
code of practice which governs interaction, to the system by which the work is valued. 
In this final chapter, ethics will be afforded special “privilege”, to use a term that 
underpins both Gob Squad’s practice and the arguments under discussion. I will argue 
that participation raises the ethical stakes in performance, and it is this that makes it one 
of the most dynamic art forms of the twenty-first century.  
 
The title of this chapter indicates that the focus of this discussion is the ethics of 
participation, while implying that the case study works are being made at a time of 
intense political unrest. The phrase an ‘ethically imperfect world’ is a direct reference to 
Gob Squad’s appropriation of Tolstoy’s preoccupation with morality (Gob Squad 
2016b). The chapter gets under way by establishing the constitution of ethics in 
participatory performance, drawing on the writing of Nicholas Ridout. I follow this by 
briefly tracing the evolution of theatre and ethics from the theatre etiquette established 
in the late nineteenth century to a less certain conception within participatory live art 
today. The discussion will determine how an ethical framework is established by the 
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three “teams”72 in attendance during Gob Squad’s performances: the professional 
performers, the watching-spectators, and the performing-spectators. I propose that over 
the course of the action, these teams alternate between performing and spectating; and 
although each group has its own ethical considerations, they are interdependent on the 
ethics of the other teams. 
 
During chapter four, I debated the notion that participatory performance is congruent 
with Joseph Pine and James Gilmore’s concept of “the experience economy”. I now 
wish to expand on this analysis from an ethical perspective by considering the 
delegation of labour to spectators, turning once more to the arguments offered by Claire 
Bishop and Jen Harvie, along with Ridout’s work in this area. I will examine how 
performance is delegated within Gob Squad’s practice and its effect on the audience, as 
well as returning to Jacques Rancière’s theory that we can be emancipated whilst 
staying in our seat. I argue that an “emancipated spectator” in a Gob Squad performance 
is not an “exploited spectator”; rather, their work draws some much needed self-
reflexive attention to the perception of participation as a place of privilege and what 
Bishop calls ‘a luxury game’. I will also posit that the treatment of performing-
spectators as VIPs and the shared curtain call at the end of the performance represents a 
form of payment for services rendered. 
 
My analysis of the ethics of participation is also supported by my sixth encounter, as 
an audience member for Gob Squad’s War and Peace. This experience provides further 
insights on the construction of an ethical framework in participation, and leads into a 
section on the “spectator within” us, which engages with Ridout’s theorising. The 
                                                          
72 The term “teams” is used by Erving Goffman in his study The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 
(1959: 85).  
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discussion expands into a consideration of Erving Goffman’s concept that as individuals 
we put on a “front” before observers. These debates also remain in dialogue with earlier 
discussions around the paradox of participation, namely the duality of performing and 
spectating.        
    
In the next part of the study, I look at the role of ethics in the exchange that takes 
place between participants in performance. Building on my consideration of Levinas’s 
writing on presence (1969 [1961]), explored in the previous chapter, I will examine the 
idea of “ethics as encounter”. What follows is a discussion concerning the doubling 
process that transpires when one individual is “impressed” upon another, producing a 
form of “sympathy” or what might be better understood as empathy. In the final part of 
this section I return to Goffman’s concept of “teams” to illustrate how their ‘reciprocal 
dependence’ and ‘reciprocal familiarity’ converge to determine ethics as encounter.   
   
This chapter also recognises the occasions when spectators misinterpret, disregard, or 
re-configure their relationship to participation; therefore, unsettling the ethical 
framework for the performance. In truth, these disruptions to the form can provide some 
of the most exciting moments in the performance, as they make the risk and liveness of 
participation palpable. As I disentangle participation gone wrong, I arrive at three types 
of transgressive spectatorship; the “errant spectator” as defined by Adam Alston, the 
“mis-spectator” identified by Ridout, and what I am calling the “dis-spectator”. At the 
centre of my analysis is a group of ‘hecklers’ in the audience of War and Peace and 
their targeted jeering at a performing-spectator.  
 
In addition to the critical analysis and philosophical thoughts that underpin the 
arguments contained in this chapter, I conducted a Skype interview (July 2016) with 
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Gob Squad’s Sharon Smith, who performed in both of the case study works. This 
conversation is placed in dialogue with my own experience as a spectator and the 
related theoretical concepts to offer an in depth evaluation of the ethics of participation 
from multiple perspectives. 
 
5.3 Towards an Ethics of Participation 
This section begins to establish the relationship between ethics and participatory 
performance. In Theatre and Ethics, Ridout offers a general definition that ‘[e]thics is 
about being good and staying good by acting well’ (2009: 11). Furthermore, he suggests 
that one might think about ethics as the process of working out on what basis we decide 
what is good or bad, and what gives us the capacity to make those judgements (2009: 
11). However, this calculation is especially complex in participatory performance, as 
‘alongside the “parts” created for us by the performers are other habitual, sticky roles, 
including that of spectator’ (Heddon, Iball, Zerihan 2012: 121). This raises the issue of 
how participants judge their performance and the performance. Additionally, how do 
watching-spectators evaluate their experience, and what and whom is being critiqued?  
 
The issue of how we make value judgements about participatory performance is 
highlighted by Claire Bishop in her consideration of ‘the ethical turn’ (2012). She notes 
that ‘socially engaged practices are extremely difficult to discuss within the 
conventional frameworks of art criticism’ (Bishop 2012: 18). This results from an 
ethical imperative towards ‘a good or bad model of collaboration’ rather than an 
aesthetic requirement of artistic mastery (Ibid., 19-20). As such, there is an emphasis on 
‘process as product’, bolstered by a resistance to the commodification of art within a 
capitalist culture (Ibid., 19). In Conversation Pieces, art historian, Grant Kester notes 
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that ‘[a]rt’s function as a form of emancipatory communication is almost always 
presented in opposition to a malevolent other (kitsch, mass culture, etc.) that threatens 
to destroy or compromise it in some way’ (2004: 29-30). Nevertheless, as this chapter 
will establish, there can be a tension in the way that the relationship between ethics and 
aesthetics is interpreted by spectators.  
 
Acknowledging that ethics are foundational to participatory work, it is important to 
look at what kind of ethics is being promoted. Ethical frameworks are often founded on 
social consensus; thus, how to ‘act’ is typically fairly prescriptive. Theatre etiquette is 
the most recognisable system of ethical behaviour in performance. Its origins are 
consistent with, but not limited to, the introduction of electric lighting in theatres in the 
1880s. The ability to lower the houselights on the audience resulted in their previously 
noisy and demonstrative behaviour being faded into the darkness (Heim 2016: 64). By 
the latter half of the twentieth century, laughter and applause were largely the only 
permissible signs of audience engagement with a performance. However, the 
proliferation of participatory forms from the late 1990s onwards has served to rethink 
audience behaviour; casting theatre etiquette or ethics into a period of uncertainty.  
 
This does not mean that spectatorship in these works is without rules. On the 
contrary, as the study has demonstrated, participation is underpinned by a tacit 
agreement that spectators will accept the rules of the performance. But, these rules are 
usually specific to an individual performance or artist/company’s style; therefore, they 
are lacking the same level of convention for the audience. Still, at the same time, there 
is a strong impulse to “give good audience” and to participate in normative assumptions 
about the work, perhaps invoking the notion of an “ideal audience-participant” (Heddon, 
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et al 2012: 124). Indeed, this role might be played convincingly by the expert 
participant-spectator, as standards are established through their prior experience and 
specially developed skills, enabling them to translate and communicate how one should 
act. While this can offer stability to fellow spectators and the performance maker, for 
Gob Squad these practised spectators are to be avoided, as I will discuss later in the 
chapter. 
  
There are also times when the instructions for a participatory work are deliberately 
opaque or open to interpretation, in an attempt to offer greater agency to the spectator; 
for example, the themes offered to participants during La Pocha Nostra’s improvised 
human mural, and the questions posed to participant-spectators during Gob Squad’s 
War and Peace. To cite Ridout: ‘It is in the situation of doubt, in the moment of choice, 
when you ask yourself, “How shall I act?”, that you are opening up the space of ethics’ 
(2009: 12). This space of ethics might also be equated to Fisher’s ‘space of speech’ 
(2011: 25), examined in chapter two, as a place where established structures are 
suspended to allow alternative models of democratic politics and resistance to be 
opened up. It might also be reasoned that it is amidst an ethical ambiguity that one finds 
the “antagonism” that Bishop (2004) calls for in socially engaged art.   
 
Ridout identifies social engagement as an area of convergence between theatre and 
ethics, in the way that theatre regularly dramatises social issues which might easily be 
thought of as ethical dilemmas (2009: 13). Gob Squad is no exception to this tendency 
and both Western Society and War and Peace actively draw the audience into social and 
ethical problems, often asking the performing-spectators direct questions that involve 
them making a moral decision. As Ridout observes: ‘Theatre inserts its ethical questions 
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into the lives of its spectators in a situation in which those spectators are unusually 
conscious of their own status as spectators, and thus as people who may exercise ethical 
judgement’ (2009: 15). In Gob Squad’s practice, ethical questions are literally inserted 
into the framework for participation, heightening the spectators’ awareness of their 
ethical responsibility. There is also that remarkable moment in Western Society when 
performing-spectators can be seen watching a recording of themselves while knowing 
that their watching is being observed by the audience; hence, embodying a process of 
reciprocal spectatorship that is consistent with a symmathesy of participation. I suggest 
that it is the duality of making a judgement at the same time as being judged that gives 
ethics its potency in the theatre, which is magnified and complicated when participation 
is present.  
 
As previously noted, there is an established distinction between the one who ‘acts’ 
and the one who ‘judges’ in the theatre, distinguished by the roles of ‘performer’ and 
‘spectator’. However, following Caroline Heim’s argument (2016) outlined in chapter 
two, in the case study works by Gob Squad there are three troupes present: professional 
performers, watching-spectators, and performing-spectators. Yet, what is particularly 
striking is the way in which these troupes can be seen exchanging roles. As parts are 
reconfigured and interchanged within the performance, questions regarding 
responsibility and authority inevitably arise, which can bring forth both exciting and 
potentially troublesome consequences. To echo Fischer-Lichte, when we open the 
border between the performance and the audience, the dichotomies on which traditional 
notions of theatre come to be founded are renegotiated. I propose that it is on this 
threshold that a space for ethics is opened up which empowers us to reconsider our basis 




However, Gob Squad has never been bound by mainstream theatre conventions due 
to its interdisciplinary constitution, with members coming from varying artistic fields. 
In the Skype interview, Smith explained that: “we didn’t have to really un-train. There 
were none of those theatre problems in our way” (2016: 2). Indeed, it may well be the 
fact that live art does not need to break from a tradition to which it never belonged that 
enables it to be at the forefront of experiments with the audience. Nonetheless, although 
there may not be “those theatre problems”; this does not mean that there are not 
expectations and ethical codes of behaviour in relation to Gob Squad’s work. Following 
Herbert Blau’s (1990) assertion that actors and spectators are co-dependant, I suggest 
that in Gob Squad’s performances each troupe is actualised in the presence of the other. 
As such, while each of them is governed by their own set of rules, they are 
interdependent.  
 
The performing-spectators are always the newest troupe to be formed, as they are 
brought together as the performance unfolds. Their presence complicates the ethics of 
the Gob Squad performers and the watching-spectators, in part because the performing-
spectators’ impulse towards participation is premised on an element of risk. Yet, as I 
have implied in relation to the attendance of expert participant-spectators and superfans, 
the space for ethics within this latest group is perhaps closing, as participation becomes 
normalised through its growing popularity. Just as a mainstream audience has learnt 
how to perform its role through watching the behaviour of other audience members and 
following the given rules of theatre etiquette; contemporary audiences of participatory 
practice may also find themselves performing in rather prescriptive and predetermined 
ways. Bishop identifies that ‘[y]ou hear yourself speaking in clichés, unable to break the 
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conceptual structure that the artist has set in place’ (2008: 120). At first glance, Gob 
Squad’s use of “remote acting” might be considered as a highly obedient form of 
audience participation; however, as I will show, their practice draws self-referential 
critical attention to the concept of participation as a privilege, epitomising the metaphor 
of delegated performance as ‘a luxury game’. 
 
5.4 Delegated Performance as a Luxury Game  
This discussion will explore the notion that participatory performance can be seen as a 
place of privilege. In addition, it recognises a developing scepticism about the ways in 
which spectators are employed to co-produce the work, with the suggestion that the so-
called emancipated spectator may well be the exploited spectator. The immersive 
theatre company You Me Bum Bum Train (YMBBT), which offers an extravagant 
alternate reality experience for an individual passenger, has most notably been accused 
of exploiting its army of unpaid volunteer performers.73 The producers, Kate Bond and 
Morgan Lloyd,74 claim that it isn’t financially viable to pay their volunteers and that the 
experience is in fact a “training project” for them and “not simply a show being staged 
for the entertainment of the ‘audience’ and the commercial gain of the producers or 
promoters” (Hutchison 2016). An article in The Telegraph billed it as ‘the volunteering 
experience of a lifetime’, with the number of volunteers now in the tens of thousands 
(Chandrasekhar 2012). Harvie notes:   
[I]t could be argued that such worker exploitation is pervasive … across much 
contemporary art and  performance, where audiences are increasingly regularly     
called on to participate in, contribute to and at least co-create the performance 
also for free and sometimes, more precisely, at the cost of a fee. (2013: 28)   
   
                                                          
73 There have been threats of legal action by the performers union Equity, and a campaign launched by 
the blog Actorsminimumwage (AMW) that volunteers should be paid National Minimum Wage. 
74 According to an interview with The Telegraph in 2012, neither of the producers receives a wage from 
YMBBT (Chandrasekhar 2012). 
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Still, Harvie is quick to acknowledge that in many instances of audience participation, 
audience members are not so much ‘passively exploited’ as ‘actively exploit’ the 
opportunity to be performing-spectators and part-time artists (Ibid., emphasis original). 
Furthermore, she asserts that regardless of which side of the debate one stands, given 
the shift in the production of art and performance and the redeployment of labour, it is 
imperative that one questions how this effects social power relations (Ibid.; 28-29). 
 
Gob Squad was an early adopter of audience participation in contemporary 
performance, beginning with Room Service in 2003. As Smith discusses, “[w]e wanted 
to bring somehow the real world inside the theatre, or still have a connection to the 
outside via some sort of media or technology which would allow, again, this leak. And 
that eventually became … the audience themselves” (2016: 2). Bishop highlights that in 
contrast to the way that visual artists in the 1960s and 1970s used their own bodies as 
the form and content of their work, with implied authenticity,75 contemporary artists 
delegate or “outsource” authenticity by using other people’s bodies (2008: 110). The 
notions of “outsourcing”76 and “delegated performance” can be seen as concurrent 
tendencies (Bishop 2008: 118). Delegated performance exemplifies Joseph Beuys’s 
metaphor that ‘everyone is an artist’ by offering the audience agency to contribute to the 
art making process. According to Harvie, ‘[d]elegated art and performance thus 
celebrate amateurism, doing art for the pleasure of it’ (2013: 36). This is corroborated 
by YMBBT, where non-professional actors typically make up 80 percent of their 
                                                          
75 The way that “authenticity” has been reconsidered by contemporary artists, as outlined in Bishop’s 
2008 article, is indicative of how this term and the related notions of being real, true and genuine are 
mutable and contested concepts. My usage of the term “authenticity” is consistent with the ways in which 
it has been interpreted by Bishop (2008), and acknowledges that the meaning alters when “authenticity” is 
performed. 
76 The term “outsourcing” is a 1990s buzzword that refers to the subcontracting of activities from one 
business to another. 
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volunteers, as producer Bond notes, ‘[t]hey're happy to be subtle, which is much more 
authentic’ (Chandrasekhar 2012). Yet, the 20 percent of YMBBT’s volunteers who do 
have acting experience coincides with my suggestion that artists are also known to rely 
on a contingent of expert participant-spectators to maintain a certain level of cogency 
and quality.  
 
Gob Squad maintain that they actively avoid expert participants precisely because 
they lack authenticity, as Smith states: “we definitely would not choose the person who 
looks like they’re saying choose me, choose me. And that’s because if they start acting 
up on stage … they will not look good” (2016: 10). She coincidentally remembered the 
eager young woman that I noted in my account, recalling: “There was a woman who 
was desperate to catch one of these toys … obviously I could see her so I had to sort of 
look at her and I even threw some toys in her vague direction but there was no way I 
was going to throw it into her arms” (2016: 11). Expertise has a paradoxical relationship 
to participation, as it is often implied that it is neither necessary nor desirable, 
potentially undoing the authenticity of the work or what we might think of as 
contaminating the “leak” that Gob Squad refer to. Simultaneously, there is a view that 
everyone has the expertise to get involved; thus, participation is seen as a great 
equaliser. Additionally, as I have discussed, though expert participant-spectators may 
not feature in the intended aims of participatory artists, in reality they make up a notable 
portion of a live art audience and are self-made through their learnt behaviour of 
typified responses to participation. I wish to propose that to avoid nurturing expert 
participant-spectators and an etiquette of participation, artists have to keep changing the 
rules or at the very least provide a space for ethics in which those rules might be 
236 
 
reinterpreted. I suggest that it is in this liminal space, permeated with the potential for 
failure and transgression, where participation is at its most alive.  
 
In contrast to conventional theatre, where people pretend to be other people, part of 
the appeal of participatory practice in live art contexts is the promise of authenticity. 
André Antoine’s assertion that we need a new breed of actors ‘who are spontaneous and 
authentic, in touch with reality through and through’ might well be attributed to the 
participant-spectators who have emerged on to the stage in contemporary performance 
(citing Antoine 1890 in Drain 1995: xvii). In this way, the ethics of participation may 
suggest that a “good” performance is interchangeable with the idea of an “authentic” 
performance. This echoes Andy Lavender’s claim that “authenticity” has become one of 
the defining terms of contemporary performance practice (2016: 25). In The Experience 
Economy a new perspective, Albert Boswijk and his co-authors consider that 
‘Authenticity is about rediscovering values and traditions and interpreting them in a 
new way within a progressive context. The individual is looking for genuineness and 
originality: for the core and essence of things’ (2007: 46). This analysis also 
corresponds to the discussion in chapter three concerning the way that performance 
makes the ordinary conspicuous (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 179-180). I suggest that perhaps 
the real art in participatory performance is being able to perform your authentic self 
without looking like you are performing. However, while the notion of staging 
authenticity might be argued as being inauthentic, it is essentially the combination of 
two different types of authenticity – stemming from the heart and the head. This hybrid 
form of authenticity is both emotional and logical, as the participant on stage is very 
much the same as their original self, but nonetheless different. On the one hand they 
recognise that their genuineness is sought, but on the other hand they also see the need 
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to customise their authenticity for the audience and in the situation of performance. 
What is presented becomes an adjusted form of authenticity, which corresponds with 
Goffman’s concept of “front”, discussed later in the chapter.  
 
Delegated performance may be underpinned by the rhetoric of participation as a 
democratising of the arts; however, its use of other people’s bodies to complete the 
work has provoked criticism that participants are being exploited. In Western Society, 
Gob Squad’s delegation of labour makes explicit the way that participation creates 
social power relations that can be both politically enabling and limiting. When Gob 
Squad “open the border” and invite audience participation it is a direct reference to the 
border politics of Western society; however, it also denotes to a lesser extent the 
breaking down of the imaginary “wall” that exists between performers and spectators. 
As Smith puts it:    
[W]e’re using the metaphor of the theatre lights … We’re playing with the idea that 
the audience are outside Western society quite literally. They’re … refugees seeking 
asylum and we have the key to the gate. So we’re really playing, because … the title 
is Western Society and we create this idea of a very lush, privileged, safe, light, warm 
space and suggest that the darkness of the seating area is somehow outside that … 
It’s quite a crude and direct metaphor and it relates less to our feelings about theatre, 
although of course … we absolutely refer to the fourth wall and a wall or as a gate or 
whatever that’s locked. (2016: 4)  
 
In Western Society the selection of refugees (spectators) to this advantaged space is a 
“strange lottery”, and where you are located (sitting in the auditorium) largely dictates 
your chances of receiving the “key to the gate”.  
The theme of privilege is one of the most pertinent aspects of Western Society, and 
more recently War and Peace. What is more, audience participation is used in part to 
demonstrate the artifice and inequality of social power relations at play when 
participation is present. This is at its most perceptible in the metaphor of the VIP status 
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that is awarded to participant-spectators in Western Society, who are given special 
access to a guest area where they are lavished with complimentary champagne and 
refreshments. This notable image of privilege also converges with Bishop’s contention 
that unlike the inexpensive performance art of the 1960s and 1970s, which was 
produced quickly and centred on the artist’s own body, ‘delegated performance, by 
contrast, is a luxury game’ (2008: 114). One only needs to look at Marina Abramović to 
see a clear example of this shift, as the relatively modest requirements of Rhythm 0 
(1974), with its six hour duration and 72 objects on a table, has grown into 512 Hours, 
with lockers and noise-cancelling headphones for 160 people at a time as well as an 
army of gallery assistants. While Abramović maintains that “this show was zero cost” 
(KunstSpektrum 2014) this appears to be contradicted by the list of her supporters on 
the Serpentine website, which includes her exhibition circle and the luxury brand 
Givenchy. In addition, the gallery receives public funding through Arts Council 
England; therefore, although admittance to 512 Hours was free of charge, the tax payer 
indirectly paid towards the exhibition (Serpentine Galleries 2016). Similarly, YMBBT 
has come under fire as a recipient of Arts Council funding, in the way that the public is 
paying for the privileged experience of a few. This appears especially uneven in light of 
the fact that they actively seek celebrity endorsement, allowing individuals who already 
hold a privileged position to bypass the usual ballot process to obtain a ticket. There is 
something ethically unsettling about the public subsidising the once in a lifetime 
experience of Prince Harry (March 2016) and Madonna and her son Rocco (April 
2016). Furthermore, tickets for YMBBT are priced at £48.50 and have become hot 
commodities, but, like Punchdrunk and Secret Cinema, this price point is a barrier for 




Yet, it should also be recognised that the majority of live artists continue to use 
audience participation in a way that is relatively inexpensive and affordable to the 
audience. Gob Squad’s Western Society does not profess to be a once-in a lifetime 
experience or even immersive; the action tends to unfold within the duration of a few 
hours, supported by a modest set design that includes the use of a projection screen and 
a selection of props and costumes. In this way, it does not demand the hefty ticket prices 
of some immersive companies, with Gob Squad tickets averagely priced at around £15. 
In actuality, Western Society does not represent Bishop’s notion of delegated 
performance as “a luxury game”; however, theatrically it does exactly that. The manner 
in which performing-spectators are directly referred to and treated as VIPs artificially 
elevates their status, as Smith states: “the VIP table is very cheap; we’re being very 
cynical about the luxury” (2016: 6). At the same time, the VIP table also enables the 
Gob Squad performers to have an intimate exchange with the performing-spectators, 
including casting them into their re-enactment roles. According to Smith:  
[W]e want to frame their presence on the stage in a way that means we can have 
a real conversation, even if there’s headphones and instructions and silly 
costumes and artifice involved. That we can exist there and we can really be 
there and when we look at each other, we see each other and when we speak to 
each other we’re having an actual conversation. (2016: 7)  
 
The VIP table occupies a liminal space, in the off stage (on stage) area to the living 
room, where the viewing audience can clearly see the Gob Squad performers toasting 
and chatting to the performing-spectators. The Gob Squad performers remove elements 
of their costume in what appears to be an attempt to become real people like the 
participants. It could also be seen as an attempt to dissolve any perceived hierarchy of 
performer over spectator. At the VIP table the action is largely improvised; in contrast 
to the living room area, where much of the performance is loosely scripted and 
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instructed to the participants through their headphones. Nevertheless, though this 
exchange may foster a closer relationship between performing-spectators and the Gob 
Squad performers, it arguably has the opposite effect for watching-spectators. As 
observers of the interaction between Gob Squad and the performing-spectators, we 
become aware that their proximity affords them special knowledge of the performance; 
experiences that we are unable to hear, feel or taste. It is difficult in this moment not to 
feel a pang of jealousy as someone left on the outside looking in. The greater the 
proximity participants have to the performance, through these private moments, the 
further away the watching audience feels. Still, at the same time, we can never forget 
that we might have been part of the lucky seven; therefore, those watching continue to 
empathise with their fellow spectators on the stage, albeit from a seat in the dark.    
 
According to Gob Squad, being outside also has its benefits, echoed by the remark 
that “sometimes it’s good to sit in the dark and watch”. Indeed, it was this comment that 
prompted me to ask Smith if a spectator can be emancipated whilst staying in their seat, 
to which she replied:  
Yes, unanimously yes. Before the audience gets involved in the work we still 
hope to work with the semi-improvisational structures … we are live writing 
that work in real time and, therefore, the room is active in that writing. And that 
involves the audience and that, therein it feels different … they’re definitely 
activated even if they’re just sitting there. Because they’re affecting … if they 
sneeze or laugh or walk out … or not. Whether they are a small audience or a 
large audience … it’s felt in Gob Squad’s work, it’s not ignored. (2016: 8) 
 
As it happens, there are also moments when the seated audience is encouraged to 
collectively participate in the performance; joining in the movement actions to Michael 
Jackson’s Earth Song is one example. Therefore, although the spectators in the 




5.5 Delegated Performance as a Projection Screen 
At this stage in the study, I wish to draw attention to the way in which performing-
spectators are used as a metaphorical projection of the underpinning politics of Gob 
Squad’s work. This discussion also extends to the actual use of projection within 
Western Society. In Gob Squad’s practice, participation works towards producing 
parallel feelings of alienation and connection with their audience. Smith states:  
We find the audience in the theatre situation in Western Society as … a 
projection screen in a way. They arrive in a situation visibly unprepared and … 
they wear headphones that are very visible. And they become involved in 
something we call remote acting … and the audience therefore looks at two 
things at once. They see this body, this unprepared body and they maybe hear 
the words of another, or see the actions of another. And it’s something that if we 
were doing it as performers … there would be no disconnect. There would be an 
assumption maybe that we owned that text. (2016: 2-3) 
 
The notion of the audience “as a projection screen” converges with Abramović’s 
statement that the audience can ‘project onto me like a mirror’ (in O’Brien 2014: 34 
emphasis original), and Fischer-Lichte’s concept of “PRESENCE: PRESENCE” (2012: 
115). It is indicative of the duality and doubling presence between the Gob Squad 
performer and their counterpart remote actor, as well as between the performing-
spectator and the watching-spectator. Smith’s emphasis on the “unprepared body” of the 
spectator corresponds to the idea of “outsourcing” authenticity, and is placed in 
opposition to the notable artifice of the headphones. This serves to magnify rather than 
compromise the performing-spectators’ genuineness, as an obvious lack of control over 
proceedings makes them all the more vulnerable. However, it could be argued that 
instead of empowering the audience, remote acting encourages the kind of obedience 
that Harvie cautions against (Harvie 2013: 43). In fact, Gob Squad counteract this 
argument by adopting remote acting as an alienation device, and notably exposing its 




Remote acting functions as an alienation device resulting from the way that the 
watching-spectator bears witness to the strangeness of the performing-spectator 
communicating the words and actions of the Gob Squad performer. This has a 
distancing effect that encourages the seated audience to engage more critically with 
what they are seeing. It follows Gob Squad’s refusal to own the text and is 
demonstrative of their desire for shared authorship with their audience. Moreover, on 
seeing the performing-spectator compute what is being said to them through the 
headphones, the watching-spectator registers a process of translation. Applying the 
notion of the performing-spectators as a projection screen, what is reflected back to the 
auditorium is Rancière’s conception of an emancipated audience as ‘a community of 
storytellers and translators’ (Rancière 2007: 280).  
 
Nonetheless, at the same time, Gob Squad exposes the power dynamic that 
underscores remote acting, by deliberately drawing attention to the status of the artist. 
This occurs during a scene in which Sarah can be seen whispering instructions to a 
performing-spectator who is in the role of her Dad, rather than communicating through 
the headphones. Closely followed by a sequence where Simon is evidently 
communicating with the Dad through a microphone that connects to his headphones. 
Instead of negating the scepticism that has been imposed on participatory practice, Gob 
Squad highlights the exploitative potential of delegated performance. Gob Squad’s 
embodied assessment of participatory practice emerges from the fact that they are part 
of its trajectory, rather than a reflection of its popularity. While Harvie warns that 
delegated performance may risk replicating exploitative and manipulative contemporary 
labour relations, she notes that ‘at its best, it draws self-reflexive critical attention to that 
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risk’ (2013: 29). Similarly, Bishop notes that the strongest examples of delegated 
performances: ‘produce disruptive events that testify to a shared reality between viewers 
and performers that throw into question agreed ways of thinking about subjectivity, 
ethics, and economics’, rather than staging ‘the mere spectacle of participation’ (2008: 
123). 
 
One way in which Gob Squad maintains some agency and autonomy for their 
audience is by allowing a degree of “play” within their framework for participation.  
Therefore, even though Gob Squad’s model of participation operates within a structure 
that determines where the performance is going from beginning, middle to end, as 
Smith tells us, “there’s room for play and for receiving signals from the outside” (2016: 
4). This includes the act of translation which underscores remote acting, as the detail 
and direction given to them via the headphones is limited by the immediacy of the 
performance. Therefore, the remote actor is required to spontaneously interpret and act 
upon the information that they receive. In this way, and coinciding with the other case 
study performances, improvisation and reciprocity are essential components in the 
execution of remote acting and the continuation of the performance. However, it is 
worth noting that the interpretive decisions that the performing-spectator makes, such as 
their textual delivery or the manner in which they carry out actions, is not subject to 
directorial scrutiny, as that process is absent. Subsequently, there are moments when 
speech appears wooden, unrefined, and with incorrect intonation. But, rather than being 
condemned as a “bad” performance, on the contrary, this works to amplify the liveness 
and authenticity of the event: the notion that it is happening in “real-time” and with 
“real” people. When we critique the performance both during and after its realisation, 
participation is its own criteria. By this I mean that our evaluation is less about the 
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quality of the participant’s performance, and more about their authenticity; the degree to 
which they committed to the task; and how their participation translated into meaning 
and experience.  
 
A further manifestation of play in Western Society appears in the “open” spaces 
provided for questions and answer sessions with performing-spectators as themselves, 
which act as a running commentary throughout the piece. Participants consider topics 
ranging from whether national borders are good or bad, to a choice between their own 
limbs or their child’s life. These moral dilemmas make visible the conception of 
performance as a space for ethics, as well as highlighting the futility of binaries. 
Following Bishop, these exchanges between Gob Squad members and performing-
spectators fuse together ‘the staged and the spontaneous’ (Bishop 2008: 121). While 
authorial control is fundamental to the structure of these interactions, the end result is 
largely reliant on the skills of the participant to meet or even exceed the expectations of 
the Gob Squad performer and the viewing audience. Nevertheless, the artificiality of the 
theatrical setting and projection screen, which frame participation, draws attention to the 
inauthenticity of the participant’s spontaneity (Ibid). This underscores my earlier 
statement that the art of spectator-participation resides in the performing-spectator’s 
ability to stage their spontaneity while holding on to their authenticity. As Bishop notes, 
some of the most powerful instances of delegated performance are those that ‘permit 
“authenticity” (subjects that are engaged, passionate, fragile, complex) to emerge within 
situations of intense artificiality’ (Ibid., 120). Additionally, the mutual physical contact 
of performers and spectators visible during the Q&A scenes further challenges 
relational oppositions by unsettling the “us” and “them” divide between spectators and 
performers. At the same time, a new “us” and “them” is established in the form of those 
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that do and those that don’t participate on stage, echoing David Beech’s argument 
(2010: 25). 
 
Thus far, I have examined how Smith’s envisaging of the performing-spectators as a 
metaphorical projection screen works to create a form of disconnection and connection 
for the watching audience. I will now turn to the way that actual projection screens are 
employed in Western Society, to create both distance and intimacy between performing 
and watching audience members. Throughout the performance a projection screen is 
intermittently placed in front of the living room space, where a live feed of the 
unfolding action is shown. When we watch the developing participation through the 
screen it further frames the participant-spectators as performers; therefore, producing a 
greater distance between them and the watching audience.  
 
Conversely, the close up and enlarged images of performing-spectators on the 
screens is exposing and invokes a sense of intimacy for the viewer. Moreover, as Figure 
11 shows, the live image can frequently be seen in action through the screen or at the 
same time as the projected version. 
 
 
Figure 11: The duality of live and mediated performing-spectators.77 
 
                                                          
77 The source for this image is https://www.lancasterarts.org/whats-on/gob-squad-western-society 
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This corresponds with Philip Auslander’s theory (1999), as the viewer no longer 
distinguishes between the live re-enactment on stage and the mediated version, and 
begins to accept the projected reality as their first point of reference. Yet, while camera 
tricks such as zooming in may bring the viewer closer to the subject, they are a reminder 
that what we see projected is a manipulated reality. Furthermore, as a final act of 
resistance to its disappearance on screen, the live performance steps out from behind the 
projection to observe the mediated version of itself. Hereafter, watching-spectators 
observe the performing-spectators reclaiming their authentic selves by becoming 
watching-spectators. Smith reflects:  
[T]here’s a return for them [performing-spectators] to … the dark side. And they 
get to see the result of their labour in a way. The product that they’ve … 
contributed to making. … we liked the feeling of them being able to see 
themselves, and us being able to see them, see themselves. Us meaning 
everybody else. … you see them get their set up, you see them get the toy, the 
space, you see them get constructed, the screen comes and sort of closes them in. 
You see them on the screen, they’ve gone into the TV and they start to do this 
video that you talked about for the first half an hour, forty minutes. And there’s 
something really magical about that. … letting them sort of see their own sort of 
premier screening in a way … There’s something really resolved about it. (2016: 
13). 
By watching the participants watching themselves on screen, the audience makes the 
performing-spectators consciously aware that their labour is being publicly 
acknowledged, and this for me goes some way towards withstanding the exploitative 
potential of delegated performance. I also suggest that it is performing-spectators’ return 
to “the dark side”, to their authentic self, which makes their shared curtain call with Gob 
Squad all the more meaningful. As Figure 12 illustrates, the united bow at the end of the 




Figure 12: The shared curtain call.78  
Smith maintains:  
[A]t the end of Western Society the applause is for those people. You know it’s   
as much as it is for us … it’s [for] their friends and their friends’ friends and it’s 
just the general sense that they’ve been through that thing and they’ve come out 
of it looking really good. (2016: 9) 
 
Significantly, the desire for participants to “look good” suggests a duty of care to those 
people, rather than a desire to take advantage of them.  
 
The act of the audience watching the performing-spectators watching themselves 
epitomises the performance of presence as an emergent and processual phenomenon, as 
we see the notion of being there thrown into confusion in relation to the live and the 
mediated, now and then, us and them. To complicate matters further, the original 
YouTube film fades into the end of the recorded footage: 
[Y]ou just see the granny walking in … and you see the guy come round to 
change the channel. So by this point it’s a very, very recognisable film. And 
especially when you’ve embodied it. You know, when you’ve actually played 
granny and you’ve actually changed the channel. And then you see it with 
yourself and with this, you see that yes you have existed inside something that 
existed before. (S. Smith 2016: 14) 
 
This perception of existence is magnified by the growing collection of Western Society 
remake videos on YouTube, which demonstrate that there are others who have existed 
                                                          
78 The source for this image is http://tdps.berkeley.edu/january-faculty-spotlight-alan-read 
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inside something that existed before. Therefore, rather than fuelling alienation the 
technology works to connect previous participants, and to suggest that their experience 
“doesn’t end there” (S. Smith 2016: 14).  
5.6 The Sixth Encounter: War and Peace 
It is June 2016. I am waiting outside of the auditorium at the Nottingham Playhouse to 
gain entry to Gob Squad’s War and Peace. The basis for this new live video 
performance is that a group of artists are holding a salon, reminiscent of the gatherings 
conducted in High Society Russia at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The topic 
of conversation is War and Peace, a “heavy” book written over almost a century and a 
half ago, and how the novel intersects with contemporary society. This playful and 
improvised work is ‘a modern day attempt to address one of Tolstoy's concerns: how 
should one live a moral life in an ethically imperfect world?’ (Gob Squad 2016b).  
 
Before we are let into the theatre, the performers emerge out of the entrance and 
begin to mingle with the expectant audience. They are dressed in a costume consisting 
of a beige coloured shirt with a long apron dress over the top. I note Simon’s platform 
shoes and make a comment to him that they are very Ibiza Circa 1997. He appears 
pleased with this observation, and I am pleased that I have shown willing. However, my 
participatory efforts go no further, as I become consciously aware that giving too much 
might be construed as a tacit agreement to do something much bigger. I take my seat 
towards the front; meanwhile the performers continue to conduct mini-interviews with 
spectators. Before long the purpose of these encounters is revealed, as performers begin 
to take to the stage with their spectator interviewees. They recount into a microphone a 
series of facts about the spectator including their name and where they come from, as 
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well as other titbits of information, such as their special talent or their Father’s 
occupation. During this sequence, I spot Simon close at hand, and I start to panic that he 
might remember me from earlier. I avoid making eye contact with him as the words 
“don’t pick me” race through my head. I question what would I say about myself; the 
truth, or a better, funnier version of the truth? I reason that it is much easier and safer to 
stay where I am. It turned out that I was right to weigh up the danger of participation, as 
the events that followed led to a performing-spectator being directly heckled by a group 
of audience members.   
 
In contrast to Western Society, the participants in War and Peace are chosen, rather 
than selected at random. Nevertheless, reflecting on Western Society, there are some 
familiar strategies of participation in operation. Firstly, as Figure 13 shows, the VIP 
table is back; this time it is reframed as a High Society Russian salon, complete with 
refreshments for the invited spectators.  
  
Figure 13: The salon.79  
 
But, in this production the table is in front of the raised stage, towards stage right. As 
such, the performing-spectators are not always clearly visible in the flesh; however, 
their participation is captured on camera and projected on the large screens on stage. In 
                                                          
79 The source for this image is http://www.gobsquad.com/projects/war-and-peace 
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this way, it could be said that the performing-spectator’s mediated image is more 
prominent than their live persona; although, this does depend on your proximity to the 
salon. Over the course of the evening, we are introduced to a procession of characters 
from both the book and beyond, and scenes unfold from shifting viewpoints. While all 
the time the salon of Gob Squad performers and performing-spectators are watching and 
taking stock of the action. At regular intervals the company members ask the 
performing-spectators about their own notions of war, freedom, privilege and safety, 
reminiscent of the questioning that took place during Western Society. Significantly, the 
performance is again completed with a shared curtain call between Gob Squad and the 
performing-spectators, where all are rewarded for the fruits of their labour with the 
rapturous applause of the audience. 
5.7 The “spectator within” and the spectator out “front” 
This next section takes as its starting point my anxiety about being selected as a 
performing-spectator in War and Peace, underpinned by a self-conscious awareness of 
how I might be perceived. This brings me once more to Ridout’s writing on theatre and 
ethics, specifically his appropriation of philosopher Adam Smith’s (1759) theory80 that: 
‘we judge our own behaviour in the guise of an imaginary “spectator” within us’ (2009: 
33). The principle that underlines this concept is that we each possess an ‘impartial 
spectator’ inside ourselves, and it is to them that we direct our behaviour for ethical 
judgement. Our perception of whether or not the “spectator within” approves or 
disapproves of our actions will determine whether or not we consider our behaviour to 
be right or wrong. Ridout notes: 
[I]ndividuals, in making ethical judgements, must separate themselves into two 
subjectivities – the one who judges and the one whose action is judged. This 
                                                          
80 See Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (2002/1759). 
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distance – the distance marked out by the act of sympathising with oneself – is 
what distinguishes this kind of ethical judgement from simply doing as you 
please or acting in whatever way makes you feel good. (2009: 35)   
 
This act of self-sympathy requires both an emotional connection to oneself and an 
element of disconnection which enables enough distance for reason to emerge. As 
Ridout puts it, drawing on Tracy Davis’s writing (2004):81 ‘A doubling of the self in 
which both reason and emotion are at work, in which there is an attempt to measure one 
against the other and let neither obliterate the other, becomes the basis for an ethical 
position’ (2009: 35). He notes that it is an ‘active dissociation’, to use Davis’s 
expression, which enables a critical viewpoint in oneself (Ibid., 36). This corresponds 
with Gob Squad’s motivation to create a form of disconnection in Western Society, 
through their use of remote acting. However, while reason is generally recognised as 
underscoring alienation, it is also reliant on the presence of emotion as the entity from 
which ethical thought must stand aside (Ridout 2009: 36). One might also apply this 
doubling of the self to what I have called “the paradox of participation”, in the sense 
that a performing-spectator is both the performer of the action and the audience who 
judges that action. Furthermore, the duality of this position nurtures both reason and 
emotion, and I suggest that operational participation is largely based on upholding 
equilibrium between these elements. Too much reason may stultify the participant and 
bring the participation to a standstill. Too much emotion may lead to the participant 
becoming carried away in the moment and acting up, which may shift the desired course 
of participation and develop into a more transgressive form of interaction. In this way, 
one might say that an imbalance between reason and emotion has the potential to undo 
the art of participation and to produce a “bad” performance. Conversely, undoing the art 
                                                          
81 See Tracy Davis’s 2004 essay ‘Theatricality and Civil Society’ in Tracy C. Davis & Thomas Postlewait 
(eds) Theatricality (2003: 127-55). 
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may bring forth exactly the kind of “antagonism” which Bishop suggests is needed in 
socially engaged practice.  
  
Drawing on my own experiences of participation, I also wish to propose that the 
“spectator within” us has a capacity to speak directly to us (“go on take a risk) or to 
express our inner feelings (“don’t pick me”). Yet, this impartial spectator is often 
influenced by what Heddon et al refer to as “introjection”, which they interpret as an 
‘observance of once prescribed and now habitual behaviours carried by us all’ (2012: 
125). These “introjects” frequently guide our moral compass and illustrate how one 
should act. As Heddon and her co-authors observe: ‘Commitment to our “introjects” (“I 
should be, I must be, I ought …”) can be so strong that they often have the power to 
override our interest in our own well-being’ (Ibid). There are also times when the 
introjection clashes with our original impulse; thus, what we want to do and what we 
think we should do are at odds with each other. This can result in the participant 
offering an expected rather than a truthful response. Reflecting on my own impartial 
spectator in War and Peace, it is this split that brings a feeling of disappointment in 
one’s self, as my frequent impulse not to participate is in conflict with the introject that I 
must “give good audience” and please the artist/company. The omnipresence of “the 
ideal spectator” is never far away, beseeching me to cede my will and take the plunge. 
More often than not, I hold firm to my original and honest response, but this does not 
wholly dismiss the feeling that I have not fulfilled my part somehow. There are times, 
such as in War and Peace, when I evade my impartial spectator by avoiding direct 
invitation or the searching eyes of a performer; therefore, negating the need to formulate 
a response. Yet, I am also acutely aware that the more I commit to participation, the 
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more I am likely to experience in return; and it is this recognition that persuades an 
idealised “spectator within” to emerge.  
 
The first appearance of my idealised spectator within occurred when I purchased my 
ticket. It is often at this moment when we must decide where we would like to be 
positioned in relation to the performance, and perhaps how we would wish to be seen. 
Tickets for War and Peace were priced between £14-16 and I selected the more 
expensive seats, close to the front row. This decision was primarily based on the fact 
that I wanted us (I was accompanied by three friends) to be seen by the company; 
therefore, increasing the possibility of being chosen for participation. This was not a 
popular decision with my friends, who complained because they don’t like participating, 
or the rest of the audience, as the front rows were noticeably unpopulated. In fact, 
before the performance was in full swing, the company encouraged spectators to move 
forward, with the assurance that they wouldn’t be made to participate. On the subject of 
the front row, it is at this juncture that I wish to introduce Erving Goffman’s related 
notion of “front” to analyse “the presentation of self” in the situation of participation.  
  
Goffman determines that the impression given by an individual to observers is 
determined by ‘the expression that he gives, and the expression that he gives off.’ 
(Goffman 1990 [1959]: 14). In the first instance an impression is given, through the use 
of recognisable signs to convey information about one’s character to others. In the 
second occurrence the sign activity is indicative of the character, or given off, rather 
than intentionally expressed. However, it should be noted that an individual can 
deliberately misinform their audience through both use of signs, as Goffman observes: 
‘the first involving deceit, the second feigning’ (Ibid). Goffman refers to the 
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expressiveness on an individual in the presence of others as a performance (Ibid., 32). 
His adoption of this theatrical term is suggestive of the correlation between the 
“spectator within” and “the presentation of self”, which I propose are brought together 
in his notion of “front”. He uses the label “front” to define the largely fixed element of 
an individual’s performance which works to manage the impression being made on 
those observing. As he states: ‘Front, then, is the expressive equipment of a standard 
kind intentionally or unwittingly employed by the individual during his performance’ 
(Ibid). Goffman determines that the performance of front can be divided into parts, 
which include setting, appearance and manner. According to Goffman, ‘setting’ refers 
to the scenery and stage props that frame the performance of front; ‘appearance’ 
concerns those personal signs which indicate the individual’s social status; and 
‘manner’ relates to those signs which are indicative of the role that the individual 
expects to have in the unfolding event (Ibid., 32-35). Moreover, he acknowledges that 
we often expect some coherence between these three components of front (Ibid., 35). In 
other words, how an individual expresses themselves is typically governed by the 
concurrent tendencies of where they are, their social standing, and how they expect to 
be treated. It could also be said that relations amongst these three factors provide the 
basis on which the spectator within selects their social front and critiques the 
performance.  
 
Goffman suggests that ‘fronts tend to be selected, not created’ (Ibid., 38), and 
‘become institutionalised in terms of the abstract stereotyped expectations to which it 
gives rise’ (Ibid., 37). This resonates with the argument that as participatory 
performance develops into a popular art form; it becomes entrenched with preconceived 
ideas of how spectators should act. Nonetheless, following Goffman, the audience is 
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likely to find that there is a selection of fronts from which to choose, the most notable of 
which are the watching-spectator and the performing-spectator, although these positions 
will also be divided into a further assortment of fronts. 
  
Returning to my own presence within the audience for War and Peace, instead of 
maintaining consistency between the varying parts of my front, my appearance and 
manner contradicted each other. The decision to purchase seats just a few rows back 
from the stage suggested an authoritative status instilled with a desire to be seen; 
however, my manner conveyed a lack of confidence and an expectation to be left alone. 
This contradictory behaviour can be traced back to the pre-performance of booking the 
tickets, wherein I attempted to present an idealised impression of myself as someone 
who is unabashed in their willingness to participate in live art. As Goffman illustrates, 
citing Charles Cooley, ‘If we never tried to seem a little better than we are, how could 
we improve or “train ourselves from the outside inward”?’ (Cooley 1922: 352-3 in 
Goffman 1990 [1959]: 44). However, despite my attempt to put on the front of an ideal 
spectator, in reality this was overwhelmed by my over analysis of the situation and 
inclination to be risk-averse. 
 
 Goffman’s analysis of the presentation of self from the perspective of a theatre 
performance makes specific reference to the “front” and “backstage” regions and the 
behaviour that they manifest. I suggest that these spaces and the different kinds of 
performance that they support are emphasised in the staging of both Western Society 
and War and Peace, in particular through the presence of the VIP/salon area. Goffman 
uses the term “front region” to describe the place where the performance is staged, 
which will typically include some ‘setting’. In this space the performer will usually 
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uphold certain standards, or what Goffman refers to as maintaining ‘decorum’. In the 
context of live art, as an art form with a penchant for challenging its audience’s 
sensibilities, the notion of ‘decorum’ to mean propriety and modesty does not hold 
much relevance. However, a second form of ‘decorum’ offered by Goffman, which he 
calls “make-work” can be usefully applied to Gob Squad’s practice.  
 
This concept of “make-work” considers the activity taking place, which includes the 
requirement that workers will produce a certain amount of labour within a given time, 
and are able to give the impression that they are working hard at any given moment 
(Goffman 1990 [1959]: 112). In the front region of both Gob Squad productions, the 
Gob Squad performers and participants can be seen make-work. From the outset the 
audience is introduced to the task of producing a re-enactment of a given stimuli (A 
YouTube video in Western Society and Tolstoy’s novel in War and Peace), which 
suggests an expected amount of work to be made in the duration. The lack of an interval 
also implies that the work will be relentless in its attempt to achieve the desired result. 
The impression of making-work is emphasised further through the elaborate use of 
theatrical paraphernalia, specifically props and costume, as well as the embodiment of 
exaggerated techniques such as acting and dance. There are striking examples of this 
practice in War and Peace, most notably during the catwalk of Tolstoy characters which 
extends beyond the book and into popular culture; the solo ‘dance of history’ that 
Sharon performs; the repeatedly deconstructed scene between Napoleon and the Russian 
Tsar; and in the audition process for the novel’s much coveted role of Pierre Bezukhov, 




Figure 14: The audition for the role of Pierre Bezukhov.82  
 
Alongside his discussion on the staging of make-work, Goffman also introduces the 
representation of its counterpart: “make-no-work” (Ibid., 113). What follows is the 
suggestion that there are instances in the front region where individuals may wish to 
express the idea that they are not working (Ibid., 113-114). This sign activity is evident 
within the designated VIP/salon area of Gob Squad’s performances, where the 
performers can be observed removing elements of their costume (Western Society), 
taking refreshments, and chatting off script, in an attempt to represent not-performing or 
what Goffman refers to as “make-no-work”. Interestingly, Gob Squad’s actualisation of 
this concept takes place in the front region as Goffman infers; however, it occurs in a 
defined area which is signified as the back region or backstage (Ibid., 114). As Goffman 
tells us backstage knowingly contradicts the performance given out front. It is here that 
the production is assembled; where ‘illusions and impressions are openly constructed’ 
(Ibid), as wardrobe assistants make alterations to costume, and props are prepared for 
use. It is in this space that cast members can run lines, step out of character, update 
Facebook and tweet: they can drop their front stage “front”.  
 
                                                          
82 The source for this image is https://www.volksbuehne-berlin.de/praxis/en/war_and_peace 
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In Western Society Gob Squad employs the VIP area as a backstage space to cast the 
newly volunteered participant-spectators, as Smith explains:  
[W]e invite the audience behind [the] set at the beginning, before they take their 
seats … we want to kind of check them out, we get the opportunity to really 
carefully see who’s making eye contact with us, who’s looking too enthusiastic, 
who looks absolutely horrified at the idea that they’re even on the stage etcetera. 
(2016: 10) 
 
This invitation to go behind the set correlates with Goffman’s envisaging of backstage 
as an area where a performer may assume their personal front; although, it should be 
noted that as long as others are present this will still be a front rather than their real self. 
Furthermore, I wish to emphasise that the successful casting of participant-spectators is 
largely dependent on the artist’s ability to accurately interpret their front. In a 
conventional theatre situation, backstage is usually partitioned off from the front stage 
to maintain its secrets, specifically as the place where impressions are managed 
(Goffman 1990 [1959]: 116). However, in Western Society the audience bears witness 
to the fabrication of the performance to follow, as roles are cast and headphones 
distributed in plain view. In this way, it is not just the backstage that is exposed, but also 
the coexisting artifice of performance and social fronts. Indeed, this is one of the themes 
explored in War and Peace; for example in the explicit manufacturing of the social 
fronts presented by Napoleon, the Russian Tsar and Pierre Bezukhov, as we see their 
appearance and manner altered to affect the impression that each of them gives and 
gives off. The remote actors in Western Society are cast in the front that they must 
perform; still, as I indicated earlier, they must also write their part live in the moment. 
Their acting is not only dependant on the instructions that they receive through the 
headphones, but also their own inbuilt capacity to make judgements about their 
performance and adapt it accordingly. This realisation of the participant’s “spectator 
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within” is mirrored in the watching-audience, who empathises with the participant by 
calling upon both emotion and reason. This relational dimension to participatory 
performance shifts ethical responsibility away from the self towards an ethical 
responsibility for someone else. 
5.8 Ethics as Encounter  
Ridout suggests that ‘ethics might in fact be all about everyone but yourself’ (2009: 13).  
Accordingly, this discussion will explore Ridout’s concept of “ethics as encounter”, 
which draws on Levinasian ethical thought (See Levinas 1969, 1989). As such, my 
analysis of ethics coincides with the discussions on co-presence that I developed in 
chapters three and four, specifically the consideration of Levinas’s concept of presence 
as a face-to-face exchange. For Ridout, Levinasian ethics applied to performance 
‘encourages the spectator to stop seeing the performance as an exploration of his or her 
own subjectivity and, instead, to take it as an opportunity to experience an encounter 
with someone else’ (2009: 8). This is a philosophy which is epitomised in practice 
where an encounter with another is at the centre of the work, such as in one-to-one 
performance. Nonetheless, it is also fostered in Gob Squad’s use of participation, to 
strengthen the bond between those on stage and those seated in the auditorium. Smith 
defines this connection between performing-spectators and watching-spectators as: 
the ability to relate to that person because they’ve left one part of the auditorium 
and they’ve gone to another part of the room … they’ve crossed over that line. 
And they’ve kind of taken a little bit of the audience with them, so there’s a 
certain sort of extension of themselves maybe into the performance space. 
(2016: 3) 
 
Drawing on Goffman, I have talked about the way in which impressions are transmitted 
and contrived by an individual, employing his term “front”. Ridout also considers the 
idea of an “impression”, but as a type of bodily exchange between human beings which 
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produces what he refers to as “sympathy”. It should be highlighted that Ridout’s 
appropriation of “sympathy" derives from its use by Adam Smith (1723-1790) and other 
philosophers at that time, to convey a kind of physiological communication between 
people, and not a simple case of feeling sorry for someone (2009: 34-35). Ridout argues 
that because we all possess more or less the same qualities and feelings, an 
understanding of someone else’s situation can enact itself on an individual’s own 
person, which he calls an “impression”. In this doubling process what someone else is 
doing or feeling ‘is “impressed” upon me; it is like the action of a printing press on the 
surface of a body. As a result of this impression, I experience the feeling along with the 
other person. Literally, I feel the same thing … from one body to another’ (2009: 34). 
For Ridout, the subsequent feeling of sympathy enables us to feel satisfaction when we 
perceive someone doing something good, or dissatisfaction when they imprint an act of 
wrong doing (Ibid). On this basis, he identifies that it is in our encountering of one 
another that human beings establish ‘a capacity for ethical judgement which is a natural 
extension of their existence as physiological beings’ (Ibid., 35). It might be reasoned 
that our predisposition for sympathy underlies our spectator within, as an inbuilt 
mechanism for assessing the way in which we might be judged by those on which we 
“impress”. This implies, as Ridout muses, that ethics is always in the end about 
someone else.  
 
The interdependency between individual and relational ethics is actualised in Gob 
Squad’s question and answer sessions with participant-spectators, which is a feature of 
both works under discussion. In these moments, the interviewee-spectator will instantly 
separate themselves into two roles; first, they need to assess how to respond to the 
question; secondly, they must refer their response inwards to their impartial spectator. 
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For the spectator within, this is a self-reflexive process based on their previous 
communication with others. In short, ethics as encounter fuels the ethical judgement 
within us. When in a Q&A situation, there is an almost instantaneous process of 
improvising our answer and filtering that answer based on the impression that we would 
wish to make. This process coincides with the duality of emotion and reason that 
underscore ethical judgement. Of course, there are times when our ability to be 
spontaneous hinders the effectiveness of our impression. There are also instances when 
our impartial spectator gets it wrong, which might occur when we are not familiar with 
the other people that are in attendance, thus, misjudging what the reception will be. 
Then there are those situations when an individual wilfully goes against the ethical code 
generally accepted by others, as discussed in the next section.  
 
I propose that Ridout’s notion of “sympathy” is made stronger when the person on 
stage belongs to the same “team” as the watching-spectator. Reflecting on participation 
in Gob squad’s performance, Smith contemplates, ‘once somebody does go in, you tend 
to think about yourself don’t you? Like how would I feel if that was me … you’re on 
the same team … you’re kind of gunning for them’ (2016: 8). The concept of “teams” is 
usefully explored by Goffman, who uses the term “team”: ‘to refer to any set of 
individuals who cooperate in staging a single routine’ (1990 [1959]: 85). In this way, 
the audience can be understood as a team, even if the team-mates perform varying roles 
on a continuum of interactivity. For Goffman, ‘whether the members of a team stage 
similar individual performances or stage dissimilar performances which fit together into 
a whole, an emergent team impression arises’ (Ibid). Yet, as Goffman observes, it is 
clear that members of the same team will have a notable relationship to each other, as 
each member is reliant on the good behaviour of their team-mates, establishing a ‘bond 
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of reciprocal dependence’ (Ibid., 88). Furthermore, this cooperation is reinforced by a 
given ‘reciprocal familiarity’, which ‘is automatically extended and received as soon as 
the individual takes a place on the team’ (Ibid). However, Goffman is clear to point out 
that should a person go outside the boundaries of acceptable team behaviour or what we 
might call ethics, ‘giving the show away or forcing it to take a particular turn’, he is still 
considered part of the team (Ibid). Indeed, it is the person’s membership of the team that 
makes their actions all the more disruptive (Ibid., 89); I will discuss this further in the 
subsequent section. This reinforces my assertion that even when spectators cross the 
border and undertake a performance role, they are nonetheless part of “Team 
Audience”. Furthermore, part of the performing-spectators’ dramatic effect comes from 
the fact that they appear to be acting beyond the pale of the team’s typical behaviour; 
therefore, requiring the other members to reconsider their own conduct. However, as I 
have previously mentioned, I suggest that on the other side of the border the participant-
spectators form a new team, which complicates rather than abolishes their membership 
of Team Audience. This is instead of the view that the volunteers temporarily join the 
team of performers, which I refute on the basis that they are only given access to the 
front region. Even when the stage includes part of the back region, as we find in Gob 
Squad’s practice, it is a theatricalised representation of behind the scenes and not the 
backstage proper. 
 
In Goffman’s hypothesising, the constitution of a team with its ‘reciprocal 
dependence’ cuts across social and political divides, which is also a claim made on 
behalf of practitioners that employ audience participation. In chapter three, I highlighted 
the way that Abramović recognised her art as bringing people together who would not 
ordinarily share the same space (KunstSpektrum 2014); similarly, Gob Squad draw 
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attention to the idea that the performing-spectators are people that otherwise may not 
come into contact. Yet, as I have outlined, the new bonds formed between participants 
in the “new world” do not deny the pre-existing bonds that they have with the audience. 
Additionally, according to Goffman, when two teams come into contact they tend to 
maintain their established appearance, as well as supporting the impression that the 
other team are keen to uphold. However, the relationship between the teams may be 
reorganised during moments of crisis (Goffman 1990 [1959]: 166). Chapter three noted 
how audience participation may be interpreted as a form of social crisis, in the way that 
the original social distance between the performers and the audience is decreased. Yet, 
as Goffman suggests, ‘when the crisis is past, the previous working consensus is likely 
to be re-established, albeit bashfully’ (Ibid). I am reminded of that awkward feeling 
post-participation when you bump into a performer in the real world. It is striking how 
quickly intimacy dissipates once the show is over. Nevertheless, this does not diminish 
the presence of intimacy in the encounter itself, either embodied or impressed upon us.   
In the newly formed team of performing-spectators an impression is quickly 
established, which is largely focused on compliance and the realisation of “giving good 
audience”. However, there are moments when both performing-spectators and 
watching-spectators demonstrate forms of communication which deviate from the 
agreed team impression.  
 
5.9 Participation Gone Wrong: The “errant spectator”, the “mis-spectator”, and 
      the “dis-spectator”   
At this stage of the chapter I will turn my attention to a number of moments within my 
encountering of Western Society and War and Peace where spectators appeared to 
transgress the boundaries of participation. The notion of participation “gone wrong” 
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refers to when spectators divert from their intended role and the parameters set out by 
the artist. Until now, I have focused on the principles and processes of participation, 
which to a large extent safeguard against the potential for things to go wrong. However, 
I propose that it is often when things don’t go to plan that participation gets really 
interesting, in terms of social relations and ethics. In general, practitioners do what they 
can to limit the possibility of the performance going wrong, which typically includes 
some form of informal casting. In War and Peace this process was made explicit 
through the initial interviewing of audience members; whereas, in Western Society the 
randomness of the selection method appeared to disregard a need for casting. Yet, Smith 
has suggested that when “chucking those toys” there are people to avoid. Furthermore, 
participants undergo a form of audition with a member of the crew when they are given 
their headphones. It is during this time that the re-enactment parts are handed out by the 
tour manager. As Smith explains, “he gets a moment with them in the dark side, he can 
see then if somebody looks terribly nervous, or if somebody looks a little bit too eager. 
And he can kind of sort them out a little bit’ (2016: 10). Still, despite an artist’s best 
efforts, there are times when miss-casting or misbehaviour occurs. 
 
In the performance of Western Society that I attended, there were two striking 
instances of a spectator making a mistake; both of which resulted in much humour and 
exceeded the effect that participation had on the watching-audience. In the first 
example, Mr “Does that mean I have to go up” - cast as the Cake Lady - ate the cake 
before he was given the cue, resulting in a hearty applause from the audience. In the 
second instance, a young male remote actor corpsing infected the whole auditorium 
with the giggles. These spectators might be looked on as “errant audience members”, to 
use Alston’s term, in the way that they strayed from the intended course (2016: 65).  
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Following Alston’s notion of errant immersion, the mistakes made by Mr ‘Does that 
mean I have to go up’ and his giggling co-performer are ‘mistakes that make’ (Alston 
2016a: 67 emphasis original). In Alston’s theorising, this making emerges from ‘a 
surplus of expertise, reading too well and taking too far an invitation to get involved’ 
(Ibid). While this view might be applied to the over enthusiastic Cake Lady, it is not 
relevant to the example of corpsing, which conversely suggests a lack of expertise or 
engagement. All the same, inexpertise might also be seen as offering mistakes that 
make. As Ridout states: ‘a measure of inexpertise may be crucial to an interruption of 
the consensus around value to which experts, both performance makers and spectators, 
routinely contribute, a consensus in which we agree only to see and hear what we 
already know’ (2012: 173). For Ridout, this consensus coincides with what Rancière 
refers to as “the distribution of the sensible” (2009), inasmuch as it constitutes an 
aesthetic order which imposes a value system on which we base judgements and 
determine who gets to be called an expert (Ibid). Ridout identifies his conception of the 
“mis-spectator” as capable of realising Rancière’s reconfiguration of this consensus: ‘to 
render visible what had not been, and to make heard as speakers those who had been 
perceived as mere noisy animals’ (Rancière 2009: 24-5 in Ridout 2012: 174). In this 
way, Ridout notes that the inexpert spectator bears a resemblance to Rancière’s 
“emancipated spectator”, as the producer of their own story (2012, 174; see also 
Rancière 2007: 279). 
 
I wish to propose that all mistakes can be mistakes that make, and not just for the 
maker of the mistake, who I’m quite sure enjoyed the laughs that they received, but also 
for the perceiver of the mistake. For me, those disruptions to the course of Western 
Society were highlights because they emphasised the authenticity of the performing-
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spectators and the potential risks of staging participation. It is my assertion that part of 
the appeal of participation is the risk of transgression and failure, which is implicit in 
the invitation for non-professionals to take to the stage. This risk is not only understood 
by those that accept the invitation, but by the watching audience, who assume a certain 
level of responsibility for the performance through their very attendance and as team 
mates of the participants. Although, as I have indicated, a participant’s misbehaviour 
often creates the illusion of failure rather than failure itself, as these moments of 
undoing are capable of creating a performance that is far more entertaining and genuine 
than what was originally intended. Misbehaviour and mistakes emphasise the un-
rehearsed nature of participation because they remind us that even when there are 
imposed limits, these may be breached. 
 
A striking example of audience transgression in participatory performance occurred 
during War and Peace; the likes of which I have not seen before or since. This moment 
interrupted the consensus of the audience, represented a crisis in the ethics of 
participation, and brought acute attention to the expert participant-spectator. The 
behaviour on display during this unruly exchange converges with elements of Alston’s 
errant audience member and Ridout’s inexpert figure. However, I propose that it more 
accurately fits with a third category of transgressive spectatorship, which I have called 
the “dis-spectator”. It could be said that the trouble began in the casting, or what might 
be considered miss-casting, as over the course of War and Peace it transpired that one 
of the chosen performing-spectators had been a political party candidate during the 
previous General Election. Consequently, when Gob Squad’s Simon asked the 
participant a series of questions, she offered very full responses and seemed to have her 
own agenda, taking up quite a lot of stage time and appearing difficult for him to rein in. 
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This prompted a group of three audience members, who were sitting in front of me, to 
heckle her, shouting comments and insisting that she speed up her answers. I propose 
that the three hecklers demonstrate the behaviour of the dis-spectator. The “dis” derives 
from the term “dissent” and the closely related “dissident”; it refers to the notion of a 
spectator who has dissented from the majority of the audience and is actively 
challenging the established structures and processes of the performance. Unlike the 
errant spectator or the mis-spectator there is nothing mistaken about the actions of the 
dis-spectator, whose deliberate actions are inclined to break, rather than make a 
performance. Of course, this form of spectatorship exists on a continuum; at the lowest 
level the dis-spectator can be seen questioning an immersive performer on their back 
story to try to catch them out; whereas at the highest level the dis-spectator may stage 
an intervention that threatens to undo the whole performance or redirect the focus to 
their agenda. I suggest that an invitation to participate can bring out the “dis-spectator 
within us”, especially when fuelled with hedonistic and narcissistic desire. Yet, 
typically this operates at a playful level, with a view to have a bit of fun rather than to 
create discord.  
 
In War and Peace, the disorderly behaviour of the hecklers created a palpable 
tension within the auditorium, crossing the border into the performance. It was apparent 
that neither the audience nor the performers knew what to do. And, it would be 
dishonest if I didn’t admit that there was something thrilling about watching this crisis 
unfold: witnessing Simon struggling to rein in the overzealous interviewee, at the same 
time as attempting to ignore the shouts from the disgruntled observers. It magnified the 
liveness of the experience, and arguably reconfigured the performance as a space for 
discord and “antagonism”. Yet, despite the revolutionary possibilities, I found the 
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heckling rude and oppressive, and my sympathy and allegiance was whole heartedly 
with my team mate on stage. Thankfully she appeared unmoved by the abuse directed at 
her; no doubt a thick skin earned through her campaigning as a politician. Though I had 
felt that she was somewhat overplaying her part, I continued to support her as a member 
of Team Audience. The heckling that she endured demonstrated one of the greatest fears 
of participation: the idea that you might get it wrong and be booed off stage. But, how 
did she get it wrong, and what were the hecklers trying to achieve? Putting aside the 
possibility that the hecklers knew her in some way, I suggest that her front indicated a 
lack of authenticity or vulnerability. In this way, her professionalism denied the 
audience the celebrated impression of the amateur as an artist. While her appearance 
and manner suggested an expert participant-spectator; in contrast, the fact that she was 
unable to underplay her public front suggested inexpertness in participatory 
performance. Whether cast as an errant spectator who surpassed her role, or as a mis-
spectator who overestimated how much to say, perhaps in the eyes of the hecklers she 
threatened the consensus of the performance. To this end, we may conclude that the 
hecklers sought to reclaim control of the performance for the audience, but also on 
behalf of the performers – to break in order to make. Following Goffman, it may be that 
their interruption was intended to reprimand their team member for going outside of the 
typical standards of participation. However, the paradox of their protest is that it 
brought more discord to the performance, and created a rupture in the ethics of 
participation.  
 
As such, audience members and Gob Squad performers alike were compelled to 
question who is responsible for the performance; who is responsible for the performing-
spectator; who is responsible for the hecklers; how do we bring resolution to this 
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situation; do we want to resolve this situation or is this what we have been waiting for? 
After all, as Ridout tells us: ‘Theatre’s greatest ethical potential may be found precisely 
at the moment when theatre abandons ethics’ (2009: 70). Though I want to stress that 
the situation of hecklers in War and Peace is very rare, for me, it evidences that the 
ethics of participation remains contested ground, fraught with conflicting notions of 
responsibility and impression management. It was striking that no-one intervened when 
the dis-spectators collectively berated the participant-spectator, not the audience, not 
Gob Squad, and not the theatre ushers. The company discusses how they use a raw form 
of narration to maintain authenticity over their text and to be able to ‘react to 
spontaneous heckling from the audience’ (Gob Squad 2010: 46); however, they seemed 
unprepared for the heckling directed at their co-participant. While participation may be 
conceived by its makers as the “opening up of a border”, the breaking of the fourth wall, 
or the unlocking of a gate from their side, little attention has been given to what happens 
if the border/wall/gate is breached from the other side.  
 
5.10 Conclusion 
Hélène Cixous considers that ‘Feeling pleasure means losing oneself’ (1991: 152). I 
propose that the ethics of participation reward those that risk losing themselves to 
pleasure (or being heckled) with special privileges including greater access to the 
secrets of the performance and elevated social status. However, Gob Squad’s practice 
draws self-reflexive critical attention to the artifice of participation as a privileged 
position, and how participants might be manipulated or made vulnerable. All at once 
their approach to spectatorship recognises and magnifies the enabling and limiting 
potential produced by participation. The shared curtain call with participants is a 
testament to Gob Squad’s emancipation rather than exploitation of spectators, while 
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unreservedly upholding Rancière’s claim that emancipation can also be found by 
remaining in your seat.  
 
This chapter has established that the ethics of participation is about one’s own 
subjectivity, and at the same time it is about our encounters with others. It has 
demonstrated the function of the three teams (company performers, performing-
spectators, and watching-spectators) in Gob Squad’s work, and highlighted the way that 
they interchange roles and determine their own interdependent ethical codes. My 
analysis has recognised how the ethics of participation raises the stakes in performance, 
bringing into view the errant spectator, the mis-spectator, and the dis-spectator. 
Nevertheless, I suggest that ethical promiscuity is part of participation’s vitality, which 
is in danger of being compromised if its ethics become too formulaic and spectators’ 
responses learnt. If there is one attribute that the ethics of participation insists upon, it is 
the capacity to spontaneously stage one’s authentic self. This serves as a reaction and 
resistance to the concurrent rise of the network society; where impressions are filtered 
on Instagram and fronts are managed through Facebook updates and retweets. In this 
way, the ethical imperfections of our world have been impressed upon participatory 
performance, as the ethics, aesthetics and politics of Western society continue to 
circumvent both war and peace.  
271 
 
 Chapter Six: Final Conclusions 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis has developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of spectator-
participation in live art by examining the performance practices of Guillermo Gómez-
Peña’s La Pocha Nostra, Marina Abramović, and Gob Squad. It has offered new 
insights on the possibilities and limitations of these experiential performances, drawing 
on both scholarly investigation and embodied research. As I stated at the beginning of 
the thesis, my interest in participation arose out of a need to resolve my experience as a 
performing-spectator. Subsequently, this framework serves to disentangle the 
transformative processes and possible side effects of participation, so that we might 
better comprehend these complex and contradictory encounters.   
 
It is ‘the morning after (the night before)’, and we are waking up to the full 
consequences and potentialities of participation. In fact, the period of time over which 
this thesis has been researched and written serves to reflect how the field of immersive 
and participatory practices has developed, in particular, the way that the focus has 
shifted from relational aesthetics to the complicity of participation in a neoliberal 
culture. However, I suggest that there is still a need to drill down into the research at a 
more detailed level. To this end, the framework presented in this thesis takes a fresh 
look at the phenomenology of participatory live art. It advances on from “the 
emancipated spectator”, as outlined by Jacques Rancière, to reconsider its meaning 
within live art. It examines the relationship between ritual and the transformative and 
emergent processes that foster and manage participation. Furthermore, responding to a 
dearth of literature, it recognises presence and ethics as foundational concepts in the 
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development of participation. Moreover, the study establishes spectator-participation as 
a practice in its own right, and charts the birth of a new breed of spectator who 
anticipates the possibility of co-creation. It recognises several emerging types of 
participant, namely the “expert participant-spectator” and the more transgressive “dis-
spectator”. While determining that participation can offer spectators a licence to act in 
ways outside of their everyday political and social reality, it calls attention to the lack of 
consideration and after-care given to spectators post-participation.    
 
In addition, the way in which these arguments are elucidated through the close 
analysis of performances by the case study artists and companies, underlines the 
contribution that they have made to the field. A particular highlight in the research is 
my interview with Gob Squad’s Sharon Smith (2016), and her insightful reading of 
spectators as “refugees seeking asylum”, artists as the custodians of the “gate”, and 
participation as the key to opening the border.  
 
Even though my analysis concentrates on specific case study performances, I 
maintain that the discussions and concepts to emerge out of these encounters are 
transferable to other participatory works inside and outside of live art. Indeed, accepting 
Lois Keidan’s suggestion that live art is the research lab for mass culture (2015), 
looking at these practices and audiences may reveal the ways in which we can expect 
the mainstream to develop in the future. In this concluding chapter I will highlight the 
major insights and implications of the study, and the future areas for investigation.  
 
6.2 Researcher and Narrator 
Chapter one noted a tendency in the literature that I reviewed towards a separation 
between a theoretical analysis of participatory experience and the experience itself. 
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Therefore, I sought to take a holistic approach to the analysis of the case study 
performances, by adopting the triple perspective of the spectator, the performance 
maker, and the scholar. An important feature of the research was my own Spectator-
Participation-as-Research (SPaR), which enabled my encounters to have a presence 
within the study. The use of photographs throughout the thesis is also part of this desire 
to capture the work itself, while recognising that these images also take on their own 
presence as “the document performance” (Schneider 117-120 in Brine and Minton 
2008). I came to realise as the investigation developed that the anecdotes were not just 
an introduction to the performances but pivotal to identifying the academic lines of 
enquiry to be pursued. As a result, throughout the thesis I have maintained a dialogue 
with the experiences themselves, alongside and in conjunction with the theoretical 
conversations that take place.  
 
Early on in the study, I identified how the tendency amongst academics to combine 
anecdote and scholarly writing mirrors the duality of the performer/spectator role and 
the condition of being inside/outside of participatory performance at the same time. In 
this way, participation can be seen to turn researchers in the field into narrators, 
realising Rancière’s notion of an emancipated community as a community of 
storytellers (2007: 280). Yet, typically there is a paradox here, as the emphasis on the 
creation of a community is undermined by the way that scholarly reflections concentrate 
on an individual journey (Aragay and Monforte 2016: 8 emphasis original). This 
coincides with my realisation in chapter three, drawing on the work of Rachel Gomme 
(2015), that although participatory performances may seem to offer a shared experience 




Another insight revealed in chapter three came about as a consequence of my 
adoption of three perspectives within La Pocha Nostra’s work; as a performing-
spectator, watching-spectator, and collaborative artist. This approach revealed a unique 
perspective on the interrelationship between the different roles within participatory 
performance, what it feels like from both sides of the border and the position of being 
indeterminately in-between the two.  
 
6.3 The Rise in Participatory Live Art 
 
In addressing the function of participatory live art, I have established how an aesthetic 
of participation has arisen out of a contemporary social and cultural context. As a result, 
the thesis highlights the ways in which participation can be socially and politically 
enabling, but also limiting. Tracing the origins of participation in live art, I noted how 
the resurgence towards this practice at the turn of the twenty-first century was a reaction 
to an increasingly mediatised and depoliticised society. I also emphasised the important 
role that Home Live Art (HLA) played in this revival, and how support for this work 
has continued with the Live Art Development Agency (LADA). I suggest that as the 
world’s leading organisation for live art, LADA is instrumental in elevating certain 
types of practice. But, we do need to be careful that the discourses, events and resources 
that are promoted by the agency reflect the artists that come under its remit, rather than 
the institution driving the artistic agenda.  
 
I have concluded that over the last ten years, the proliferation in participatory works 
has developed concurrently with our advancement into the era of the social network, 
driven by the continued growth in smartphone usage. While Facebook may report that 
we have more friends than we could ever recall, for many of us there is a sense that our 
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“real” self has become even more isolated. We live in an age where the notion of ‘to be 
or not to be’ has become synonymous with ‘to tweet or not to tweet’ (Jones 2012: 155). 
Yet, in contrast to artists’ perception of a depoliticised society at the turn of the 
Millennium, social networks have in fact re-politicised society, playing a key role in 
recent political campaigns.   
 
Social networks currently portray a divided nation, as many turn to online platforms 
to continue fraught political debates, and to share their frustration at voting results 
which seek to further discriminate against marginalised bodies. Consequently, I suggest 
that along with the participatory desires of hedonism and narcissism noted by Adam 
Alston (2013), enthusiasm for this work replicates theatre’s sensitivity to social feeling 
and action. Furthermore, as I outlined in chapter three, these performances might be 
interpreted as modern day social dramas and rites of passage, which possess a capacity 
to treat our acute emptiness and social crisis with artistic experience. This converges 
with a yearning desire to physically experience a sense of togetherness and the presence 
of our own life, as well as creating a ‘space for speech’ (Fisher 2011: 25) in which 
alternative social and political realities might be staged. The case study performances 
bear witness to the way in which participation can foster a genuine exchange between 
bodies, unite strangers, and heighten one’s attendance. In response to the acceleration of 
social media as the modus operandi for human interaction, I suggest that we need the 
kind of human connection founded in participatory experience now more than ever. 
Nevertheless, my research has demonstrated that these experiential works can also be 
limiting. Above all, although it is capable of destabilising established hierarchical 
structures including the notion of the artist over the spectator, participation can be 
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socially divisive, producing a new pecking order of spectatorship that privileges doing 
over seeing. One of the insights to emerge from my analysis of La Pocha Nostra’s 
practice, in chapter three, is the way in which the role of the watching-directing-
spectator challenges this arrangement, by demonstrating that seeing is doing. However, 
in my consideration of Abramović’s 512 Hours, discussed in chapter four, I followed 
Claire Bishop’s argument (2008, 2004) that participation can create a spectacle of 
sociability rather than a more sustainable or antagonistic form of engagement. Still, at 
the same time, the way in which this public experiment brought disparate people 
together evidences how these exchanges can represent a form of passive and 
imaginative resistance. Overall, I conclude that participatory live art, notwithstanding its 
limitations, has an important job to do. An aesthetic of participation arises out of a need 
to attend to our “real” self; to nurture an embodied sense of mutuality and community; 
and to create a ‘space for speech’ in which we might envisage a new social and political 
future, albeit in a language co-written by the artist. 
6.4 Emancipating Spectators 
In this thesis, Rancière’s concept of “the emancipated spectator” (2007, 2009) has 
influenced my argument, but I have moved beyond this theory in my analysis of 
emancipating spectators in live art. In doing so, I have identified how a live art audience 
has a different set of conventions and expectations from a theatre audience. 
Consequently, the live art spectator anticipates the potential for an embodied response 
as well as a critical one, with participation merely extending those expectations. 
Moreover, in the performances under discussion, the image of an emancipated spectator 
being freed from their seat in a darkened auditorium is only applicable to Gob Squad’s 
Western Society and War and Peace. Significantly, these two performances draw self-
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reflexive critical attention to the idea of an emancipated spectator as a privileged and 
VIP spectator.  
 
I conclude that the emancipated spectator in live art is largely directed at the binary 
of activity and passivity. In this way, the spectator is reconceived as a co-creator, who 
has agency to affect the production of the performance through their creative responses. 
This mode of emancipation is designed to empower spectators and give them autonomy 
over their participatory experience. The live art community has a particular sensitivity 
towards a democratising of the arts, as many of the artists and spectators have felt 
marginalised and disenfranchised from mainstream culture and politics. While live art 
has provided a creative space in which artists can openly share their personal and 
political viewpoints, participation has been adopted as the vehicle for empowering and 
emancipating their audience. 
 
Nevertheless, the thesis has also demonstrated how participation may in fact be 
extorted from the spectator, who is primed to have a special complicity (Alston 2013: 
129; see also Fried 1968: 127) with the practice. This resonates with the arguments put 
forward by Bishop (2008) and Jen Harvie (2013) that delegated performance may 
produce an exploited spectator instead of an emancipated one. Although I would not go 
as far as to say that the spectators in the case study works are deliberately taken 
advantage of, the agency that they are afforded may in fact be what Astrid Breel refers 
to as the display of agency, and sometimes it is hard to know the difference. In short, 
the emancipation of spectators in live art, more often than not, comes with sanctions. 
Nevertheless, while this may impose some limits on the creative possibilities of the 
practice and its outcome, it also serves to safeguard the aesthetic of the work and the 
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audience’s role within it. Therefore, if we interpret these works as deploying an 
aesthetic of risk, the guidelines that frame participation might be considered as a form 
of risk-management. In addition, to echo Rachel Zerihan (2009), the spectator might 
actually experience a form of emancipation as a consequence of the scaffold for 
participation set out by the artist, which authorises them to behave in a particular way 
without having to take responsibility for their actions. Yet, as I have discussed in 
relation to ‘the morning after’ participation, the spectator’s ability to hold themselves 
accountable for their behaviour may well be suspended rather than released. 
 
In my consideration of Rancière’s emancipated spectator from a more distant 
position to the performance, I have reasoned that the watching-spectator is actively 
involved in the translation of the complex scenes and “irresistible images” (Bogad 
2015) unfolding from participation. Still, as Wilkinson (2015) considers, the shared 
cultural values, narrative conventions and collective memory between spectators 
influences how watching-spectators process their personal experience. In this way, 
‘Rancière’s active spectator is never an isolated subject’ (Wilkinson 2015: 142). This 
challenges Rancière’s concept of the emancipated spectator as ‘an actor in his own 
story’ (Rancière 2007: 279 emphasis mine), which leads me to propose that a more 
radical emancipation of the spectator is needed if we are to create new stories and new 
endings.  
 
Importantly, although my experiences as a watching-spectator afforded me the 
distance to critique the performances that I witnessed, they did not produce the same 
intense embodied experience that the performing-spectator role had brought forth. In 
this way, I am inclined to suggest that if there is a main principle for spectator-
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participation in live art and beyond, it is this: the more that is given in participation, the 
more that is taken in participation, for both the artist and the spectator. 
 
In moving beyond Rancière’s theory, I have gained another insight into the 
emancipated spectator, resulting from the transformative capacity of participatory live 
art, wherein the spectator is released from their everyday self and social reality. In the 
case study performances, we have seen how this can be brought about through both 
physical and mental processes. In La Pocha Nostra’s human mural exercise, 
performing-spectators are transformed through costume, props and their active decision 
making in the shaping of the improvisation. While immersed in play they are able to 
relinquish their normal responsibilities and “front” (Goffman 1959). In Gob Squad’s 
remote acting, even though participants are literally controlled by the performers, the 
requirement to follow the instructions being communicated gives them a licence to do 
things that ordinarily they might not do, with the defence that the performance made 
them do it. Lastly, in Marina Abramović’s 512 Hours a combination of physical and 
mental activities work towards emancipating spectators from the world outside, in what 
might be thought of as a form of imaginative immersion, where the mind rather than the 
performance space takes the spectator to another place. In sum, my analysis of the 
different modes of spectatorship within the case study performances determines that 
there is more than one way of emancipating spectators in participatory live art. 
However, at the same time I have highlighted the mixed emotions that can follow 






6.5 A “Symmathesy” (living system) of Participation in Live Art 
The thesis offers a new way of looking at the phenomenology of participatory live art 
by determining these encounters as a complex network of contradictory and 
interdependent relations. Accordingly, it argues that these performances constitute a 
“symmathesy” of participation, to use Nora Bateson’s term, which should be viewed as 
a whole experience rather than as a series of parts. In chapter three, I established what I 
am calling “the paradox of participation”: the duality of holding the position of 
performer and spectator, inside and outside of the performance, and being both and 
neither at the same time. The research upholds that there are contradictory couplings in 
participation including the interplay between autonomy and heteronomy, emancipation 
and compliance, ordinary and extraordinary, experience and memory, experience and 
documentation, destiny and surprise, emotion and reason, risk and responsibility, self 
and other. Reflection on my own encounters prevents me from accepting Laura Cull’s 
(2011) reading of ontological participation as an immanent encounter which denies the 
existence of an outside position. However, consistent with Cull’s view, I suggest that 
we do need to alter the systemic way in which we think about participation. While the 
paradox of participation complicates our perception of the experience, it is ultimately 
the thing that holds the work together. As such, the thesis proposes that the mind and 
the body are not in opposition during participation but interdependent, enabling us to 
fulfil our responsibility to the performance, to safeguard the experience, and to take care 
of our role within it. Furthermore, it is the symbiosis of the mind and body during 
participation that enables the spectator to become an “embodied mind” within their own 




One can also apply the notion of interdependency to the other paradoxical relations 
in the situation of participation, which enables us to observe paradox without needing to 
choose one side or the other, as Nora Bateson notes (2016: 170). This corresponds with 
Fischer-Lichte’s theory on the “reenchantment” of participant-spectators, in which the 
perception of binaries as an “either/or” situation is replaced by the condition of “as well 
as” (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 207). Drawing on Bateson, I suggest that to only perceive of 
participation as a series of ‘parts’ blinds us to the way in which these relational pairs 
operate within the emergent process of participation. Therefore, I have adopted 
Bateson’s term “symmathesy” as a new concept to describe the communication of 
interdependency and mutual learning that occurs in participation as a ‘whole’ living 
system (2016: 168). I propose that our understanding of participatory live art can be 
advanced through this new terminology, which better reflects the complex interactions 
that take place within these live works. 
 
6.6 Spectator-Participation as a Practice   
Looking at the implications of this research for performance makers, the thesis has 
shown how working with a live and participating audience can be a difficult 
responsibility to manage. Nonetheless, as I said in chapter two, I am wary of advocating 
a “dramaturgy of participation” or a training field for the performers of this work, as 
suggested by Persis Jade Maravala and Jorge Lopes Ramos (2016). I have cautioned 
that if we are too didactic about how participation operates, we may produce the 
presentation of participation rather than a meaningful invitation to engage in the work. I 
have even suggested that live art may be the custodian of participatory practice as an 




However, at the same time, I propose that we do need to recognise that spectator-
participation is a nuanced practice in its own right, which requires a specific set of 
understandings. Indeed, this thesis charts the birth of a new breed of spectator, whose 
expectations, needs and behaviour have evolved alongside the advancement of 
participatory practice. In chapter three, I acknowledged how this has given rise to the 
appearance of the “expert participant-spectator”, adding another tier to the hierarchy of 
spectatorship. In chapter five, I distinguished three transgressive types of participant-
spectator: the “errant spectator” (Alston 2016a), the “mis-spectator” (Ridout 2012), and 
my own concept of the “dis-spectator”. These spectator roles epitomise the element of 
risk and potential for failure that underscores participation, emphasising its liveness and 
making it an exciting place to be. I follow Alston to conclude that mistakes and 
misdemeanours can in actuality make rather than break a performance. At the same 
time, reflecting on the heckling during Gob Squad’s War and Peace, I recommend that 
artists are better equipped to manage these kinds of situations, and are clearer on where 
their duty of care to a participant begins and ends.   
 
For emerging practitioners of participation, chapter three examines the practical 
processes and techniques that underscore fostering participation. The chapter has 
mapped the development of participation in the interactive rituals and extreme 
performance games of La Pocha Nostra, using these labels as conceptual frames through 
which to analyse their performance methodology. This simultaneously provides a 
potential structure for performance makers to follow, which suggests the building 
blocks towards fostering “productive participation” without being too prescriptive. My 
examination finds many shared characteristics between ritual practice and participatory 
performance, and elucidates how strategies and tactics are employed by artists to garner 
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the audience’s “special complicity”. This includes outlining a set of theatrical devices, 
pinpointed by Fischer-Lichte (2008), that create a heightened level of awareness in the 
spectator. I have identified a distinguishing feature of audience participation in these 
live art works as their ability to transform the ordinary, not into the extra-ordinary (more 
than ordinariness), but into the extraordinary (unusual).  
 
6.7 Presence and Ethics 
This study proposes that presence is foundational to the process and effect of 
participation. It concludes that the emerging nature of form in participatory performance 
converges with the evolving manifestations of presence that it produces. Chapter four’s 
exploration of presence in Marina Abramović’s 512 Hours highlights how the 
attendance of the artist and the spectator is magnified through participation.   
 
It observes how against the backdrop of “the experience economy” (Pine and 
Gilmore 1999) there is a perceived value of being there, which is epitomised by the 
selfie. Indeed, this is indicative of participatory performance’s paradoxical relationship 
to technology. On the one hand, these live exchanges serve to represent a counterculture 
to a technology based society. On the other hand, they appropriate online platforms as 
the place to brag, document, extend, relive, romanticise and even decompress from 
one’s experience. Moreover, the social reality perceived by participants during the 
original performance may even be superseded by a social media reality of the 
experience. 
 
In my examination of presence I determine that a heightened state of being arises 
from the expectant bodies of both the artist and the audience, especially when there is a 
demand to do something. I emphasise how the artist’s “auratic presence” (Cormac 
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Power 2008) or what might be referred to as a “strong concept of presence” (Fischer-
Lichte 2008) channels the energy between the bodies within the performance space. In 
Abramović’s case this is directly related to her celebrity-artist status and perceived 
superhuman qualities, as well as deriving from the nuances of her performance training.  
 
I also conclude that the artist’s own embodied presence returns a feeling of 
embodiment to her spectators, articulated by Fischer-Lichte (2008) as a kind of 
PRESENCE: PRESENCE. This corresponds to Sharon Smith’s notion of the audience 
as a projection screen, actualised in the staged duality of the Gob Squad performer and 
their counterpart remote actor, as well as between performing-spectators and watching-
spectators. Furthermore, I draw on Josephine Machon’s theory of (syn)aesthetics (2009) 
to highlight that when we are reminded of a previous participatory encounter our body 
recalls the sensation, extending the experience and contributing to its addictive capacity.  
 
Lastly, I have ascertained how participation constitutes the co-presence of the artist, 
performing-spectator and watching-spectator. Echoing Rachel Gomme (2015), my 
reflection has testified that it is through the mutual exchange between co-participants 
with equal status, rather than between the artist and spectator, that a shared experience 
of intimacy comes into being. Additionally, I have established how Heidegger’s concept 
of “out-standing standing-within” (1978) interpreted by Simon Jones, and the related 
notion of “neighboring nearness” (1971) offer a theoretical framework for 
understanding the way in which we perceive the other’s ‘othering’ in the situation of 
participation (Simon Jones 2012: 170). More importantly, the way that “out-standing 
standing-within” is characterised by the condition of ‘knowing’ at the same time as 
‘not-knowing’ is usefully developed in Levinas’s writing, to contend that our 
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encountering of the mystery of another is ‘always in action and never done’ (S Jones 
2012: 164). Therefore, the thesis concludes that participation eventually turns the 
encounter back in on itself, to manifest as a self-encounter.  
  
The emergent nature of presence coincides with a mutable code of ethics within 
participatory performance in live art. Chapter five draws on Ridout (2009) to reason that 
there is a double dimension to the ethics of participation: one is concerned with the self, 
and the other is about everyone else. Furthermore, I have concluded that an underlying 
principle in the ethics of participation appears to be an ability to stage one’s authenticity 
at will. It is surprising that as an aesthetic of risk, more research has not been dedicated 
to the study of ethics within these complicated works. Certainly, an ethical ambiguity 
has opened participation up to criticism, especially regarding the exploitative potential 
of this work. Nevertheless, paralleling my argument against ‘the dramaturgy of 
participation’, I suggest that ethical promiscuity is part of participation’s vitality, which 
is in danger of being compromised if it becomes too fixed. Still, at the same time, I 
argue that artists have an ethical responsibility to take care of their spectators during and 
after their participatory experience.    
 
6.8 Future Areas for Investigation 
This thesis has provided a comprehensive overview of research on participation in live 
art, as well as addressing some of the gaps in the literature. But, there is still work to do. 
The conversations concerning the “symmathesy” of binary relations, and the discourse 
on presence and ethics are indicative of the complex nature of these concepts, and as 
such they invite further critical and philosophical readings to offer a deeper insight into 
their role within participation. One area of further investigation that I have drawn 
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attention to at various points in this study is the way in which participatory performance 
practices converge with the characteristics and ethos of rave and club culture that 
emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s. On the emerging field of spectator-participation 
as a practice in its own right, it would be useful to extend the analysis and data on 
audience behaviour, to have a better awareness of their changing needs, expectations, 
and sensibilities. There is also the question of how the audience values participatory 
works. If it is a case of a performance being effective rather than good, as Gómez-Peña 
suggests (2005: 25), how is this measured? What are the criteria by which this is 
judged? Lastly, I propose that we have a responsibility to further consider the 
consequences of participation and the after-care that should be given to spectators post-
participation.  
 
Deeper reflection on my own participatory experiences, in relation to the critical 
concepts and debates that I have unravelled over the duration of this study, has shifted 
my thinking back and forth. At best participation can make the spectator feel 
empowered, emancipated, and even “special”, but at worst it can make one feel 
inadequate, manipulated and expendable. It is ‘the morning after (the night before)’, and 
I have uncovered the complexities, contradictions, pleasures and pitfalls of participatory 
live art; to conclude, that it is one of the most dynamic and fruitful fields of 
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This is a transcript of a Skype interview that I conducted with Gob Squad member, Sharon 
Smith, which took place on 1 July 2016. 
word   Emphasis on word 
 
KJ 
As discussed, I’m recording this interview, but if at any stage you didn’t want me to 
record it any further, you’re well within your rights to say, “okay I don’t want this 
recording.” If you want me to delete it all, that again is completely your right. And if I 
intend to publish anything then I will check it with you first and let you have a look at it 




Right, okay, good. So, I think I explained in my email that my PhD is on audience 




So, as I’m sure you’ve seen, there has been a rise in popularity with all things 
participatory. And so this research stems from my own experience of audience 
participation and thinking about what that means as a spectator. And I’m looking at 
three case studies, you are one of the case studies and then there are Marina Abramović 







And the title of it is ‘The Morning After the Night Before: Emancipating Spectators in 
Live Art’. So it’s taking an open-eyed look at what participation means, now. Gob 
Squad was an early adopter of audience participation in contemporary performance, 
beginning, with Room Service in 2003. What was the original impulse for directly 
working with the audience? 
SS  
We wanted to bring somehow the real world inside the theatre, or still have a connection 
to the outside via some sort of media or technology which would allow, again, this leak. 
And that eventually became, yeah, the audience themselves. 
KJ 
Okay, so in a sense I guess because you were not coming originally from theatre, you 
were not bound by perhaps typical audience behaviour in the theatre which kind of was 
already a sort of a breaking away from those sort of, those barriers perhaps in a sense. 
SS  
We didn’t have to really un-train. There were none of those theatre problems in our 
way.  
KJ 
Yeah, okay. Great. Okay, so more recently Kitchen, Western Society and now your 
latest work, War and Peace all heavily include audience participation. So is this work 
motivated by the same principles as your earlier experiments or have there been other 
shifts in your thinking?  
SS  
We find the audience in the theatre situation in Western Society as an example, or 
Kitchen as a good example of using an audience member as, as a projection screen in a 
3 
 
way. They arrive in a situation visibly unprepared and in both of those shows they wear 
headphones that are very visible. And they become involved in something we call 
remote acting. So they’re either receiving, they’re receiving some sort of instruction, so 
they’re kind of being told what to do, or they’re being asked to give in to this other sort 
of instruction, and the audience therefore looks at two things at once. They see this 
body, this unprepared body and they maybe hear the words of another, or see the actions 
of another. And it’s something that if we were doing it as performers we… there would 
be no disconnect. There would be an assumption maybe that we owned that text, or 
we… 
KJ 
So in a sense is there an element of it being almost like a kind of an alienation device 
because of this disconnection? 
SS  
Yeah, it’s definitely about alienation. And it’s about, therefore, I don’t know… They, 
it’s, from our experience and what we’re interested in is the ability to project onto a 
person who isn’t sort of in on it. And also the ability to relate to that person because 
they’ve left one part of the auditorium and they’ve gone to another part of the room. 
You know, they’ve crossed over that line. 
KJ 
Yeah, that border. 
SS  
And they’ve kind of taken a little bit of the audience with them, so there’s a certain sort 
of extension of themselves maybe into the performance space. 
KJ 
Yeah, that’s exactly what I’m interested in and I’m going to come to presence in a 
moment actually. Okay, so moving along, a democratising of the arts has long since 
been the rhetoric of participation and in Western Society, Sarah suggests that you open 
the border and you give some audience members the opportunity to bask in the glow of 
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the performance. So to what extent does your work challenge or expose the 
conventional hierarchy of performer over spectator? 
SS  
Yeah, well in the first place in Western Society we’re using the metaphor of the theatre 
lights, or whatever, as a… We’re playing with the idea that the audience are outside 
Western Society quite literally. They’re, you know, they’re refugees seeking asylum and 
we have the key to the gate. So we’re really playing, because it’s, you know, the title is 
Western Society and we create this idea of a very lush, privileged, safe, light, warm 
space and suggest that the darkness of the seating area is somehow outside that, you 
know. It’s quite a crude and direct metaphor and it relates less to our feelings about 
theatre, although of course it is, you know, we absolutely refer to the fourth wall and a 
wall or as a gate or whatever that’s locked. But we are very concerned with creating an 
event which is live and which has a structure which no matter how fixed or tight still 
allows the event, the real time event to get in and affect what happens and how it 
happens. We don’t do this in a big way with like some sort of crazy flow diagram of 
possibilities. We’re always quite controlled in terms of where our performance is going 
from beginning, middle to end. But it’s more within and within each moment there’s 
room for play and for receiving signals from the outside. 
KJ 
I definitely saw that in War and Peace because actually when you were asking 
questions of the audience you gave them quite a lot of space. 
SS  
And that performance piece is very new and we’re really, at the moment we’ve been 
making quite a lot of changes. We’re still trying to make it much more… I mean we 
have it in War and Peace with those little bits at the table but we felt, actually, I mean 
not to go into a long story but War and Peace was made in quite a specific context 
which when it was first born it meant it was a lot more fixed than we like. And when it 
came to Nottingham it was kind of starting to crack open a little bit more, but we’re still 






Yes, you’re right, yes we do, if we ask a question we wait. We definitely wait for the 
answer. 
KJ 
Great, so I’m coming to the table now, you talked about the table there with the 
audience. So in Western Society the audience are told that there will be seven golden 
tickets handed out to the audience at random, and the lucky winners will be made VIPs 
and rewarded with champagne and chocolates while the rest of the audience watch from 
the side-lines. So there’s also an element of this VIP treatment in War and Peace. 
Again, there’s that table there and I believe again they’re invited to have a drink as well. 
So in this way, I’d like to suggest that the performance actually kind of draws a sort of 
self-reflexive critical attention to a hierarchy of spectatorship when participation is 
present. And, you know, you’ve talked about this idea of, you know, I think Sarah 
mentioned at one stage it was a bit like picking teams sometimes, when you’re kind of 
taking out those performing spectators. So could you just say something in terms of the 
politics perhaps and the potential limitations of spectatorship in your work but, you 
know, more widely really where participation is present?  
SS  
You have to explain a little bit what you mean by the politics of spectatorship. So from 
what perspective do you want me to comment, from the audience’s perspective? Or 
[inaudible 12:28]. 
KJ 
I think, I guess, well, I guess in a way from both. So in my, you know, in watching both 
Western Society and War and Peace, one of the things I liked about it is the fact that it 
seemed to be consciously aware of the complication of what happens when you choose 






and you leave others behind, and it seemed to acknowledge that. It seemed to 
acknowledge it by, by I guess heightening the VIP status and making that explicit, 
rather than trying to kind of give this sense about it being an opening up and a 
democratising, at the same time it seemed to be aware of itself and the fact that whilst 
on the one hand it’s doing that, on the other hand there’s arguably a kind of different 
hierarchy being set up.  
SS  
Yeah, yeah. Well, yeah, it’s an interesting reading and I can see why you would see it 
like that. And I’d never really thought about it. The VIP table in Western Society came 
along with those ideas of privilege and yes they do, if you read it from a theatre 
perspective they do acknowledge or reference, self-reference the status of the artist I 
guess in the situation. But for us it came from, um, from a different place. It arrives 
there but it came from, we were in Venice Beach as we did a residency in LA as part of 
that process and it was in Venice Beach where we found this collision of, of economies 
and we were very, very moved by that. And there’s something, there’s a huge influence 
from that strip on Venice Beach that place was what made us think about extremes or, 
yeah, occupying a position in proximity to another position which is very different. And 
you’d see it in the, that’s what influences the gold, that overtly sort of sexy gold… I 
mean of course it’s very cheap… 
KJ 
Yes, so there’s an artifice there.  
SS  
Because we’re being very cynical about it. And the VIP table is very cheap, we’re being 
very cynical about the luxury. But it’s also, it also is attached to the way we want to 
work with people, you know, some participatory work is interested in really provoking 
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the audience or challenging them in a way and that’s not just Gob Squad’s agenda. You 
know we really, in Kitchen we wanted it to be an exchange. We want something from 
them, therefore we want to make them feel as safe and as special as possible. And we 
definitely want them to be with us and we don’t want to make them look stupid or feel 
stupid. And we want to frame their presence on the stage in a way that means we can 
have a real conversation, even if there’s headphones and instructions and silly costumes 
and artifice involved. That we can exist there and we can really be there and when we 
look at each other, we see each other and when we speak to each other we’re having an 
actual conversation. So that’s our agenda in all of that work. And I think the VIP table 
just remained an interesting place for us. Of course there was, there’s always a bit of 
work, a bit of one project that leaks into the next project. And I think for us it was that 
VIP table. But of course it ties right into the salon to the fear of then sort of high society 
KJ 
Yeah, of course it does in War and Peace. 
SS  
mingling in this… 
KJ 
Yeah, and notions of privilege and class again 
SS  
privileged safe place. But, yeah, it’s an interesting… Of course, again, we are aware of 
the theatre as a site and it is, it’s a layer in there but it’s not our primary agenda.  
KJ 
Okay so there’s been a kind of presupposition that a participatory spectator is a more 
emancipated spectator. So I recall that in Western Society it suggested that sometimes 
it’s good to sit in the dark and watch, right? So in terms of watching spectators and 
performing spectators, how are you thinking about these roles in relation to kind of 
notions of passivity and activity and is there a sense that you can be emancipated whilst 




That’s a good question. Yes, unanimously yes. Before the audience gets involved in the 
work we still hope to work with the semi-improvisational structures and I think, 
therefore, the friction that’s involved with having to get from A to B but not specifying 
how you can get there as a performer, or as a group of performers. You know, we are 
live writing that work in real time and, therefore, the room is active in that writing. And 
that involves the audience and that, therein it feels different. It feels different from, as a 
performer and it feels different as an audience. So, yes, they are, they’re definitely 
activated even if they’re just sitting there. Because they’re affecting, you know, if they 
sneeze or laugh or walk out or, or not. Whether they are a small audience or a large 
audience or, you know, it’s felt, it’s felt in Gob Squad’s work, it’s not ignored.  
KJ 
Yeah, I certainly felt watching Western Society that there was a real sense of being with 
the audience members that were participating, wishing them well, hoping that they 
don’t get it wrong, supporting them. And where perhaps they took their role too far or 
started something too soon, you know, really being with them if they laughed about that 
or if they were reprimanded in a joking way, really being there, you know, on that stage 
as part of it. 
SS  
If only seven people go in, like I was saying about Kitchen earlier, or I think if you 
know you’ve had this opportunity or this moment where you could of, but you didn’t, 
and I’m not particularly into participating myself when I go and see theatre. And I 
certainly don’t want to be forced to participate, but once somebody does go in, you tend 
to think about yourself don’t you? Like how would I feel if that was me and there is a 
certain, yeah, you’re on the same team. So, so you’re kind of gunning for them, you 
know. 
KJ 




Yeah. It’s different from the, from the informed position that the performer is in. So 
yeah, you go in with them. So it’s something to do with the way the performance is 
structured and put together with this option to play for the performers. And then it’s also 
to do with following the people that go in. I mean, at the end of Kitchen, at the end of 
Western Society the applause is for those people. You know it’s as much as it is for us, 
you know, it’s, it’s their friends and their friends’ friends and it’s just the general sense 
that they’ve been through that thing and they’ve come out of it looking really good. 
KJ 
Yeah, that bow at the end that you do with the performing spectators, I think is a really 
significant moment that seems to be saying that there is an equality here, it’s a 
recognition of the fact that they’ve worked too. A sense of, yeah, I guess recognising 




So in both Western Society and War and Peace we see audience members taking centre 
stage and what I’m trying to establish is perhaps whether due to the rise in participation, 
spectator participation has become a practice in its own right. What I’m arguing is that 
because the audience has arguably changed and there are people out there now that seek 
out participation, and will take any opportunity available to get on stage and do stuff. 
There are people now that are expert in participation and know how to play, and how to 
take those opportunities. So, in your view, are there certain special skills and 
characteristics that are desirable in a performing spectator? 
SS  
Yeah, well it’s a good subject. I think we very clearly, I mean it’s hard. Okay so in 
Kitchen we, we invite the audience to walk behind the set before. There’s a big screen at 
the front where we project three different films, and behind there’s three different 
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performance spaces. So there are live films being made behind this big fourth wall. And 
we invite the audience behind this set at the beginning, before they take their seats. 
Partly because we want them to understand that the films are being made, they’re not 
just watching a pre-recorded thing, which they did think when we first started. But also 
we want to kind of check them out, we get the opportunity to really carefully see who’s 
making eye contact with us, who’s looking too enthusiastic, who looks absolutely 
horrified at the idea that they’re even on the stage etcetera. And we definitely would not 
choose the person who looks like they’re saying choose me, choose me. And that’s 
because if they start acting up on stage when we, in the situation that we want them to 
be in, they will not look good.  
KJ 
So there’s a duty of care in a sense as well.  
SS  




It’s nice to be foolish and fragile and as performers we make sure that we are at least as 
foolish and fragile as any of them could possibly be, but when it comes to over-acting 
and playing up your situation and thinking it’s all about you and that ego problem, it 
just, it just doesn’t work. And the last thing we want is to make anybody look a bit silly, 
in a bad way. And that’s something we have to be really careful about. And then when 
we made Western Society, because it’s this strange lottery we were really concerned that 
we couldn’t curate that selection in a careful way. But you do see, you know, so you 
have to really do it in the moment when you’re out there chucking those toys. 
Sometimes there are people with their hands up. 
KJ 








it’s quite a strange, I had it the last time we did Western Society actually. There was a 
woman who was desperate to catch one of these toys and I kept, obviously I could see 
her so I had to sort of look at her and I even threw some toys in her vague direction but 
there was no way I was going to throw it into her arms. Even though with Western 




so it’s not as easy to run away with the situation or… And you can, when they come up 
there’s also another moment when Matt is giving them their headphones and stuff and 




So he can, he has to check things like language. There’s one gender specific, I mean if 
we can we choose a man for this one role. And also he can sort of see then, cos he gets a 
moment with them in the dark side, he can see then if somebody looks terribly nervous, 
or if somebody looks a little bit too eager. And he can kind of sort them out a little bit. 




Yeah, it’s interesting because it seems like actually in a way you’re quite resistant to 
expert participant spectators because you want something authentic, but at the same 
you’re mindful of the fact that you’ve got a duty of care to those spectators, and also 
you’ve got a responsibility to the piece as well. That you select people and put them in 
the right roles so that it still functions, and so that they are also protected within that 
structure. I hadn’t thought about potential barriers like language, which you just don’t 
know until the spectator is out there, particularly in Western Society. Whereas with War 
and Peace there seemed to be a bit more of an interviewing process. 
SS  
Yeah, you’ve got to time to chat to people in the foyer for War and Peace and that’s a 
different thing again because it really is just a conversation with those people and to 
make sure that they’re happy with sitting on the stage, and I mean in Nottingham there’s 
a raised stage, but in different venues of course there isn’t that. So then they really are 
quite present both on screens and at the table. I mean often what we do is we kind of 
create an intimate situation with an audience member by either being behind the screen 
or not, or being physically in a situation where their image might be very big and 
zoomed in and quite exposing. Their actual physical person is sitting very close to ours 
and almost hidden. So we use the screen as a way to create intimacy and also project 
this big, vulnerable image, yeah. 
KJ 
In Western Society there was a really poignant moment where the performing spectators 
collectively leave the stage and watch a recording of their performance. In turn the 
watching spectators watch the performing spectators becoming watching spectators. 
And there appears to be something really interesting going on in terms of notions of 
presence, with the media, with each other and with ourselves. So could you maybe just 
say something about the way in which you were thinking about presence and also 




Well, I’m really personally not one for idealising a process. So I would be lying and not 
true to myself if I suggested that this is exactly what should happen. It’s the end. How 
do we end, you know? How does this whole thing end and then end. And of course 
they, they can see the show the whole way through because they’re sitting, if they’re not 
in it they can see from the table into behind the screen. So somehow there’s a return for 
them to their, I mean we don’t send them back out to their seats because it would be too 
messy. But there’s a return for them to their sort of, to the dark side. And they get to see 
the result of their labour in a way. The product that they’ve, that they’ve contributed to 
making. And there is something that we want, that we… I’m not going to say we 
wanted anything, we discovered in trying out different ways to end the show that we 
liked the feeling of them being able to see themselves, and us being able to see them, 
see themselves. Us meaning everybody else. Because we’d already seen, there’s 
something just theatre magical about, you know, you see them get their set up, you see 
them get the toy, the space, you see them get constructed, the screen comes and sort of 
closes them in. You see them on the screen, they’ve gone into the TV and they start to 
do this video that you talked about for the first half an hour, forty minutes. And there’s 
something really magical about that. And everybody else gets to see it. This playback or 
these reconstructions of this playback and then, yeah, letting them sort of see their own 
sort of premier screening in a way there’s, yeah. There’s something really resolved 
about it. 
KJ 
Yeah, I think you’re right. There is something really quite magical about watching their 
faces seeing where they’ve just been in a sense. It’s like looking at yourself in a dream 
almost. And I don’t know if in some way whilst resolving things, which it absolutely 
does, at the same time it also brings them into the disconnect, because they can see 







But at the same time it’s returning that performative self to the watching self.  
SS  
I think, cos also there’s this mystery of this video that we never really show because 
we’re not allowed to show it legally. But you see a little, you know, it fades into it at the 
end, you see their, their remake and it fades into the tiny image and you just see the 
granny walking in and you see her, and you see the guy come round to change the 
channel. So by this point it’s a very, very recognisable film. And especially when 
you’ve embodied it. You know, when you’ve actually played granny and you’ve 
actually changed the channel. And then you see it with yourself and with this, you see 
that yes you have existed inside something that existed before. So there’s, I mean 
there’s an awful lot in it. But there’s also just like how the fuck do we end this show? 
And there’s a relationship, at the very end of Kitchen all the performers have left and 
four people who replace the performers are sitting in the kitchen chatting and I love that 
ending. And it’s similar with this everybody else has left and you just see these people 
left there with this kind of ghostly sort of video. I mean then it comes back to an image 
of someone holding the phone but basically the show ends with just those people’s 
images left. And maybe there’s something, you know, because now there’s a whole 
collection of those videos on YouTube and it continues to grow, and in terms of a sort 
of alone together or the alienation that technology fuels; it doesn’t end there. 
KJ 
Yeah, it’s ongoing. Well thank you Sharon. 
SS  
And thanks for being interested in Gob Squad! 
 
TRANSCRIPTION ENDS  
 
